dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

comparison Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

see comparison (1).

Fri 2010-06-18 10:37 EDT

Monetary Economics Review

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, W. Godley and M. Lavoie, Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2007...Acknowledging the existence of a complex institutional structure that includes households, firms, banks and governments (sometimes separated from the Central Bank), "our aspiration is to introduce a new way in which an understanding can be gained as to how these very complicated systems work as a whole"...the "new way" referred above is currently known as Stock-Flow Consistent modelling (SFC)...The main bid of Godley and Lavoie (G&L, from now on) is to show (successfully, one could note) that the SFC models make it necessary to fully articulate an accounting structure, avoiding "black holes", gaining in consistency, accuracy, and providing a common framework for the comparison of different models...one gets really convinced that it is the type of approach that makes it possible to analyse a great number of elements and complexities of the real world, as much as one wishes!...G&L adopt an institutional classification (households, firms, banks, government and the central bank). All the models presented in the book start with a "balance sheet" matrix, where all the assets and liabilities of each sector are described...

Monetary Economics Review.

Sun 2010-02-28 13:43 EST

"Sultans of Swap" by Gordon T Long, FSU Editorial 02/24/2010

...When asked why there are $605 Trillion derivatives outstanding (1) how do you articulate an answer to this horrendous and almost unimaginable number? The US is the largest economy in the world but tallies only 2.3% in comparison. Global bank reserves amount to only 1.2% of this accumulation. The gargantuan size appears to defy all logic...we discover the Sultans of Swap. The Bond Vigilantes are of a previous era. They are dead -- RIP. Through the magic mix of Credit Default Swaps, Dynamic Hedging and Interest Rate Swaps the Sultans of Swaps effectively control interest rate spreads. Through Regulatory Arbitrage they extort tremendous political sway globally. They live in the world of risk free spreads. Low interest rates simply attract more volume for their concoctions. We have had an explosion in Money Supply globally as the charts (right) indicate. The parabolic rise matches the increase in these derivative products along with their ability to turn Interest Rate Swaps into high powered bank lending...Everything is based on tax payers paying, GDP expanding and interest rates staying low...

FSU Editorial 02/24/2010; Gordon T Long; sultans; Swap.

Yahoo! Finance: Tech Ticker Tue 2009-10-27 11:18 EDT

Policymakers in "Denial" About the Banks, Carmen Reinhart Says

In "This Time Is Different," economic professors Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard) and Carmen Reinhart (Maryland) examine eight centuries of financial crises, demonstrating how the credit crunch of 2008 wasn't so unique, after all. That's the good news...Reinhart gives policymakers "low marks" for failing to deal head on with toxic assets. There's "a lot of denial" in the approach to the banks, she says, seeing comparisons to Japan's post-bubble policies of delaying write-downs, which created zombie banks. "I'm not seeing a great deal of learning,"

bank; Carmen Reinhart Says; denial; finance; policymaking; Tech Ticker; Yahoo.

The Big Picture Wed 2009-10-14 11:36 EDT

Andy Xie: Here We Go Again

Former Morgan Stanley Analyst Andy Xie explains why China is a potential bubble: [Consider] the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The US Federal Reserve kept monetary policy loose to help the banking system. The dollar went into a prolonged bear market. During the descent, Asian economies that pegged their currencies to the dollar could increase money supply and lending without worrying about devaluation, but the money couldn't leave home due to the dollar's poor outlook, so it went into asset markets. When the dollar began to rebound in 1996, Asian economies came under tightening pressure that burst their asset bubbles. The collapsing asset prices triggered capital outflows that reinforced asset deflation. Asset deflation destroyed their banking systems. In short, the US banking crisis created the environment for a credit boom in Asia. When US banks recovered, Asian banks collapsed. Is China heading down the same path? There are many anecdotes to support the comparison. Property prices in Southeast Asia became higher than those in the US, but ``experts'' and government officials had stories to explain it, even though their per capita income was one-tenth that of the US. Their banks also commanded huge market capitalizations, as financial markets extended their growth ad infinitum. The same thing is happening in China today. When something seems too good to be true, it is. World trade -- the engine of global growth -- has collapsed. Employment is still contracting throughout the world. There are no realistic scenarios for the global economy to regain high and sustainable growth. China is an export-driven economy. Bank lending can support the economy for a short time, however, stocks are as expensive as during the heydays of the last bubble. Like all previous bubbles, this one, too, will burst.

Andy Xie; Big Picture; Go.

The Wall Street Examiner Tue 2009-10-06 09:27 EDT

From Black Scholes to Black Holes (part 4- Finance)

...the problems associated with mortgage finance pale in comparison to those associated with derivatives. Warren Buffett famously called these securities financial weapons of mass destruction, but I think he understated the problem. These securities are far worse- a Ponzi scheme even Carlo wouldn't have dreamed of. We can choose to fire a WMD, but these securities have taken on a life of their own and they will, in my view, drag everything financially tied to them into oblivion- into a black hole...In the end the remaining banks will merge into one and money, instead of light, would never be able to escape as the fallacy of netting benefits- the assumption that they are all similarly valued- is exposed.

Black Holes; Black Scholes; finance; Part 4; Wall Street Examiner.

Mon 2007-11-05 00:00 EST

PrudentBear

Road to Ruin: Credit Bubble Bulletin, by Doug Noland; "subprime and the SIVs were peanuts in comparison to the CDO market. Well, the CDO marketplace is chump change compared to Credit Default Swaps and other over-the-counter (OTC) Credit derivatives that...have never been tested in a Credit or economic downturn"; CDS debacle looming

Prudentbear.

Thu 2007-09-27 00:00 EDT

Calculated Risk: Who Should Pay the Rating Agencies?

comparison to FICO, consumer credit scores; lenders seen "going out of their way to make sure those reports didn't tell the whole picture"

Calculated Risk; pay; Rating Agencies.

Wed 2002-01-16 00:00 EST

Digital Camera Reviews, Ratings and Price

Comparison

Digital Camera Reviews; Price; rate.