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WaMu Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

Cuomo suing WaMu (1); new WaMu used huge sales commissions (1); Reckless Strategies Doomed WaMu (1); WaMu Alt (1); WaMu became (1); WaMu Mortgage Pool (1); WaMu needed (1); WaMu originated (1); WaMu Purchase Puts JP Morgan (1); WaMu subprime loans went (1); WaMu suffered (1); WaMu survived (1); WaMu systematically dismantled (1); WaMu's (3); WaMu's riskiest loans raked (1); WaMu's subprime home loans failed (1); WaMu's top executives (1).

Wed 2010-08-25 08:41 EDT

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual | The Big Picture

...My disagreement with the Zandi-Blinder report is not its theoretical underpinnings -- it is by definition a hypothetical counter-factual. Rather, it is the counter-factual Blinder/Zandi chose to use: ``What would the economy look like now if we had done nothing?'' Instead, I propose a better counter-factual: ``What if we had done the right thing, instead of nothing -- or the wrong thing?''...In my counter factual, the bailouts did not occur. Instead of the Japanese model, the US government went the Swedish route of banking crises: They stepped in with temporary nationalizations, prepackaged bankruptcies, and financial reorganizations; banks write down all of their bad debt, they sell off the paper. In the end, the goal is to spin out clean, well financed, toxic-asset-free banks into the public markets...One by one, we should have put each insolvent bank into receivership, cleaned up the balance sheer, sold off the bad debts for 15-50 cents on the dollar, fired the management, wiped out the shareholders, and spun out the proceeds, with the bondholders taking the haircut, and the taxpayers on the hook for precisely zero dollars. Citi, Bank of America, Wamu, Wachovia, Countrywide, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan, etc. all of them should have been handled this way...

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual; Big Picture.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:14 EST

Business & Technology | Part two | WaMu: Hometown bank turned predatory | Seattle Times Newspaper

What few people knew was that bank executives crafted a radical new business strategy in 2003 that was intended to boost profits. The new WaMu used huge sales commissions and misleading marketing to hawk risky and overpriced loans to borrowers. In short, WaMu became one of the nation's biggest predatory lenders. The strategy eventually failed, not only bringing down Washington Mutual but deceiving borrowers, costing thousands their homes. In particular, the bank promoted as its "signature loan" a complex product known as the option ARM. This adjustable-rate mortgage, much like a credit card, gave borrowers the choice of making low minimum payments. But that option didn't cover the interest and only dug them deeper into debt.

business; Hometown bank turned predatory; part; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology; WaMu.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:12 EST

Business & Technology | Part one | Reckless strategies doomed WaMu | Seattle Times Newspaper

In its headlong pursuit of growth, WaMu systematically dismantled or weakened the internal controls meant to prevent the bank from taking on too much risk -- the very standards and practices that had helped it grow in the first place. WaMu's riskiest loans raked in money from high fees, but because the bank skimped on making sure borrowers could repay them, they eventually failed at disastrously high rates. As loans went bad, they sucked massive amounts of cash that WaMu needed to stay in business. WaMu's subprime home loans failed at the highest rates in nation. Foreclosure rates for subprime loans made from 2005 to 2007 -- the peak of the boom -- were calamitous. In the 10 hardest-hit cities, more than a third of WaMu subprime loans went into foreclosure.

business; part; Reckless Strategies Doomed WaMu; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:09 EST

The downfall of Washington Mutual - Puget Sound Business Journal (Seattle)

WaMu suffered through not one but two bank runs in its final months. The first run was many times larger than the run that felled California lender IndyMac in July 2008, though neither shareholders nor the public knew about it. WaMu survived that run, and the second run was tapering off when regulators moved in and shut the bank, citing the run as the reason. In addition, WaMu's top executives, led by CEO Alan Fishman, were trying to sell the bank after federal regulators imposed a deadline, only to discover that they were being undermined by those same regulators, executives say. The government's plan to seize the bank, if it became known beforehand, would cause potential buyers to immediately cool their heels, because buying after a government takeover would be a lot cheaper than even the desperate private purchase deal that Fishman was seeking.

downfall; Puget Sound Business Journal; Seattle; Washington Mutual.

Thu 2009-10-01 10:14 EDT

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS): A System Designed to Create the Mortgage Back Security Bubble. >> Dr. Housing Bubble Blog

Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems (MERS)...claims to be a privately-held company and their function is keeping track of a confidential electronic registry of mortgages and the modifications to servicing rights and ownership of the loans. However, if you dig deeper into MERS and their shareholders you will find the same crony bankers...shareholders include AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, WaMu, CitiMortgage, Countrywide, GMAC, Guaranty Bank, and Merrill Lynch...MERS allowed for the mortgage backed security business to explode since it allowed mortgages to be shipped off to Wall Street to be minced into tiny tranches and sold off by the big investment banks...MERS is a front for the mortgage and banking industry. It is claimed as a system of convenience but in reality, it is nothing more than the grease to lube up the housing bubble...what is significant about the Kansas Supreme Court finding has to do with the actual legal ownership of the note and deed especially when it comes to foreclosure...MERS is a straw man...provides ``an opaque veil that clouds not only the actual real ownership of the promissory note, but title to the property.''

created; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; MER; mortgage; mortgage Electronic Registration System; security bubble; Systems designed.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Tue 2008-10-07 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: WaMu Purchase Puts JP Morgan at 15% Share of Bank-Broker Market

15; Bank-Broker Market; naked capitalism; shares; WaMu Purchase Puts JP Morgan.

Wed 2008-08-06 00:00 EDT

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> An Examination of WaMu

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> An Examination of WaMu; Washington Mutual

economic; examiner; Market; WaMu; watch; winter.

Wed 2008-07-23 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Death Spiral Financing at WaMu, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup

Citigroup; Death Spiral Financing; Merrill Lynch; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; WaMu.

Tue 2008-04-01 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: WaMu Alt-A Pool Deteriorates Further

May 2007 liar-loan pool originally rated 93% AAA, now 25% 60-day delinquent or worse

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Pool Deteriorates Further; WaMu Alt.

Fri 2008-03-21 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: Evidence of "Walking Away" In WaMu Mortgage Pool

2008-02-23

evidence; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Walking Away; WaMu Mortgage Pool.

Fri 2007-11-09 00:00 EST

Calculated Risk: WaMu and The Rep War

by Tanta: "outsourcing regulatory liability to a third party bag-holder and doing business on a representation and warranty basis without pre-sale due diligence" are mortgage industry lynch-pins

Calculated Risk; Rep War; WaMu.

Fri 2007-11-09 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: OFHEO's James Lockhart Takes Cuomo to the Woodshed

Cuomo suing WaMu for appraisal fraud

naked capitalism; OFHEO's James Lockhart Takes Cuomo; Woodshed.