dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

aligned Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

poorly aligned incentives (1).

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Wed 2010-04-07 18:22 EDT

THE ENRON BANKING SYSTEM

``Panics do not destroy capital -- they merely reveal the extent to which it has previously been destroyed by its betrayal in hopelessly unproductive works'' -- John Mills ...We should draw a distinct line in the sand between banks and diverse risk taking firms. There are always going to be Enron's in the economy, but why should we allow our entire banking sector to mirror Enron? Taking a 30,000 foot risk management view I say something must be done to ensure these banks can never do this again. Turn banks into true banks. Hedging and exotic business models are fine. Just don't commingle them under the same umbrella as a deposit taking ``bank''. With that, a few ideas come to mind: * Our banking system should be aligned with the goals of the nation to help ``grease'' the wheels of the economic growth engine of the United States. Banks should be more like utilities and less like hedge funds. Otherwise, banking becomes counter-productive and potentially destructive. * Banks should not be allowed to exact onerous fees on the public or enact a business model which is inherently dependent on driving their customers deeper and deeper into debt. This undermines the entire goal of productive economic growth. * ``Banks'' should be true lending institutions. Non-traditional banking operations and products such as CDS, ``off balance sheet'' finance, derivatives as collateral and such would be deemed illegal unless performed only by non banking/lending institutions (such as hedge funds) so as to insulate the public and true lending institutions from the risk taking, ``hedging'', and ``financial innovation'' of firms such as Lehman Brothers.

ENRON BANKING SYSTEM; pragmatic capitalists.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.