dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

odds Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

1000-odd word precis written (1); 30 odd years (1); low odds (1); odds Obama's economic thinking (1); overall odds (1).

Wed 2010-10-13 09:01 EDT

Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System

...Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., commonly referred to as ``MERS,'' is the recorded owner of over half of the nation's residential mortgages. MERS operates a computer database designed to track servicing and ownership rights of mortgage loans anywhere in the United States. But, it also acts as a proxy for the real parties in interest in county land title records. Most importantly, MERS is also filing foreclosure lawsuits on behalf of financiers against hundreds of thousands of American families. This Article explores the legal and public policy foundations of this odd, but extremely powerful, company that is so attached to America's financial destiny...The article culminates in a discussion of MERS' culpability in fostering the mortgage foreclosure crisis and what the long term effects of privatized land title records will have on our public information infrastructure. The Article concludes by considers whether the mortgage banking industry, in creating and embracing MERS, has subverted the democratic governance of the nation's real property recording system.

foreclosures; mortgage Electronic Registration System; subprime mortgage lending.

billy blog Tue 2010-08-31 18:22 EDT

Monetary policy under challenge ... finally

The central bankers have been meeting in Wyoming over the weekend as part of the annual Economic Symposium organised by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City...some notable presentations...suggest that key central bankers are starting to realise that the economic crisis in not over and the fiscal-led recovery is slowing and that monetary policy alone cannot provide the solution. Moreover, one leading central banker [BOE deputy Charles Bean] indicated that monetary policy is not a suitable tool for controlling longer term problems such as price bubbles in specific asset classes. This view challenges the basis of the mainstream macroeconomics consensus that has dominated the policy debate for 30 odd years and culminated in the worst financial and economic crisis in 80 years. It is certanly a welcome trend in a debate which is typically flooded with ideological input from the mainstream macroeconomics profession....

Billy Blog; challenges; final; monetary policy.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-07-16 16:15 EDT

What is Simon Johnson Smoking?

Simon Johnson...incorrectly celebrates a toothless provision in the Dodd-Frank bill as being tantamount to an anti-trust act for too big to fail banks...If we believed this bill was meaningful, action be taken against these banks immediately upon signing. Odds of that happening? Zero...The problem is it not merely the size of these firms, but the fact that they control infrastructure that is deemed critical to modern commerce. I'll get into specifics in short order, but in some cases the firm owns critical plumbing outright; in other cases, it is so tightly networked to other firms that mucking with it very much runs the risk of taking down the rest of the grid...Citi runs a big corporate cash management/reporting system called GTS...And no one is going to dare tamper with JP Morgan's clearing business...The problem is that it would take a radical restructuring of the very biggest banks, the critically placed dealer firms, and the most important payment and clearing operations to make a real dent in systemic risk. The officialdom the political lacked the will to do so at the peak of the crisis, and there is no basis for fantasizing that it will suddenly develop more nerve now.

naked capitalism; Simon Johnson Smoking.

Tue 2010-06-01 17:29 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> In the spirt of debate ... my reply

