Mon 2009-12-21 18:24 EST

Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008

Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor

The crisis of 2008-09 has focused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. In this paper we study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a newly constructed historical dataset for 12 developed countries over the years 1870-2008, utilizing the data to study rare events associated with financial crisis episodes. We present new evidence that leverage in the financial sector has increased strongly in the second half of the twentieth century as shown by a decoupling of money and credit aggregates, and we also find a decline in safe assets on banks' balance sheets. We also show for the first time how monetary policy responses to financial crises have been more aggressive post-1945, but how despite these policies the output costs of crises have remained large. Importantly, we can also show that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises...

1870-2008; Credit Booms Gone Bust; financial crises; leverage cycle; monetary policy.

zero hedge Fri 2009-12-18 13:20 EST

Focusing On (And Profiting From) The Upcoming Chinese Financial Crisis

Today's piece of contrarian economic insight comes once again from the strategists at SocGen, this time Dylan Grice, whose piece entitled "Popular Delusions: China's looming financial crisis will provide the next buying opportunity" is somewhat self explanatory. Not surprisingly, Dylan, who quotes the NBER, focuses on the overabundance of cheap credit as the catalyst that will ultimately topple the economy. Mr. Grice's conclusion: buy if you must, but wait for the credit bubble pop.

focused; profits; Upcoming Chinese Financial Crisis; Zero Hedge.

Debtor's prison Thu 2009-12-17 10:24 EST

Did Greenspan predict the inevitable collapse of the USD?

MAAA

Much of our recent discussion has focused on the seemingly inevitable collapse of the US-debt-backed global financial system. In continuation of that theme, today we will explore a specific aspect of this problem: the likelihood of a US default...

Debtor s Prison; Greenspan predictions; inevitable collapse; USD.

Wed 2009-12-16 15:41 EST

Steve Keen's DebtWatch No 31 February 2009: ``The Roving Cavaliers of Credit'' | Steve Keen's Debtwatch

``Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money-lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and gives this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner-- and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it.'' [Karl Marx] Marx's analysis of money and credit, and how the credit system can bring an otherwise well-functioning market economy to its knees, was spot on. His observations on the financial crisis of 1857 still ring true today...

31 February 2009; credit; Roving Cavaliers; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

naked capitalism Sun 2009-11-29 12:53 EST

Obama: Debt could cause a double dip recession

Edward Harrison of Credit Writedowns

Barack Obama has now come clean about his thinking on why his administration has decided to focus first on reducing the deficit and next on jobs. He fears a double-dip recession will occur if foreigners lose confidence in the U.S. dollar, causing interest rates to spike. This is nonsense and it demonstrates how much at odds Obama's economic thinking is with reality. This is the clearest indication that the Obama Administration doesn't understand how modern money works. In fact, by focusing on deficit reduction, he has increased the chances of a double dip instead of decreasing them.

caused; debt; double-dip recession; naked capitalism; Obama.

naked capitalism Fri 2009-10-23 09:50 EDT

Guest Post: The Ongoing Cover Up of the Truth Behind the Financial Crisis May Lead to Another Crash

George Washington of Washington's Blog

William K. Black -- professor of economics and law, and the senior regulator during the S & L crisis -- says that that the government's entire strategy now -- as during the S&L crisis -- is to cover up how bad things are (''the entire strategy is to keep people from getting the facts'')...PhD economist Dean Baker made a similar point, lambasting the Federal Reserve for blowing the bubble, and pointing out that those who caused the disaster are trying to shift the focus as fast as they can...Economist Thomas Palley says that Wall Street also has a vested interest in covering up how bad things are...The media has largely parroted what the White House and Wall Street were saying...One of the foremost experts on structured finance and derivatives -- Janet Tavakoli -- says that rampant fraud and Ponzi schemes caused the financial crisis. University of Texas economics professor James K. Galbraith agrees...Congress woman Marcy Kaptur says that there was rampant fraud leading up to the crash...Black and economist Simon Johnson also state that the banks committed fraud by making loans to people that they knew would default, to make huge profits during the boom, knowing that the taxpayers would bail them out when things went bust.

Crash; Financial Crisis; Guest Post; lead; naked capitalism; Ongoing Cover; truth.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Fri 2009-10-23 09:44 EDT

OTC Derivative Regulation Proposals ? Neat, Plausible and Wrong!

Satyajit Das

Proposals for over-the-counter (OTC) derivative regulations are consistent with H. L. Mencken?s proposition that: "there is always a well-known solution to every human problem--neat, plausible, and wrong." A central omission is the speculative use of derivatives. Industry lobbyists focus on the use of derivatives to hedge and manage risk promoting investment and capital formation. While derivatives can play this role, the primary use of derivatives now is manufacturing risk and creating leverage.

fears; financial products; loath; neat; OTC Derivative Regulation Proposals; plausible; Satyajit Das's Blog; wrong.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 10:13 EDT

Overview Of Goldman Sachs Electronic Trading: Part 1

Zero Hedge is starting a multi-part overview of Goldman Sachs' Electronic Trading client-focused product suite, to demonstrate just how extensively embedded in modern market architecture are Goldman's various DMA and "liquidity" facilitation schemes, and the depths of dark pool domination via Goldman's global order router, and other specific topical offerings.

