Calculated Risk Fri 2009-10-23 08:29 EDT

McClatchy: "How Moody's sold its ratings"

CalculatedRisk

Kevin Hall at McClatchy Newspapers writes: How Moody's sold its ratings -- and sold out investors (ht Atrios) A McClatchy investigation has found that Moody's punished executives who questioned why the company was risking its reputation by putting its profits ahead of providing trustworthy ratings for investment offerings. Instead, Moody's promoted executives who headed its "structured finance" division, which assisted Wall Street in packaging loans into securities for sale to investors. It also stacked its compliance department with the people who awarded the highest ratings to pools of mortgages that soon were downgraded to junk.

Calculated Risk; McClatchy; Moody's Sold; rate.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-10-22 19:59 EDT

Are the Fed, the Congress and the Primary Dealers an Alliance of Convenience?

...large flows of fiat paper dollars, I submit, explain the increasingly manic behavior of markets, investors and large banks over the past decade as true investment opportunities are increasingly outnumbered by speculation...

alliance; Congress; convenience; Fed; IRA Analyst; Primary Dealers.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-13 19:53 EDT

Central Banks Diversifying Away from Greenback

Sentiment on the dollar is very bearish, and its long-term outlook is not promising at all. But this could point to either another leg down (the beginning of a disorderly slide that many observers worry about) or could also produce a snapback rally if an unexpected rise led to short covering (particularly if equities markets rallies were to fade and lead investors to seek cover until the dust settled in Treasuries). [dollar losing reserve currency status]

Central Banks Diversifying; greenback; naked capitalism.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 10:10 EDT

Albert Edwards Warns Of Western Authorities' Positioning For Dismal Failure, As US Becomes Japan Redux

Albert Edwards continues doling out common sense; everyone, and the market in particular, continues ignoring it...The post-bubble whiplash in the economic and profits cycle is exactly a replay of Japan?'s experience. They too had seen an extended period of strong and steady growth going into the peak of the bubble. It took many years, repeated painful lapses back into recession, and sharp declines in equity markets before investors fully de-rated valuations low enough to reflect a new new paradigm...To gauge whether the world economy can surprise and escape this balance sheet recession, keep a very close eye on the bank lending numbers.

Albert Edwards Warns; Becomes Japan Redux; dismal failure; positive; Western authorities; Zero Hedge.

The Guardian World News Mon 2009-10-12 10:02 EDT

Ex-Wall Street financiers face criminal action

Former Bear Stearns hedge fund manager Matthew Tannin's private jottings show concerns about 'blow up risk' to investors...Tannin and his boss, Ralph Cioffi, ran two funds holding $1.4bn of clients' funds that collapsed in July 2007, an event widely viewed as the first clear signal of America's sub-prime mortgage crisis and the global credit crunch. The meltdown of these funds sparked a chain of events that contributed to the demise of Bear Stearns, an 85-year-old Wall Street institution, in early 2008. They have been charged by US prosecutors with defrauding customers by hiding the true condition of investments as prospects steadily darkened.

Ex-Wall Street financiers face criminal action; Guardian World News.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 09:37 EDT

The 60% Plunge In Private Equity Deal Flow

If there is one sector that is really hurting despite the outperformance of all other asset classes (money being thrown at equities, bonds, and commodities without regard or prudence as Rosenberg has pointed out), it is private equity. Indeed, while credit has thawed in general, investors are still completely shutting out the 5x+ leverage transaction world: the bread and butter of the LBO business model. For a sober look at the desolation in the PE landscape, even as funds rush to raise more billions in dry equity powder which sits at banks collecting 1%, consider that YTD only $33 billion in 654 PE deals has been disclosed, a 60% drop from the 1,532 deals done through Q3 in 2008, and N/M when compared to the heady days of 2007....

60; plunge; Private Equity Deal Flow; Zero Hedge.

The Economic Populist - Speak Your Mind 2 Cents at a Time Sat 2009-10-10 12:53 EDT

Proposal: A New Mortgage Finance System

Our mortgage finance system is broken. It needs some serious restructuring or a complete overhaul. We can learn a lot about a new structure from the Danes. The Danish mortgage system is one of the oldest and most sophisticated housing finance markets in the world...Danish mortgage system is a pass-through system that allows mortgage borrowers to benefit from close to capital market financing conditions. In the Danish system, borrower/homeowner don't obtain a mortgage from a mortgage loan originator such as a bank or mortgage lender. They borrow from investors in a transparent and standardized bond market through a mortgage credit institution (MCI). MCI issues bonds in the bond market that match as much as possible the amount and maturity of the borrower's mortgage. The beauty of this system is that a mortgage is exactly matched and balanced with an actively traded bond. MCIs play the vital roles of advisors to the borrower/homeowner and bearer of the credit risk of the mortgage -- they remain ``on the hook'' in the event of delinquency or default. They are mortgage credit insurers. The MCI originator bears full responsibility for timely payments from the borrower/homeowner. So, MCI has an incentive to make sure borrower/homeowners obtain a mortgage loan that is affordable for that family. Meanwhile, bond investors worry about only interest rate risk, with complete insurance on the mortgage that backs the their bond investment. This makes for a highly efficient system.

economic populist; Mind 2 Cents; New Mortgage Finance System; proposed; speaking; Time.

