dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

Complicated Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

complicate Restructuring (1); complicated systems work (1); Complicating Fed's Job (1); Fed's Complicity (1); monstrously complicated (1); simultaneously complicates Congress (1).

billy blog Mon 2010-09-20 09:39 EDT

The consolidated government -- treasury and central bank

...The notion of a consolidated government sector is a basic Modern Monetary Theory starting point and allows us to demonstrate the essential relationship between the government and non-government sectors whereby net financial assets enter and exit the economy without complicating the analysis unduly. This simplicity leads to many insights all of which remain valid as operational options when we add more detail to the model...the mainstream macroeconomics obsession with central bank independence is nothing more than an ideological attack on the capacity of government to produce full employment which also undermines our democratic rights...The vertical transactions which add to or drain the monetary base that I have outlined here are transactions between the government and the non-government sector... These transactions are thus unique -- they change net financial assets in the economy. All the transactions between private sector entities have no effect on the net financial assets in the economy at any point in time...

Billy Blog; central bank; consolidated government; Treasury.

Thu 2010-08-19 16:04 EDT

The AIG Bailout Scandal

The government's $182 billion bailout of insurance giant AIG should be seen as the Rosetta Stone for understanding the financial crisis and its costly aftermath. The story of American International Group explains the larger catastrophe not because this was the biggest corporate bailout in history but because AIG's collapse and subsequent rescue involved nearly all the critical elements, including delusion and deception. These financial dealings are monstrously complicated, but this account focuses on something mere mortals can understand--moral confusion in high places, and the failure of governing institutions to fulfill their obligations to the public. Three governmental investigative bodies have now pored through the AIG wreckage and turned up disturbing facts--the House Committee on Oversight and Reform; the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which will make its report at year's end; and the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), which issued its report on AIG in June. The five-member COP, chaired by Harvard professor Elizabeth Warren, has produced the most devastating and comprehensive account so far. Unanimously adopted by its bipartisan members, it provides alarming insights that should be fodder for the larger debate many citizens long to hear--why Washington rushed to forgive the very interests that produced this mess, while innocent others were made to suffer the consequences. The Congressional panel's critique helps explain why bankers and their Washington allies do not want Elizabeth Warren to chair the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau...

AIG bailout scandal.

Fri 2010-06-18 10:37 EDT

Monetary Economics Review

Monetary Economics: An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income, Production and Wealth, W. Godley and M. Lavoie, Palgrave/Macmillan, London, 2007...Acknowledging the existence of a complex institutional structure that includes households, firms, banks and governments (sometimes separated from the Central Bank), "our aspiration is to introduce a new way in which an understanding can be gained as to how these very complicated systems work as a whole"...the "new way" referred above is currently known as Stock-Flow Consistent modelling (SFC)...The main bid of Godley and Lavoie (G&L, from now on) is to show (successfully, one could note) that the SFC models make it necessary to fully articulate an accounting structure, avoiding "black holes", gaining in consistency, accuracy, and providing a common framework for the comparison of different models...one gets really convinced that it is the type of approach that makes it possible to analyse a great number of elements and complexities of the real world, as much as one wishes!...G&L adopt an institutional classification (households, firms, banks, government and the central bank). All the models presented in the book start with a "balance sheet" matrix, where all the assets and liabilities of each sector are described...

Monetary Economics Review.

zero hedge Fri 2010-04-23 20:02 EDT

How Lehman, With The Fed's Complicity, Created Another Illegal Precedent In Abusing The Primary Dealer Credit Facility

Five months ago, Zero Hedge observed the nuances of the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and concluded that this artificial liquidity boosting construct was nothing more than yet another scam to allow banks to extract ever more money from taxpayers, with the complicit blessing of the Federal Reserve Board Of New York (as the original piece also provided an in-depth discussion of the triparty repo market which is now a parallel to the buzzword of the day in the form of Lehman's "Repo 105" off balance sheet contraption, it should serve as a useful refresher course to anyone who wishes to understand why while Repo 105 with its $50 billion in liability contingency may have been an issue, the true Repo market, with over $3 trillion of likely just as toxic assets, is where the real pain in the future will come from). The PDCF would allow assets of declining and even inexistent value to be pledged as collateral, thus making sure that taxpayer cash was funneled into sham institutions holding predominantly toxic assets, and whose viability was and is limited, yet still is backed by the Fed, which to this day continues to pour our money into them. Today, with a tip from the NYT's Eric Dash, we demonstrate just how grossly negligent the Federal Reserve was when it came to Lehman's abuse of the PDCF, and how the trail of slime of Lehman's increasingly obvious manipulation of its books goes to the very top of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and its then governor - a very much complicit Tim Geithner...

abuse; created; Fed's Complicity; Illegal Precedent; Lehman; Primary Dealers Credit Facility; Zero Hedge.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps -- Exercises in Surrealism

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps - Exercises in Surrealism; CDS payouts are placing a material pressure on the price of underlying bonds and loans exacerbating broader credit problems ``The CDS market is also complicating restructuring of distressed loans as all lenders do not have the same interest in ensuring the survival of the firm. A lender with purchased protection may seek to use the restructuring to trigger its CDS contracts''

Credit Default Swap; exercised; fears; financial products; loath; Satyajit Das's Blog; surreal.

Fri 2008-06-13 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Quelle Surprise! Imports Lowering Inflation and Complicating Fed's Job

Complicating Fed's Job; Imports Lowering Inflation; naked capitalism; Quelle Surprise.