naked capitalism Sat 2010-07-24 16:34 EDT

Summer Rerun: ``Unwinding the Fraud for Bubbles''

Tanta at Calculated Risk

This post first appeared on March 27, 2007. ...Telling the difference between the victims and the victimizers, the predators and the prey, and the fraudulent and the defrauded, is getting a lot harder when you have borrowers not required to make down payments able to lie about their incomes in order to buy a home the seller is overpricing in order to take an illegal kickback. The lender is getting defrauded, but the lender is the one who offered the zero-down stated-income program, delegated the drawing up of the legal documents and the final disbursement of funds to a fee-for-service settlement agent, and didn't do enough due diligence on the appraisal to see the inflation of the value. Legally, of course, there's a difference between lender as co-conspirator and lender as mark, utterly failing to exercise reasonable caution, but it's small comfort when the losses rack up. With tongue only partially in cheek, I'm about to suggest a third category of fraud: Fraud for Bubbles...My theory of the Fraud for Bubbles is, in a nutshell, that it isn't that lenders forgot that there are risks. It is that the miserable dynamic of unsound lending puffing up unsustainable real estate prices, which in turn kept supporting even more unsound lending, simply masked fraud problems sufficiently, and delayed the eventual ``feedback'' mechanisms sufficiently, that rampant fraud came to seem ``affordable.'' So many of the business practices that help fraud succeed--thinning backoffice staff, hiring untrained temps to replace retiring (and pricey) veterans, speeding up review processes, cutting back on due diligence sampling, accepting more and more copies, faxes, and phone calls instead of original ink-signed documents--threw off so much money that no one wanted to believe that the eventual cost of the fraud would eat it all up, and possibly more...

bubble; fraud; naked capitalism; summer reruns; unwinds.

New Deal 2.0 Thu 2010-07-22 15:54 EDT

The Summer(s) of Our Discontent

Marshall Auerback

Virtually every profile on Larry Summers tells us that he is one of the most brilliant economists of his generation...Only Robert Rubin and Alan Greenspan played a more important role than Summers in promoting the deregulation and lax oversight that laid the foundations for the current crisis...the latest FT defense reflects Summers's fundamental lack of understanding of modern money. Contrary to his view, the late 90s surpluses was not the reason for that period's prosperity. The surpluses are what ended the prosperity. And until the public understands this, we should expect no fundamental improvement in economic policymaking from the Obama Administration...he violates one of Abba Lerner's key laws of functional finance: a government's spending and borrowing should be conducted ``with an eye only to the results of these actions on the economy, and not to any established traditional doctrine about what is sound and what is unsound.'' In other words, Lerner believed that the very idea of what good fiscal policy means boils down to what results you can get -- not some arbitrary notion of ``fiscal sustainability''...The government budget surplus meant by identity that the private sector was running a deficit. Households and firms were going ever farther into debt, and they were losing their net wealth of government bonds. Growth was a product of a private debt bubble, which in turn fuelled a stock market and real estate bubble, the collapse of which has created the foundations for today's troubles...

0; discontent; new dealing 2; s; summer.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-07-07 14:29 EDT

Face to Face With Polished Wall Street Psychopathy (SEC Says that ICP Stole from My Old Company Edition)

Tom Adams, an attorney and former monoline executive

When the financial crisis hit, I was in the direct line of fire. My company blew up very early in the crisis, giving me the dubious opportunity to see how bad things were going to get long before most of the rest of the world, including other banks, insurers, investors, administration officials or Federal Reserve members, were able to perceive the trajectory of the crisis...much of what I thought I knew was based on things that weren't really true...While many of the failings of the structured credit market were due to unsound reliance on historical data, some were not mistakes in judgment but were the result of bad actors, misinformation and wrongdoing...

Faces; ICP Stole; naked capitalism; Old Company Edition; Polished Wall Street Psychopathy; SEC says.

Sun 2008-08-24 00:00 EDT

Here comes the downsizing of finance

by Martin Hutchinson (Prudent Bear); auction-rate securities (ARS); credit default swaps (CDS); ``CDS market creates many times as much risk as it hedges or transfers''; GSEs ``leveraged more than would have been possible without the governments quasi-guarantee, lobbied like to crazy to ensure they were not properly regulated and collapsed thankfully into the arms of the taxpayer as soon as ill winds began to blow...by their presence they turned the soundest product in financial markets, the home mortgage, into an obscene speculative casino, causing collateral damage of many times their own losses.'' ``much of the financial services innovation of the last generation was spurious and unsound, and needs to be done away with''

comes; downsizing; finance.