naked capitalism Thu 2010-09-30 08:22 EDT

Why Backstopping Repo is a Bad Idea

The normally sound Gillian Tett of the Financial Times endorses an idea that is both dangerous and unnecessary, namely, government backstopping of the system of short-term collateralized lending called repo, for ``sale with agreement to repurchase.''...But the real problem is that the only securities that were once considered to be suitable were those of the very highest quality, namely Treasuries. The real problem is in widening the market beyond that. If you have absolutely impeccable collateral, you don't care if your counterparty goes belly up if you aren't at risk of losses on the assets you hold...the real problem is the use of low quality collateral...why would we possibly WANT a system that might down the road encourage the pledging of less than stellar instruments as repo?...we need to go back and look hard at why the need for repo has risen since 2001, and how much is related to legitimate activity. The fact that it grew much more rapidly than the economy overall suggests not...official efforts should proceed...to shrink the repo market (as we've recommended for a market that has contributed to the growth of repo, credit default swaps)...our efforts NOT to restrain banks leads to a tremendous tax on all of us...a banking industry that creates global crises is negative value added from a societal standpoint. It is purely extractive...

Backstopping Repo; Bad Ideas; naked capitalism.

Christopher Whalen Fri 2010-09-17 19:31 EDT

The key to the future of finance is now emerging

Christopher Whalen

Basel III is entirely irrelevant to the economic situation and even to the banks. Through things like minimum capital levels, the Basel II rules provided the illusion of intelligent design in the regulation of banking and finance. In fact, Basel II made the subprime crisis possible and the subsequent bailout inevitable [by enabling off-balance sheet finance and OTC derivatives]...Part of the reason for my undisguised contempt for the Basel III process comes from caution regarding the benefits of regulating markets...But a large portion of my criticism for Basel III and the entire Basel framework is even more basic, namely the notion that any form of a priori regulation, public or private, can prevent people from doing stupid things...The key premise of Basel III is that the use of minimum capital guidelines and other strictures will somehow enable regulators to prevent a crises before it occurs. The only trouble is that regulators have no objective measures for compliance with Basel II/III, much less predicting market breaks...As in past decades and crises right through to 2008, the regulators will be the last to know about a problem...

Christopher Whalen; Emergency; finance; future; Key.

China Financial Markets Wed 2010-09-15 19:28 EDT

What do banking crises have to do with consumption?

Michael Pettis

For the next several years, as Keynes reminded us in the 1930s, savings is not going to be a virtue for the world economy. It is more likely to be a vice. In order to regain growth the world desperately needs less savings and more private consumption, but I think it is not going to get nearly enough to generate growth. Why? Because in all the major economies the banking systems are largely insolvent, or about to become so, and desperately need to rebuild capital...With all of the major economies facing banking crises, they must clean up the banks by forcing the household sector to pay the bill. This will put downward pressure on household disposable income and wealth for many years...For twenty years Japanese consumption growth has limped along [due to paying for] their banking crisis...Chinese consumption dropped from a very-low 45% of GDP ten years ago to an astonishing 36% last year just as -- no coincidence -- Chinese households were forced to clean up the last banking crisis...

bank crises; China Financial Markets; consumption.

Wed 2010-08-25 08:41 EDT

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual | The Big Picture

Barry Ritholtz

...My disagreement with the Zandi-Blinder report is not its theoretical underpinnings -- it is by definition a hypothetical counter-factual. Rather, it is the counter-factual Blinder/Zandi chose to use: ``What would the economy look like now if we had done nothing?'' Instead, I propose a better counter-factual: ``What if we had done the right thing, instead of nothing -- or the wrong thing?''...In my counter factual, the bailouts did not occur. Instead of the Japanese model, the US government went the Swedish route of banking crises: They stepped in with temporary nationalizations, prepackaged bankruptcies, and financial reorganizations; banks write down all of their bad debt, they sell off the paper. In the end, the goal is to spin out clean, well financed, toxic-asset-free banks into the public markets...One by one, we should have put each insolvent bank into receivership, cleaned up the balance sheer, sold off the bad debts for 15-50 cents on the dollar, fired the management, wiped out the shareholders, and spun out the proceeds, with the bondholders taking the haircut, and the taxpayers on the hook for precisely zero dollars. Citi, Bank of America, Wamu, Wachovia, Countrywide, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan, etc. all of them should have been handled this way...