The Baseline Scenario Thu 2009-10-08 16:52 EDT

The Problem with Securitization

James Kwak

The New York Times has a story on ``Paralysis in the Debt Markets'' which says, basically, that credit has dried up because of lack of demand for asset-backed securities. In English, that means that since no one wants to invest in securities that are made out of home mortgages, the people who originate mortgages have no place to sell the mortgages to, so they don't have any money to lend. And this is also true of commercial real estate, student loans, and so on. For example, ``A once-thriving private market in securities backed by home mortgages has collapsed, from $744 billion in 2005, at the peak of the housing boom, to $8 billion during the first half of this year.''...the private market may never recover. The boom in securitization was based on investors' willingness to believe what investment banks and credit rating agencies said about these securities.

Baseline Scenario; problem; securitizations.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

The IRA Analyst Sun 2009-09-13 12:14 EDT

House Testimony: The Trouble With Models Starts With Subjectivity

...we have now many examples where a model or the pretense of a model was used as a vehicle for creating risk and hiding it. More important, however, is the role of financial models for creating opportunities for deliberate acts of securities fraud..the widespread use of [VaR] statistical models for risk management suggest that financial institutions are subject to occasional "Black Swans" in the form of risk events that cannot be anticipated...We don't actually believe there is such a thing as a "Black Swan."...leaders in finance and politics simply made the mistake of, again, believing in what were in fact flawed models...Or worse, our leaders in Washington and on Wall Street decided to be short sighted and not care about the inevitable debacle...We need to simply ensure that all of the financial instruments in our marketplace have an objective basis, including a visible, cash basis market that is visible to all market participants. If investors cannot price a security without reference to subjective models, then the security should be banned from the US markets as a matter of law and regulation. To do otherwise is to adopt deception as the public policy goal of the US when it comes to financial markets regulation.

House testimony; IRA Analyst; models starting; subject; Troubles.

Minyanville Fri 2009-09-04 19:31 EDT

Five Reasons to Stay Cautious with UNG

I'll be staying away from this market for now. However, beware that if hurricane season isn't disruptive and the winter is mild, we can probably expect a major decline in NG prices all along the curve early next year as inventory levels are near record highs and available storage is virtually tapped out. This could devastate the natural gas producer stocks...Many investors think that various natural gas plays in the master limited partnerships (MLP) field (pipelines, processors, etc.) are immune to fluctuations in the price of natural gas. In the short term, this may be true in many cases depending on the type of contracts. However, it's not true in the medium term. I'd be wary of this space at this time as any sort of alteration in pricing of contracts will almost certainly elicit cuts in distributions to shareholders. And since virtually all owners of these stocks buy them for the distributions, any cuts in distributions will likely devastate the share prices -- far beyond what would be theoretically warranted.

Minyanville; reasons; stay cautious; UNG.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-03 09:59 EDT

Deep Thoughts From Leucadia

With Leucadia coming boldly from behind the shadows, where Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg have always enjoyed operating, and joining Buffett in a deal over Capmark's loan-servicing and mortgage business, it makes sense to introduce readers with some of the very original thinking of the Leucadia founders (and very close friends of the mellifluously named Dick Handler). We present their most recent annual investor letter, which frequently is cited as among the best hedge fund (even though they don't like to be seen as one) strategy reading material. downloaded pdf.

Deep Thought; Leucadia; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-03 09:59 EDT

Deep Thoughts From Leucadia

With Leucadia coming boldly from behind the shadows, where Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg have always enjoyed operating, and joining Buffett in a deal over Capmark's loan-servicing and mortgage business, it makes sense to introduce readers with some of the very original thinking of the Leucadia founders (and very close friends of the mellifluously named Dick Handler). We present their most recent annual investor letter, which frequently is cited as among the best hedge fund (even though they don't like to be seen as one) strategy reading material. downloaded pdf.

Deep Thought; Leucadia; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Tue 2009-09-01 20:16 EDT

Guest Post: The "Other" Real-Estate Issue Revisited

Submitted by Contrary Investor The ``Other'' Real Estate Issue - Revisited... ...CRE will continue to be a problem child issue for some time to come...relative to prior historical CRE reconciliatory cycles, we're just getting started.

Guest Post; Real-Estate Issue Revisited; Zero Hedge.

The IRA Analyst Tue 2009-09-01 19:21 EDT

Q2 2009 Bank Stress Test Results: The Zombie Dance Party Rocks On

...the Fed and Treasury spent all the available liquidity propping up Wall Street's toxic asset waste pile and the banks that created it, so now Main Street employers and private investors, and the relatively smaller banks that support them both, must go begging for capital and liquidity in a market where government is the only player left

IRA Analyst; Q2 2009 Bank Stress Test Results; Zombie Dance Party Rocks.

Steve Keen's Debtwatch Sun 2009-08-30 14:33 EDT

It's Hard Being a Bear (Part Two)

Cassander

One of the reasons I'm still a bear on the economy is because the economists in the optimists camp are relying upon very bad economic theory. If that theory is telling them good times are ahead, that's one of the best predictors of bad times you could have. Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) preached that stock market price shares accurately, that the amount of debt finance a company has doesn't affect its value, and many other notions that have gone up in smoke during the GFC. CAPM developer William Sharpe ``assumed a miracle'': all investors agree about the future and their expectations about the future are correct. Macroeconomic theory has been dominated by IS-LM model erroneously attributed to Keynes but actually due to convervative neoclassical John Hicks, which ``emasculated what was original in Keynes's General Theory, and this bowdlerised version of Keynes was then demolished by Friedman in the 1970s to usher in the Monetarist phase''

Bear; hard; part; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.