shadow banking system became severely strained (1).
naked capitalism Thu 2010-07-22 16:19 EDT
NY Fed: We document that the shadow banking system became severely strained during the financial crisis because, like traditional banks, shadow banks conduct credit, maturity, and liquidity transformation, but unlike traditional financial intermediaries, they lack access to public sources of liquidity, such as the Federal Reserve's discount window, or public sources of insurance, such as federal deposit insurance.
The Money Game Fri 2010-05-21 13:30 EDT
Gold is hotter than ever...As an asset class gold has outperformed just about everything over the last 10 year period. It's been an impressive run. But is it all justified? Bear with me for a bit while I take a long-term macro look at gold as an asset class...the fiat currency system is here to stay (or at least some form of it). The odds of reverting back to a purely gold based system is next to zero in my opinion. The truth is, the gold standard as a currency system is a barbarous relic. It is a currency system that worked well in the old world economy, but simply does not have the flexibility to meet the demands of the growing global economy. The global economy has become too complex and too intertwined to be constrained by the gold standard. The fiat currency system is a product of economic evolution and the growing demands and strains of international trade. Famous examples of the break-down of the gold standard and its inflexibility to meet trade demands include the UK in 1931 and the U.S. government's destruction of the gold linked currency system under the Bretton Woods agreement...
Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST
The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.
2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.
Mon 2008-11-03 00:00 EST
The Credit Crisis Endgame, by Paul Amery (PrudentBear); ``the cost of insuring against a US government default has risen by 25 times in little over a year''; ``Signs of strain in the US Treasury market are already there...poor bid-to-cover ratios, and long tails''; Reinhart, Rogoff "Forgotten History of Domestic Debt"