...Steve Keen and I agreed to foster a debate about where modern monetary theory sits with his work on debt-deflation. So yesterday his blog carried the following post, which included a 1000-odd word precis written by me describing what I see as the essential characteristics of modern monetary theory. The discussion is on-going on that site and I invite you to follow it if you are interested. Rather than comment on all the comments over on Steve's site, I decided to collate them here (in part) and help develop the understanding that way. That is what follows today... We distinguish the horizontal dimension (which entails all transactions between entities in the non-government sector) from the vertical dimension (which entails all transactions between the government and non-government sector)...A properly specified model will show you emphatically that the horizontal transactions between household, firms, banks and foreigners (which is the domain of circuit theory) have to net to zero even if asset portfolios are changing in composition. For every asset created there will be a corresponding liability created at the same time...you will make errors if there is not an explicit understanding that in an accounting (stock-flow) consistent sense all these transaction will net to zero. In adopting this understanding you might abstract from analysing the vertical transactions that introduced the high-powered money in the first place, but never deny its importance in setting the scene for the horizontal transactions to occur. I think the differences between Steve's models and modern monetary theory are two-fold. First, I do not think that Steve's model is stock-flow consistent across all sectors. By leaving out the government sector (even implicitly) essential insights are lost that would avoid conclusions that do not obey basic and accepted national accounting (and financial accounting) rules. This extends to how we define money. Second, I think Steve uses accounting in a different way to that which is broadly accepted. It might be that for mathematical nicety or otherwise this is the chosen strategy but you cannot then claim that your models are ground in the operational reality of the fiat monetary system we live in. I have no problem with abstract modelling. But modern monetary theory is firmly ground in the operational reality and is totally stock-flow consistent across all sectors. If we used the same definitions and rendered Steve's model stock-flow consistent in the same way as modern monetary theory then Steve's endogenous money circuits would come up with exactly the same results as the horizontal dimensions in modern monetary theory. His results might look a bit different in accounting terms but most of the message he wishes to portray about the dangers of Ponzi stages in the private debt accumulation process would still hold.

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; Debate; reply; spirt.

The Money Game Fri 2010-05-21 13:30 EDT

Sorry, We're Not Weimar Or Zimbabwe, And Gold Is Never Going To Be A Currency Again

Gold is hotter than ever...As an asset class gold has outperformed just about everything over the last 10 year period. It's been an impressive run. But is it all justified? Bear with me for a bit while I take a long-term macro look at gold as an asset class...the fiat currency system is here to stay (or at least some form of it). The odds of reverting back to a purely gold based system is next to zero in my opinion. The truth is, the gold standard as a currency system is a barbarous relic. It is a currency system that worked well in the old world economy, but simply does not have the flexibility to meet the demands of the growing global economy. The global economy has become too complex and too intertwined to be constrained by the gold standard. The fiat currency system is a product of economic evolution and the growing demands and strains of international trade. Famous examples of the break-down of the gold standard and its inflexibility to meet trade demands include the UK in 1931 and the U.S. government's destruction of the gold linked currency system under the Bretton Woods agreement...

currency; Go; gold; Money game; Sorry; Weimar; Zimbabwe.

Sun 2010-05-09 09:18 EDT

Why Do Senators Corker And Dodd Really Think We Need Big Banks? >> The Baseline Scenario

On Friday, Senator Bob Corker (R, TN) took to the Senate floor to rebut critics of big banks. His language was not entirely senatorial: ``I hope we'll all come to our senses'', while listing the reasons we need big banks. And Senator Chris Dodd (D, CT) rose to agree that (in Corker's words) reducing the size of our largest banks would be ``cutting our nose off to spite our face'' and that by taking on Wall Street, ``we may be taking on the heartland.'' Unfortunately, all of their arguments in favor of our largest banks remaining at or near (or above) their current scale are completely at odds with the facts (e.g., as documented in our book, 13 Bankers). ...As for why exactly Senators Corker and Dodd really support big banks, it seems increasingly likely that this is all about campaign contributions.

Baseline Scenario; Dodd Really Think; Needs Big Banks; Senator Corker.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-04-07 19:00 EDT

"How to Corner the Gold Market" By Janet Tavakoli

Janet Tavakoli wrote an interesting essay that was just posted over at the Huffington Post called "How to Corner the Gold Market" which can be read in its entirety from her website here...What struck me as odd is that I just wrote a blog piece along similar lines on the same topic today, raising many of the same issues, but that is from the opposite perspective...there is little evidence that anyone is willing to take on the exchanges, even the big players, and try and force a corner or even a squeeze against what they perceive as mispricing, such as Soros and so many other big players did with the British Pound , and most recently other big hedge funds did with mispriced products from the latest bubble in the debt markets, and financial stocks...The piece I wrote today and reference above is about a situation in the precious metals markets which has the potential to become another serious problem for almost the same basic reasons as the debt markets in our most recent financial crisis: excessive leverage concentrated in a few TBTF institutions, lack of transparency, regulatory laxity, and a mispricing of risk...