2008 Bailout Counter-Factual; Big Picture.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-07-22 10:17 EDT

Do sovereign debt ratios matter?

Michael Pettis

...No aspect of history seems to repeat itself quite as regularly as financial history. The written history of financial crises dates back at least as far back as the reign of Tiberius, when we have very good accounts of Rome's 33 AD real estate crisis...we have only begun the period of sovereign default. The major global adjustments haven't yet taken place and until they do, we won't have seen the full consequences of the global crisis...there is no threshold debt level that indicates a country is in trouble. Many things matter when evaluating a country's creditworthiness...there are at least five important factors in determining the likelihood that a country will be suspend or renegotiate certain types of debt...With inverted debt, the value of liabilities is positively correlated with the value of assets, so that the debt burden and servicing costs decline in good times (when asset prices and earnings rise) and rise in bad times...Inverted debt structures leave a country extremely vulnerable to debt crises...

China Financial Markets; sovereign debt ratios matter.

zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Mon 2010-07-19 16:18 EDT

Financial Reform Bill Fixes the Economy ... Not!

Washington's Blog

Congress, Bernanke, Geithner and the boys are patting themselves on the back for passing the financial "reform" legislation...In reality, as discussed below, none of the real problems have been addressed...little in the legislation really restores trust in the system...the bill does nothing to address the ever-widening gap in wealth...The rule of law has not been restored...Unemployment continues to plague the economy...bailing out the banks has simply spread their problems into sovereign crises...the U.S. hasn't reined in its profligate spending...the U.S. has become a a kleptocracy, an oligarchy, a banana republic, a socialist or fascist state ... which acts without the consent of the governed...

dropped; economy; Financial Reform Bill Fixes; long; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

New Economic Perspectives Mon 2010-07-19 13:51 EDT

The Myths About Government Debt and Deficit as Told By Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff

Yeva Nersisyan

...with nearly 10% of the US labor force unemployed and another 7% underemployed, the public debate is now focused on the false issue of deficits and debt. A case in point is a recent book by Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, ``This Time is Different'' that has become a bestseller...The media as well as academia have fawned all over this book...The crux of the book is that each time people think that ``this time is different'', that crises cannot occur anymore or that they happen to other people in other places. True. This is exactly what Hyman Minsky was arguing more than 40 years ago. Reinhart and Rogoff don't really explain why this perception leads to crises...The book is mostly on crises driven by government debt...[however] Aggregating data over different monetary regimes and different countries cannot yield any meaningful conclusions about sovereign debt and crises. It is only useful if the goal is to merely validate one's preconceived myth about government debt being similar to private debt...As far as I can tell Rogoff and Reinhart haven't identified a single case of government default on domestic-currency denominated debt with a floating exchange rate system...Professional economists are a major impediment on the way to using our economic system for the benefit of us all. And Reinhart and Rogoff are no exception.

Carmen Reinhart; Deficit; government debt; Kenneth Rogoff; myth; New Economic Perspectives; told.