Goldman Sachs Electronic Trading; overview; Part 1; Zero Hedge.

The Baseline Scenario Mon 2009-10-12 09:41 EDT

Escape from Punchbowlism

StatsGuy

When the Fed pumps money into the system to prevent deflation, the disincentive to holding cash/reserves is supposed to get money moving and thus restore the savings/investment equilibrium. In a sense, the goal is to decrease the incentive to use money as a store of value and therefore increase its use as a medium of exchange. Unfortunately, many conventional macroeconomists (unlike their brethren in the real-world finance schools) haven't admitted that this monetary stimulus ``leaks'' out of their models (which focus on closed domestic economies without moral hazard). Where does it go?

Baseline Scenario; escape; Punchbowl.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Mon 2009-10-12 09:22 EDT

One Hand Clapping Theory Analyzed

Michael Shedlock

Numerous people have asked me to comment on Chris Martenson's article The Sound of One Hand Clapping - What Deflationists May Be Missing. Chris Writes: ...``Trillions in probable and provable losses quietly exist, out of sight, on the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve and other financial institutions. If they ever come out of hiding and onto the books, I think the deflationists will be proven correct beyond all doubt. But let me ask this: What prevents the authorities from simply storing them out of sight forever?...I am now wondering if they cannot keep this up indefinitely.'' ...In a credit based economy, the odds of a sustainable rebound without bank credit expanding, and consumers participating is not very good. Even if one mistakenly assumes that the recent rally is a result of pretending, should we count on sustained success now more so than a measurement of stock prices in April of 1930, or any of Japans' four 50% rallies? I think not. Pretending cannot accomplish much other than prolonging the agony for decades. This is the message of Japan. Moreover, the US is arguably is worse shape than Japan because our problems are unsustainable consumer debt, high unemployment, and massive retail sector overcapacity. Those are structural problems that no amount of pretending in the world can possibly cure. In due time, the market will focus on those problems.

hand clapping theory analyzed; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Thu 2009-10-08 17:04 EDT

After subverting bank insolvency, our leaders are now about to make a mess of liquidity

FT.com | Willem Buiter's Maverecon

Unless there is a major change of direction among global economic and financial officialdom, we are at risk of ending up with a world in which liquidity provision is privatised and insolvency risk for banks is socialised. This would be the exact opposite of what makes sense: solvency is (or should be) a private good and liquidity is (or should be) a public good...The authorities should not waste their limited organisational capital to force banks to provide inefficiently the public good of liquidity when confidence and trust are low. They should instead focus on ways of enforcing hard budget constraints on banks - to confront them with the realities of insolvency in a way that separates shareholders, unsecured creditors, boards and managers from their investments while leaving the bank as a functioning organisation capable of continued intermediation.

leaders; liquidity; makes; Mess; subverting bank insolvency.

The Realignment Project Tue 2009-09-22 09:00 EDT

Public Virtues -- Part 3 (Institutional Continuity)

The Realignment Project

...all companies have to focus on the short-term. But the same is not true for the public sector....public institutions are not bound by the business cycle...government can act as the ultimate venture capitalist, making investments that might not pay off for decades to come, and it's a role that only the public sector can play...American governments at all levels have enjoyed huge success as extreme long-term venture capitalists in infrastructure and technology.

Institutional continues; Part 3; public virtues; Realignment Project.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

zero hedge Thu 2009-09-17 09:42 EDT

Excess Liquidity Game Is Coming To An End

David Rosenberg notes M1, M2 and MZM have commenced contracting at an alarming rate: M1 fell 1.0% in the August 24th week and over the past four weeks is down at a 6.5% annual rate. M2 has contracted in each of the past four weeks too and over that time has slipped at a 12.2% annualized pace, which is a near-record decline. We see the same trend in the broad MZM money measure -- off at a 15.8% annual rate over the past month. Bank credit also remains in a fundamental downtrend -- contracting at an epic 9% annualized pace over the past four weeks. So for the first time in the post-WWII era, we have deflation in credit, wages and rents, and from our lens this is a toxic brew that in the end will ensure that the focus on capital preservation and income orientation will be the winning strategy over a strict reliance on capital appreciation.

comes; ending; Excess liquidity game; Zero Hedge.

Mon 2008-09-08 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Paulson Begins Gradual Wind-Down of GSEs within Conservatorship

Paulson Begins Gradual Wind-Down of GSEs within Conservatorship, by Institutional Risk Analytics; ``Now that the Treasury at least partly has followed our recommendation and taken the GSEs off the table as a concern for the bond investors who hold trillions of dollars worth of GSE debt, the markets and the respective presidential candidates can focus on the next, more pressing challenge, namely helping to refloat the US banking system''

conservatorship; GSEs; Institutional Risk Analyst; Paulson Begins Gradual Wind.

Sun 2008-06-01 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: CFTC Investigation of Oil Trading Focuses on Tankers, Storage

CFTC Investigation; naked capitalism; Oil Trading Focuses; storage; Tanker.