corner; gold market; Janet Tavakoli; Jesse's Café Américain.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:10 EDT

Lehman: Regulators Chose to Deny, Extend and Pretend

The Lehman Examiner's report gives an unintentionally damning portrayal, both of the the structure of financial regulation in the US and how regulators failed to use the powers they had effectively...the authorities recognized Lehman had a large negative net worth. Yet rather than move decisively towards an unwind, they proceeded inertially. They urged Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to find a rescuer (who would invest in that garbage barge, particularly when Andrew Ross Sorkin's account makes clear that Fuld's moves were so obviously desperate and clumsy as to be certain to fail) and also promoted the notion of an LTCM-style ``share the pain'' resolution. Yet with the rest of the industry weak, and the magnitude of hole in Lehman's balance sheet a mystery, these courses of action had low odds of success from the outset (indeed, the ``Lehman weekend'' in which the authorities almost bulldozed through a deal, seemed designed to avoid sober analysis of how bad things were at the failing investment bank)...As much as the SEC did not cover itself with glory in this exercise, its lapses are somewhat comprehensible. By contrast, the Fed's are much harder to explain or excuse. And guess who is about to be given more oversight authority?

denied; extends; Lehman; naked capitalism; Pretends; Regulators Chose.

naked capitalism Sun 2009-11-29 12:53 EST

Obama: Debt could cause a double dip recession

Barack Obama has now come clean about his thinking on why his administration has decided to focus first on reducing the deficit and next on jobs. He fears a double-dip recession will occur if foreigners lose confidence in the U.S. dollar, causing interest rates to spike. This is nonsense and it demonstrates how much at odds Obama's economic thinking is with reality. This is the clearest indication that the Obama Administration doesn't understand how modern money works. In fact, by focusing on deficit reduction, he has increased the chances of a double dip instead of decreasing them.

caused; debt; double-dip recession; naked capitalism; Obama.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Mon 2009-10-12 09:22 EDT

One Hand Clapping Theory Analyzed

Numerous people have asked me to comment on Chris Martenson's article The Sound of One Hand Clapping - What Deflationists May Be Missing. Chris Writes: ...``Trillions in probable and provable losses quietly exist, out of sight, on the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and other financial institutions. If they ever come out of hiding and onto the books, I think the deflationists will be proven correct beyond all doubt. But let me ask this: What prevents the authorities from simply storing them out of sight forever?...I am now wondering if they cannot keep this up indefinitely.'' ...In a credit based economy, the odds of a sustainable rebound without bank credit expanding, and consumers participating is not very good. Even if one mistakenly assumes that the recent rally is a result of pretending, should we count on sustained success now more so than a measurement of stock prices in April of 1930, or any of Japans' four 50% rallies? I think not. Pretending cannot accomplish much other than prolonging the agony for decades. This is the message of Japan. Moreover, the US is arguably is worse shape than Japan because our problems are unsustainable consumer debt, high unemployment, and massive retail sector overcapacity. Those are structural problems that no amount of pretending in the world can possibly cure. In due time, the market will focus on those problems.

hand clapping theory analyzed; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-09-22 13:02 EDT

Bank of America: 40% of Junk Bonds to Default by 2013

With more than half the corporate bonds rated junk, thanks to highly-levered takeovers, it wasn't hard to imagine that a protracted economic bad spell could lead to a lot of defaults...the novel feature of the binge of late-cycle merger loans, ``cov lite'' deals, will make the damage worse...the odds of a successful [re]structuring are lower, and more companies will wind up liquidating. Thus not only will defaults reach new post-war highs, but recoveries are likely to be lower.

2013; 40; America; bank; default; junk bonds; naked capitalism.

Tue 2007-08-28 00:00 EDT

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: August 27, 2007 - Knowing What Ain't True

"Since 1999, the stock market has essentially gone nowhere in an interesting way, compared with risk-free Treasury bills." "One can go some distance in a mine field without anything blowing up it's just that the overall odds aren't good"

2007; ain't true; August 27; Hussman Funds; know; weekly market comments.