New Deal 2.0 Fri 2010-07-16 18:50 EDT

Despite Foreign Debts, U.S. Has the Upper Hand

Henry Liu

U.S. public debt as of July 8, 2010 was $ 13.192 trillion against a projected 2010 GDP of $14.743 trillion. As of April 2010, China held $900.2 billion of US Treasuries, surpassing Japan's holding of $795.5 billion. As of 2007, outstanding GSE (Government Sponsored Enterprises like Fanny Mae; Freddy Mac) debt securities (non-mortgage and those backed by mortgages) summed up to $7.37 trillion. Does this mean disaster for the US? ...the U.S., while vulnerable, is not critically over a barrel by massive foreign holdings of U.S. sovereign debt. The reason is because U.S. sovereign debts are all denominated in dollars, a fiat currency that the Federal Reserve can issue at will. The U.S. has no foreign debt in the strict sense of the term. It has domestic debt denominated in its own fiat currency held in large quantities by foreign governments. The U.S. is never in danger of defaulting on its sovereign debt because it can print all the dollars necessary to pay off foreign holders of its debt. There is also no incentive for the foreign holders of U.S. sovereign debt to push for repayment, as that will only cause the U.S. to print more dollars to cause the dollar to fall further in exchange rates... ...trade globalization through cross-border wage arbitrage also pushes down wages in the US and other advanced economies, causing insufficient consumer income to absorb rising global production. This is the main cause of the current financial crises which have made more severe by financial deregulation. But the root cause is global overcapacity due to low wages of workers who cannot afford to buy what they produce. The world economy is plagued with overcapacity as a result. It is not enough to merely focus on job creation. Jobs must pay wages high enough to eliminate overcapacity. Instead of a G20 coordination on fiscal austerity, there needs to be a G20 commitment to raise wages globally. [Henry C.K. Liu]

0; Foreign debt; new dealing 2; U.S.; upper hand.

Thu 2010-06-03 17:42 EDT

World Order, Failed States and Terrorism, Part 3: The Business of Private Security

Henry C K Liu

...Social order is the main component of domestic security. Social security is the foundation of social order. Henry J Aaron of the Brookings Institution calls the US Social Security system "the great monument of 20th-century liberalism". Privatization of social security is not a solution; it is an oxymoron. It merely turns social security into private security. Neo-liberal economics theory promotes as scientific truth an ideology that is irrationally hostile to government responsibility for social programs. Based on that ideology, neo-liberal economists then construct a mechanical system of rationalization to dismantle government and its social programs in the name of efficiency through privatization. Privatization of social security is a road to government abdication, the cause of failed statehood...In the era of financial globalization, nations are faced with the problem of protecting their economies from financial threats. The recurring financial crises around the world in recent decades clearly demonstrated that most governments have failed in this critical state responsibility. The economic benefits associated with the unregulated transfer of financial assets, such as cash, stocks and bonds, across national borders are frequently not worth the risks, as has been amply demonstrated in many countries whose economies have been ravaged by external financial forces. Cross-border capital flows have become an increasingly significant part of the globalized economy over recent decades. The US depends on it to finance its huge and growing trade deficit. More than $2.5 trillion of capital flowed around the world in 2004, with more than $1 trillion flowing into just the US. Different types of capital flows, such as foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, and bank lending, are driven by different investor motivations and country characteristics, but one objective stands out more than any other: capital seeks highest return through lowest wages. The United States is not only losing jobs to lower-wage economies, the inflow of capital also forces stagnant US wages to fall in relation to rising asset values.

business; failed state; Part 3; private security; terror; World ordering.

Mon 2010-05-24 10:55 EDT

The Root Cause Of Recurring Global Financial Crises

Henry Liu

Severe global financial crises have been recurring every decade: the 1987 crash, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007 Credit Crisis. This recurring pattern had been generated by wholesale financial deregulation around the world. But the root causes have been dollar hegemony and the Washington Consensus...The Washington Consensus has since been characterized as a ``bashing of the state'' (Annual Report of the United Nations, 1998) and a ``new imperialism'' (M Shahid Alam, ``Does Sovereignty Matter for Economic Growth?'', 1999). But the real harm of the Washington Consensus has yet to be properly recognized: that it is a prescription for generating failed states around the world among developing economies that participate in globalized financial markets. Even in the developed economies, neo-liberalism generates a dangerous but generally unacknowledged failed-state syndrome.

Recurring Global Financial Crises; root cause.

