Thu 2009-10-01 17:56 EDT

98489 -- Landmark National Bank v. Kesler -- Leben -- Kansas Court of Appeals

J. J. LEBEN

Landmark National Bank brought a suit to foreclose its mortgage against Boyd Kesler and joined Millennia Mortgage Corp. as a defendant because a second mortgage had been filed of record for a loan between Kesler and Millennia. In a foreclosure suit, it is normal practice to name as defendants all parties who may claim a lien against the property. When neither Kesler nor Millennia responded to the suit, the district court gave Landmark a default judgment, entered a journal entry foreclosing Landmark's mortgage, and ordered the property sold so that sale proceeds could be applied to pay Landmark's mortgage. But Millennia apparently had sold its mortgage to another party and no longer had interest in the property by this time. Sovereign Bank filed a motion to set aside the judgment and asserted that it now held the title to Kesler's obligation to pay the debt to Millennia. And another party, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS"), also filed a motion to set aside the judgment and asserted that it held legal title to the mortgage, originally on behalf of Millennia and later on behalf of Sovereign. Both Sovereign and MERS claim that MERS was a necessary party to the foreclosure lawsuit and that the judgment must be set aside because MERS wasn't included on the foreclosure suit as a defendant. The district court refused to set aside its judgment. The court found that MERS was not a necessary party and that Sovereign had not sufficiently demonstrated its interest in the property to justify setting aside the foreclosure. ...The district court properly determined that MERS was not a contingently necessary party in Landmark's foreclosure action. The district court also was well within its discretion in denying motions from MERS and Sovereign to intervene after a foreclosure judgment had been entered and the foreclosed property had been sold. The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

98489; appealing; Kansas court; Kesler; Landmark National Bank; leben.

Calculated Risk Tue 2009-09-22 09:30 EDT

Inspector General: FDIC saw risks at IndyMac in 2002

CalculatedRisk

From the Inspector General Report: Between 2001 and 2003, [Division of Insurance and Research] DIR risk assessments and quarterly banking profiles identified concerns about a number of issues, including:*** consumers' ever-increasing debt load, the expansion of adjustable rate mortgages, and a potential housing bubble; *** subprime and high loan-to-value (HLTV) lending as a risk in the event that the United States economy suffered a significant recession; and *** pricing and modeling charge-off risk with respect to the originate-to-sell model of the mortgage business.

2002; Calculated Risk; FDIC saw risks; IndyMac; Inspector generally.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Jesse's Café Américain Sun 2009-09-13 10:32 EDT

Barrick Capitulates

Jesse

Barrick and their partner J.P. Morgan were the target of lawsuits by the gold bulls, most notably Blanchard and Company, for price manipulation through the use of their forward sales in their hedge book. Barrick's original defense was reported to be that they were acting in conjunction with J. P. Morgan and the central banks to cap the price of gold, and were therefore immune from prosecution since the central banks are immune from prosecution. Gold market manipulations.

Barrick Capitulates; Jesse's Café Américain.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-03 09:59 EDT

Deep Thoughts From Leucadia

With Leucadia coming boldly from behind the shadows, where Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg have always enjoyed operating, and joining Buffett in a deal over Capmark's loan-servicing and mortgage business, it makes sense to introduce readers with some of the very original thinking of the Leucadia founders (and very close friends of the mellifluously named Dick Handler). We present their most recent annual investor letter, which frequently is cited as among the best hedge fund (even though they don't like to be seen as one) strategy reading material. downloaded pdf.

Deep Thought; Leucadia; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-03 09:59 EDT

Deep Thoughts From Leucadia

With Leucadia coming boldly from behind the shadows, where Ian Cumming and Joe Steinberg have always enjoyed operating, and joining Buffett in a deal over Capmark's loan-servicing and mortgage business, it makes sense to introduce readers with some of the very original thinking of the Leucadia founders (and very close friends of the mellifluously named Dick Handler). We present their most recent annual investor letter, which frequently is cited as among the best hedge fund (even though they don't like to be seen as one) strategy reading material. downloaded pdf.

Deep Thought; Leucadia; Zero Hedge.

