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basically Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2010-04-07 19:00 EDT

"How to Corner the Gold Market" By Janet Tavakoli

Janet Tavakoli wrote an interesting essay that was just posted over at the Huffington Post called "How to Corner the Gold Market" which can be read in its entirety from her website here...What struck me as odd is that I just wrote a blog piece along similar lines on the same topic today, raising many of the same issues, but that is from the opposite perspective...there is little evidence that anyone is willing to take on the exchanges, even the big players, and try and force a corner or even a squeeze against what they perceive as mispricing, such as Soros and so many other big players did with the British Pound , and most recently other big hedge funds did with mispriced products from the latest bubble in the debt markets, and financial stocks...The piece I wrote today and reference above is about a situation in the precious metals markets which has the potential to become another serious problem for almost the same basic reasons as the debt markets in our most recent financial crisis: excessive leverage concentrated in a few TBTF institutions, lack of transparency, regulatory laxity, and a mispricing of risk...

corner; gold market; Janet Tavakoli; Jesse's Café Américain.

Fri 2010-02-26 16:37 EST

Wall Street's Bailout Hustle : Rolling Stone

...The nation's six largest banks -- all committed to this balls-out, I drink your milkshake! strategy of flagrantly gorging themselves as America goes hungry -- set aside a whopping $140 billion for executive compensation last year, a sum only slightly less than the $164 billion they paid themselves in the pre-crash year of 2007..."What is the state of our moral being when Lloyd Blankfein taking a $9 million bonus is viewed as this great act of contrition, when every penny of it was a direct transfer from the taxpayer?" asks Eliot Spitzer...A year and a half after they were minutes away from bankruptcy, how are these assholes not only back on their feet again, but hauling in bonuses at the same rate they were during the bubble? The answer to that question is basically twofold: They raped the taxpayer, and they raped their clients...a brief history of the best 18 months of grifting this country has ever seen...

Rolling Stone; Wall Street's Bailout Hustle.

Jesse's Café Américain Fri 2010-01-29 16:27 EST

Morgan Paying Out 62% of Revenues in Bonuses and Pay While Average Families Face 'Years of Pain'

One has to wonder how much of that 'revenue' is merely the result of artificial mark to market accounting and prop desk speculation, and not real cash flow from commercial banking operations.That is not the pay method for a bank. That's a hedge fund. And that would be all very well and good if they were a hedge fund and responsible for their own failures and successes, but they are obtaining the discount window and federal guarantees and subsidies from the taxpayers as though they were a commercial bank...if the bankers keep taking 50+% of all the cash that touches their hands from the public subsidy, then what trickles down to the people won't accomplish anything. Years of zombie-like stagflation look to be the prognosis...The economic hitmen and the corrupt politicians are taking their pay, and the people and their children and most likely grandchildren will be stuck with unpayable debts. Just like a third world nation, which is what the US will look like when they get done cutting health, infrastructure, education, and basic services to pay for this.

62; Average Families Face; bonus; Jesse's Café Américain; Morgan pay; pain; pay; Revenues; years.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-12-29 09:03 EST

Guest Post: Investor Psychology ... Fear Turns People Into Sheep

Investors are basically rational, right? In fact, as many studies have demonstrated, the answer is no...Rather than search rationally for information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular belief, people actually seek out information that confirms what they already believe. For the most part people completely ignore contrary information...

Fear Turns People; Guest Post; Investor psychology; naked capitalism; sheep.

naked capitalism Mon 2009-12-21 15:58 EST

Obama's demand that fat cats lend is no ode to Samuelson

...to-do about President Obama's fat cat remarks and his meeting with bankers exhorting them to lend...we are getting a bunch of populist rhetoric which is pure politics to induce banks to lend recklessly and save the economy when basic economics would tell you that there is a deficit of lending capacity and demand for credit. It is the absurd kabuki theater of depression economics...David Rosenberg...sees something altogether more cynical -- an orchestrated campaign to shame and bully banks into going against their fiduciary responsibility and lending irresponsibly again!...Easy money is not the solution, it is the problem. Jobs are the solution...fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy in a depressionary environment. Quantitative easing is overrated.

fat cats lend; naked capitalism; Obama s demands; Ode; Samuelson.

Tue 2009-12-01 22:52 EST

Harvard ignored warnings about investments - The Boston Globe

It happened at least once a year, every year. In a roomful of a dozen Harvard University financial officials, Jack Meyer, the hugely successful head of Harvard's endowment, and Lawrence Summers, then the school's president, would face off in a heated debate. The topic: cash and how the university was managing - or mismanaging - its basic operating funds. Through the first half of this decade, Meyer repeatedly warned Summers and other Harvard officials that the school was being too aggressive with billions of dollars in cash, according to people present for the discussions, investing almost all of it with the endowment's risky mix of stocks, bonds, hedge funds, and private equity. Meyer's successor, Mohamed El-Erian, would later sound the same warnings to Summers, and to Harvard financial staff and board members. ... But the warnings fell on deaf ears, under Summers's regime and beyond. And when the market crashed in the fall of 2008, Harvard would pay dearly, as $1.8 billion in cash simply vanished. Indeed, it is still paying, in the form of tighter budgets, deferred expansion plans, and big interest payments on bonds issued to cover the losses.