The Money Game Sat 2010-05-22 21:47 EDT

The Root Cause Of Recurring Global Financial Crises

Henry Liu

Severe global financial crises have been recurring every decade: the 1987 crash, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the 2007 Credit Crisis. This recurring pattern had been generated by wholesale financial deregulation around the world. But the root causes have been dollar hegemony and the Washington Consensus. -- The Case of Greece --Following misguided neo-liberal market fundamentalist advice, Greece abandoned its national currency, the drachma, in favor of the euro in 2002. This critically consequential move enabled the Greek government to benefit from the strength of the euro, albeit not derived exclusively from the strength of the Greek economy, but from the strength of the economies of the stronger Eurozone member states, to borrow at lower interest rates collateralized by Greek assets denominated in euros. With newly available credit, Greece then went on a debt-funded spending spree, including high-profile projects such as the 2004 Athens Olympics that left the Greek nation with high sovereign debts not denominated in its national currency...

Money game; Recurring Global Financial Crises; root cause.

zero hedge Thu 2010-05-13 17:50 EDT

Willem Buiter Issues His Most Dire Prediction Yet: Sees "Unprecedented" Fiscal Crises, US Debt Inflation And Fed Monetization

...we were very surprised when we read Willem Buiter's latest Global Economic View (recall that he works for Citi now). In it the strategist for the firm that defines the core of the establishment could not be more bearish. In fact, at first we thought that David Rosenberg had ghost written this...Buiter presents a game theory type analysis, which concludes that the US and other sovereigns will soon be forced into fiscal austerity. Among his critical observations (we recommend a careful read of the entire 68 pages), are that the US is highly polarized, and that the Fed, which is "the least independent of leading central banks" would be willing to implement "inflationary monetisation of public debt and deficits than other central banks." The next step of course would be hyperinflation. And Buiter sees America as the one country the most likely to follow this route. Most troublingly, Buiter predicts that a massive crisis is the only thing that can break the political gridlock in the US in order to fix the broken US fiscal situation...

debt inflated; dire predictions; Fed Monetizing; fiscal crises; see; unprecedented; Willem Buiter Issues; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2010-05-06 13:44 EDT

Control Frauds HyperInflate and Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage - A Control Fraud at Work in the Silver Market Short Positions?

Jesse

Here is a working paper by William K. Black about 'control frauds' and how they relate to the most recent credit crisis in the United States, a breakdown of stewardship that has placed the rest of the world's financial sector at risk as well...``Control frauds'' are seemingly legitimate entities controlled by persons that use them as a fraud ``weapon.'' A single control fraud can cause greater losses than all other forms of property crime combined. This article addresses the role of control fraud in financial crises. Financial control frauds' primary weapon is accounting. Fraudulent lenders produce exceptional short-term ``profits'' through a four-part strategy: extreme growth (Ponzi), lending to uncreditworthy borrowers, extreme leverage, and minimal loss reserves...

Control Frauds HyperInflate; controls Fraud; Extend Bubbles Maximizing Damage; Jesse's Café Américain; Silver Market Short Positions; working.

Fri 2010-02-26 16:26 EST

Risk taking, regulatory capture and bailouts: The doomsday cycle | vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists

Peter Boone and Simon Johnson

Over the last three decades, the US financial system has tripled in size, as measured by total credit relative to GDP (see Figure 1). Each time the system runs into problems, the Federal Reserve quickly lowers interest rates to revive it. These crises appear to be getting worse and worse -- and their impact is increasingly global. Not only are interest rates near zero around the world, but many countries are on fiscal trajectories that require major changes to avoid eventual financial collapse. What will happen when the next shock hits? We believe we may be nearing the stage where the answer will be -- just as it was in the Great Depression -- a calamitous global collapse. The root problem is that we have let a `doomsday cycle' infiltrate our economic system...