Steve Keen's Debtwatch Sun 2009-08-30 14:33 EDT

It's Hard Being a Bear (Part Two)

Cassander

One of the reasons I'm still a bear on the economy is because the economists in the optimists camp are relying upon very bad economic theory. If that theory is telling them good times are ahead, that's one of the best predictors of bad times you could have. Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM) preached that stock market price shares accurately, that the amount of debt finance a company has doesn't affect its value, and many other notions that have gone up in smoke during the GFC. CAPM developer William Sharpe ``assumed a miracle'': all investors agree about the future and their expectations about the future are correct. Macroeconomic theory has been dominated by IS-LM model erroneously attributed to Keynes but actually due to convervative neoclassical John Hicks, which ``emasculated what was original in Keynes's General Theory, and this bowdlerised version of Keynes was then demolished by Friedman in the 1970s to usher in the Monetarist phase''

Bear; hard; part; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Wed 2009-08-26 16:00 EDT

Critically Under-Capitalized Banks Direct Result Of "Wonderful Chain of Stupidity"

Michael Shedlock

Last week the Wall Street Journal ran an article about how trust securities sank Guaranty Financial Group and six family-controlled Illinois banks in early July. Please consider In New Phase of Crisis, Securities Sink Banks. Federal officials on Thursday were poised to seize Guaranty Financial Group Inc., in what would be the 10th-largest bank failure in U.S. history. Guaranty's woes were caused by its investment portfolio, stuffed with deteriorating securities created from pools of mortgages originated by some of the nation's worst lenders. Delinquency rates on the holdings have soared as high as 40%, forcing write-downs last month that consumed all of the bank's capital. Guaranty is one of thousands of banks that invested in such securities, which were often highly rated but ultimately hinged on the health of... Security losses are a non-operating item and are listed after pre-tax operating income on the call report. This is very unusual and possibly reveals another cancer hiding on many banks balance sheets. those garbage trust-preferred securities problems are on top of the widely expected fallout from commercial real estate problems affecting small to medium-sized regional banks. Thus, banking woes are much deeper in many areas than either the FDIC or Fed is admitting.

Capitalized Banks Direct Result; Criticizes; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Stupid; Wonderful Chain.

Thu 2009-01-08 00:00 EST

Tom the Dancing Bug | Salon Comics

The original investment scam, courtesy of the Founding Fathers. By Ruben Bolling. Founder's Ponzi

Dancing Bug; Salon Comics; Tom.

Tue 2008-04-01 00:00 EDT

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis: WaMu Alt-A Pool Deteriorates Further

May 2007 liar-loan pool originally rated 93% AAA, now 25% 60-day delinquent or worse

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Pool Deteriorates Further; WaMu Alt.

Sat 2007-12-29 00:00 EST

Calculated Risk: The Compleat UberNerd

mortgage servicing, negative amortization, securitization, foreclosure, mortgage origination

Calculated Risk; Compleat UberNerd.

Thu 2007-12-27 00:00 EST

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> Leaking

Winter (Economic & Market) Watch >> Leaking; credit card securitization delinquincies rising; bizarre comment by "loan originator"

economic; leaks; Market; watch; winter.

Tue 2007-11-20 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: A Riveting Disclosure in the $1 Billion Swiss Re Writedown

asset-backed CDOs deemed worthless; subprime components written down to 62% of original value

1; naked capitalism; Riveting Disclosure; Swiss Re Writedown.

Mon 2007-11-12 00:00 EST

Minyanville -

Minyan Peter: Bank Earnings Post Mortem (2007-10-26); originate for resale/securitization business model broken; balance sheets growing; credit quality deteriorating; formerly abundant credit becoming scarce resource

Minyanville.

Mon 2007-10-08 00:00 EDT

A Q and A For The People Of A Forsaken Republic: Addressing the origins of the Who's-Your-Daddy Nation - The Smirking Chimp

A Q and A For The People Of A Forsaken Republic: Addressing the origins of the Who's-Your-Daddy Nation, by Phil Rockstroh - The Smirking Chimp

addresses; Daddy Nation; Forsaken Republic; originally; people; Q; s; Smirking Chimp.

Fri 2007-09-07 00:00 EDT

Calculated Risk: Mortgage Origination Channels for UberNerds

Calculated Risk; Mortgage Origination Channels; UberNerds.