Boston Globe; Harvard ignored warnings; investment.

zero hedge Fri 2009-10-23 19:30 EDT

A Stern Opponent Of Funding The FDIC's Depleted Deposit Insurance Fund, And Monetization Is... Alan Greenspan?

What a difference twenty years makes. The man whose actions basically lead to the eradication of the American middle class in its aspirational pursuit of buying massive SUVs, Prada bags, and 3rd investment properties, compliments of cheap credit, in order to appear ever so much like the upper class yet ultimately drowning itself in debt, Alan Greenspan, is probably the most critical reason why America's debt service will be nearly 90% of GDP within several decades. The adoption of his actions by the current deranged operator of the reserve currency printing press, is merely a continuation of a multiple decade long process of keeping inflation contained at the expense of devaluing the US currency, as the global liquidity pyramid recently hit one quadrillion, and continues to grow exponentially, yet...

Alan Greenspan; FDIC's Depleted Deposit Insurance Fund; funds; monetize; Stern Opponent; Zero Hedge.

The Baseline Scenario Thu 2009-10-08 16:52 EDT

The Problem with Securitization

The New York Times has a story on ``Paralysis in the Debt Markets'' which says, basically, that credit has dried up because of lack of demand for asset-backed securities. In English, that means that since no one wants to invest in securities that are made out of home mortgages, the people who originate mortgages have no place to sell the mortgages to, so they don't have any money to lend. And this is also true of commercial real estate, student loans, and so on. For example, ``A once-thriving private market in securities backed by home mortgages has collapsed, from $744 billion in 2005, at the peak of the housing boom, to $8 billion during the first half of this year.''...the private market may never recover. The boom in securitization was based on investors' willingness to believe what investment banks and credit rating agencies said about these securities.

Baseline Scenario; problem; securitizations.

Minyanville Sun 2009-09-20 11:17 EDT

Our Marionette Economy

This morning in the Wall Street Journal Wells Fargo CEO John Stumpf is quoted saying ``If it's not a government program it's basically not getting done.'' While Stumpf's comment was targeted to the mortgage market and associated with a plea for Fannie Mae (FNM) and Freddie Mac (FRE) to raise their size limits so as to be able to pick up more jumbo mortgages I believe he nailed the current state of our economy: ``If it's not a government program it's basically not getting done.''...But to me, there's a fundamental flaw to the notion that the government can create a sustainable economic recovery...I kept coming back to a comment from Bennet Sedacca: ``They (the government) can make 'em bounce, but they can't make 'em fly.''

Marionette Economy; Minyanville.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Fri 2009-07-24 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Federal Reserve Inspector General Unable to Answer Basic Questions on Where the Trillions Went

Answer Basic Questions; Federal Reserve Inspector General Unable; naked capitalism; trillion went.

Wed 2009-04-01 00:00 EDT

Calculated Risk: Fed's Hoenig: 'Too Big has Failed'

Kansas City Fed President Thomas Hoenig: ``we have not defined a consistent plan and not addressed the basic shortcomings and, in some cases, the insolvent position of these institutions''

big; Calculated Risk; fail; Fed's Hoenig.

Thu 2008-09-18 00:00 EDT

Bill Gothard | What I Teach

Institute in Basic Life Principles (IBLP); ``universal and non-optional Biblical principles of life''; Sarah Palin's Wasilla a City of Character

Bill Gothard; teach.

Tue 2008-06-03 00:00 EDT

[ The Financial Ninja ]: Really Scary Fed Charts: MAY, False Alarm?

"ed has basically traded in high quality instruments, US treasuries, for low quality instruments that the market doesn't want at all"

False Alarm; Financial Ninja; Really Scary Fed Charts.

Wed 2008-05-21 00:00 EDT

Angry Bear: Social Security Zero: the Basics Revisited & Three Myths

Angry Bear: Social Security Zero: the Basics Revisited & Three Myths

Angry Bear; Basics Revisited; myth; Social Security Zero.

Sat 2008-04-12 00:00 EDT

Hillary's Flimsy Case : Rolling Stone

Hillary's Flimsy Case, by Matt Taibbi, Rolling Stone; Obama "running as a symbol of a new politics...But if it were to get out that he's not that...then he quickly morphs into a different kind of symbol, a symbol of how an essentially bankrupt political system can seamlessly repackage itself to a fed-up marketplace by making cosmetic changes, without altering its basic nature." "In American politics, always look for the worst possible scenario to emerge triumphant"

Hillary's Flimsy Case; Rolling Stone.

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