Bailout; commentary; doomsday cycle; leading economists; regulatory capture; research-based policy analysis; risk take; Vox.

naked capitalism Wed 2010-01-13 11:54 EST

William Black'' ``Anti-Regulators: The Federal Reserve's War Against Effective Regulation''

...This essay focuses on Chairman Bernanke recent appointment of Dr. Parkinson to lead the Fed's examination and supervision. My central point is that Dr. Bernanke appointed Dr. Parkinson because he shared Dr. Bernanke's anti-regulatory ideology and has never changed those views, even in the face of the Great Recession. The anti-regulator policies that Bernanke and Parkinson championed were the principal drivers of the fraud epidemic that have produced recurrent, intensifying crises...First, Dr. Parkinson was a leading proponent of the obscene (and successful) effort to prevent Commodity Futures Trading Commission Chair Brooksley Born from taking regulatory action to prevent destructive credit default swaps (CDS). Second, Dr. Parkinson, like Greenspan and Bernanke, subscribed to the naïve view that fraud was impossible in sophisticated financial markets and that credit rating agencies were reliable. Third, Dr. Parkinson endorsed the international ``competition in regulatory laxity'' that Dr. Bernanke (belatedly) warned has degraded regulation on a global basis...

anti regulators; effectively regulated; Federal Reserve's War; naked capitalism; William Black.

Mon 2009-12-21 18:24 EST

Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870-2008

Moritz Schularick, Alan M. Taylor

The crisis of 2008-09 has focused attention on money and credit fluctuations, financial crises, and policy responses. In this paper we study the behavior of money, credit, and macroeconomic indicators over the long run based on a newly constructed historical dataset for 12 developed countries over the years 1870-2008, utilizing the data to study rare events associated with financial crisis episodes. We present new evidence that leverage in the financial sector has increased strongly in the second half of the twentieth century as shown by a decoupling of money and credit aggregates, and we also find a decline in safe assets on banks' balance sheets. We also show for the first time how monetary policy responses to financial crises have been more aggressive post-1945, but how despite these policies the output costs of crises have remained large. Importantly, we can also show that credit growth is a powerful predictor of financial crises...

1870-2008; Credit Booms Gone Bust; financial crises; leverage cycle; monetary policy.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2009-10-27 12:58 EDT

Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit by George Akerlof, Paul Romer

During the 1980s, a number of unusual financial crises occurred. In Chile, for example, the financial sector collapsed, leaving the government with responsibility for extensive foreign debts. In the United States, large numbers of government-insured savings and loans became insolvent - and the government picked up the tab. In Dallas, Texas, real estate prices and construction continued to boom even after vacancies had skyrocketed, and the suffered a dramatic collapse. Also in the United States, the junk bond market, which fueled the takeover wave, had a similar boom and bust. In this paper, we use simple theory and direct evidence to highlight a common thread that runs through these four episodes. The theory suggests that this common thread may be relevant to other cases in which countries took on excessive foreign debt, governments had to bail out insolvent financial institutions, real estate prices increased dramatically and then fell, or new financial markets experienced a boom and bust. We describe the evidence, however, only for the cases of financial crisis in Chile, the thrift crisis in the United States, Dallas real estate and thrifts, and junk bonds. Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.

bankruptcy; Economic Underworld; George Akerlof; Looting; Paul Romer; profits.

Yahoo! Finance: Tech Ticker Tue 2009-10-27 11:18 EDT

Policymakers in "Denial" About the Banks, Carmen Reinhart Says

In "This Time Is Different," economic professors Kenneth Rogoff (Harvard) and Carmen Reinhart (Maryland) examine eight centuries of financial crises, demonstrating how the credit crunch of 2008 wasn't so unique, after all. That's the good news...Reinhart gives policymakers "low marks" for failing to deal head on with toxic assets. There's "a lot of denial" in the approach to the banks, she says, seeing comparisons to Japan's post-bubble policies of delaying write-downs, which created zombie banks. "I'm not seeing a great deal of learning,"

bank; Carmen Reinhart Says; denial; finance; policymaking; Tech Ticker; Yahoo.

