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Credit Default Swap Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

Tue 2009-09-22 08:29 EDT

Guest Post: Satyajit Das on Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde Finance

One year ago, AIG was brought to the brink of bankruptcy as a result its exposure under credit default swaps (''CDS'') (a form of credit insurance). Asset backed securities and Collateralised Debt Obligations (''CDOs''), which lived up to its cheery nickname Chernobyl Death Obligation, brought the financial system to the edge of collapse...If you assumed that these events meant that wild beast of derivatives would be tamed, then you would be wrong. History tells us that there will be cosmetic changes to the functioning of the market but business as usual will resume in the not too distant futureIf you assumed that these events meant that wild beast of derivatives would be tamed, then you would be wrong. History tells us that there will be cosmetic changes to the functioning of the market but business as usual will resume in the not too distant future.

Dr. Jekyll; Guest Post; Mr. Hyde Finance; Satyajit Das.

Bank-Implode! Sun 2009-09-20 12:22 EDT

Bank-Implode! >> Blog Archive >> Exclusive -- Wells Fargo's Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb

In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo's (quote: WFC) commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books... and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank's outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank...According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer's risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds...should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.

bank implode; blogs Archive; exclusive; ticking time bomb; Wells Fargo's commercial portfolio.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-07-30 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Kabuki on the Potomac: Reforming Credit Default Swaps and OTC Derivatives

-- he Masters of the Universe who run the largest Wall Street firms of have learned not a thing when it comes to credit default swaps ("CDS") and other types of high-risk financial engineering. Indeed, not only are the largest derivative dealers fighting efforts to reform the CDS and other derivative instruments that caused the AIG fiasco, but regulators like the Federal Reserve Board and US Treasury are working with the banks to ensure that a small group of dealers increase their monopoly over the business of over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives.''

Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; Kabuki; OTC derivative; Potomac; Reforming Credit Default Swaps.

Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Musings on Credit Default Swaps

Credit Default Swap; mused; naked capitalism.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps -- Through The Looking Glass

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps - Through The Looking Glass; ``The specter of banks, some of whom have needed capital injections and liquidity support from governments to ensure their own survival, offering to insure other market participants against the risk of default of sovereign government (sometimes their own) is surreal.'' ``much of what passed for financial innovation was specifically designed to conceal risk, obfuscate investors and reduce transparency''

Credit Default Swap; fears; financial products; loath; Looking Glass; Satyajit Das's Blog.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-06-11 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane

Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane; ``The whole basis of policy making in Washington today is that the taxpayer is a sucker who does not know how to defend him or her self against this kind of regulatory gambling.''

big; Credit Default Swap; Ed Kane; fail; Institutional Risk Analyst; interview; IRA Analyst; unwinds.

Wed 2009-05-20 00:00 EDT

Credit Default Swaps, Herald of Doom (for Beginners) << The Baseline Scenario

Baseline Scenario; beginners; Credit Default Swap; doomed; Herald.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps -- Exercises in Surrealism

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps - Exercises in Surrealism; CDS payouts are placing a material pressure on the price of underlying bonds and loans exacerbating broader credit problems ``The CDS market is also complicating restructuring of distressed loans as all lenders do not have the same interest in ensuring the survival of the firm. A lender with purchased protection may seek to use the restructuring to trigger its CDS contracts''

Credit Default Swap; exercised; fears; financial products; loath; Satyajit Das's Blog; surreal.

Thu 2009-01-15 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Dizard: "Put the credit default swaps market out of its misery"

CDS pricing

credit default swaps market; Dizard; misery; naked capitalism; putting.

Thu 2009-01-15 00:00 EST

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Goldman Recommends Credit Default Swaps Against NJ, CA, WI, FL, OH, MI, Others

CA; FL; Goldman Recommends Credit Default Swaps; mi; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; NJ; Wi.

Fri 2008-11-07 00:00 EST

Jesse's Café Américain: Top 20 Credit Default Swaps Exposure Net Notional Basis

Jesse's Café Américain: Top 20 Credit Default Swaps Exposure Net Notional Basis

Jesse's Café Américain; Top 20 Credit Default Swaps Exposure Net Notional Basis.

Fri 2008-11-07 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: How Credit Default Swap Settlements Are Draining Liquidity From Interbank Market

Institutional Risk Analytics; CDS settlements

Credit default swap settlement; Draining Liquidity; interbank markets; naked capitalism.

Fri 2008-11-07 00:00 EST

Jesse's Café Américain: DTCC Report Omits A Significant Amount of Credit Default Swap Exposure

Jesse's Café Américain: DTCC Report Omits A Significant Amount of Credit Default Swap Exposure

Credit Default Swaps Exposure; DTCC Report Omits; Jesse's Café Américain; significant amount.

Tue 2008-10-28 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: DTCC Claims Lehman Credit Default Swap Worries Overblown, Net Payments Only $6 Billion

6; DTCC Claims Lehman Credit Default Swap Worries Overblown; naked capitalism; Net Payments.

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