Willem Buiter's Maverecon Sat 2009-10-10 13:13 EDT

I know I know nothing; but at least I know that

Willem Buiter

...Except for the important qualifier that the US dollar is a global reserve currency, and that the US government (and private sector) has most of its domestic and external liabilities denominated in US dollars, the pathologies of financial boom, bubble and bust in the US, the UK, Iceland, Ireland and Spain (and many of the Central and East European emerging market economies) track those of classical emerging market crises in South America, Asia and CEE in the 1990s, rather well. The emerging market analogy makes one less optimistic about a robust recovery, as typically, emerging markets whose financial sector was destroyed by a serious financial crisis took many years to recover their pre-crisis growth rates and often never recovered their pre-crisis GDP paths.

know; least; Willem Buiter's Maverecon.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-09-22 09:15 EDT

Confessions of a 'Flationary Agnostic

Jesse

I have no particular allegiance to either the hyperinflation or the deflationary camps. Both outcomes are possible, but not yet probable. Rather than being a benefit, occupying the middle ground too often just puts one in the middle, being able to see the merits in both arguments and possibilities, and being unwilling to ignore the flaws in each argument...The growth rate of dollars is slowing at the same time that the 'demand' for dollars, the velocity of money and the creation of new commercial credit, is slowing. GDP is negative, and the growth rate of money supply is still positive, and rather healthy. This is not a monetary deflation, but rather the signs of an emerging stagflation fueled by slow real economic activity and monetization, or hot money, from the Fed. The monetary authority is trying to lead the economic recovery through unusual monetary growth. All they are doing is creating more malinvestment, risk addiction, and asset bubbles...Using money as a 'tool' to stimulate or retard economic activity is a dangerous game indeed, fraught with unintended consequences and unexpected bubbles and imbalances, with a spiral of increasingly destabilizing crises and busts. The Obama Administration bears a heavy responsibility for this because of their failure to reform the system and restore balance to the economy in any meaningful way.

confessed; Flationary Agnostic; Jesse's Café Américain.

Steve Keen's Debtwatch Sun 2009-08-30 20:48 EDT

Debtwatch No. 38: The GFC--Pothole or Mountain?

Cassander

``The Marxian view is that capitalistic economies are inherently unstable and that excessive accumulation of capital will lead to increasingly severe economic crises. Growth theory, which has proved to be empirically successful, says this is not true.'' wrote Economics Nobel Prize winner Edward C. Prescott. Prescott also claimed ``the Great Depression was a conscious choice by American workers to enjoy more leisure, in response to unspecified changes in the labour market'' Apparently debt played no role. The capitalistic economy is stable, and absent some change in technology or the rules of the economic game, the [...]

38; Debtwatch; GFC; Mountain; Potholes; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

Fri 2009-01-16 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Cautionary Tales: Central Bank Liquidity Injections Made Crises Worse in Latin America

Carmine Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff; ``authorities found it difficult to mop up the liquidity they had created. Rapid growth in money supply stoked serious inflation''

cautionary tale; Central Bank Liquidity Injections Made Crises Worse; Latin America; naked capitalism.

Sat 2009-01-03 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Past Financial Crises Suggest Pain Far From Over

Economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff show historical financial crises more severe and protracted than ordinary recessions

Financial Crises Suggest Pain; naked capitalism.

Wed 2008-10-08 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Lessons From Modern Economic Crises (Not for the Fainthearted)

``episodes of credit crunches and housing busts are often long and deep''

Fainthearted; Lessons; Modern Economic Crises; naked capitalism.

Tue 2008-10-07 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: New IMF Study of Banking Crises Contradicts Bailout Bill Premise and Details

Banking Crises Contradicts Bailout Bill Premise; details; naked capitalism; New IMF Study.

Tue 2008-07-08 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: "Eight hundred years of financial folly"

Carmen Reinhart, Kenneth Rogoff; long-run historical financial crises; major capital inflows are highly correlated with near-term debt crises; Yves: "we are in the same position as Thailand and Indonesia, circa 1996, except we have the reserve currency and nukes"

financial folly; naked capitalism; years.