zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-12-08 18:26 EST

Guest Post: Woman Who Invented Credit Default Swaps [Blythe Masters] is One of the Key Architects of Carbon Derivatives, Which Would Be at the Very CENTER of Cap and Trade

...If the government allows massive carbon derivatives trading with as little oversight as over the CDS market, taxpayers will end up spending many trillions bailing out the giant banks and propping up the economy when the carbon market bubble bursts...(1) the giant banks will make a killing on carbon trading, (2) while the leading scientist crusading against global warming says it won't work, and (3) there is a very high probability of massive fraud and insider trading in the carbon trading markets.

Blythe Masters; capped; carbon derivatives; center; Guest Post; invented credit default swaps; key architect; naked capitalism; trading; Woman.

naked capitalism Fri 2009-11-20 09:42 EST

Einhorn: First, Let's Kill All the Credit Default Swaps

David Einhorn, who enjoys his considerable reputation for hard-fought battles against firms with shaky finances and dubious accounting (Alliance Capital and Lehman), has taken aim at a new and equally deserving target: credit default swaps...CDS are a means of extortion...CDS speculators win if companies die...a credit default swaps clearinghouse is not a viable solution...CDS serve the interests of the financial sector at the expense of the real economy...

Credit Default Swap; Einhorn; Let's Kill; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 19:32 EST

Very Abbreviated Takedown on SIGTARP Report on AIG CDS Payouts

Dear sports fans, your humble blogger, along with a ton of others, got the not-very-embargoed copy of the SIGTARP report on the New York Fed's conduct with respect to its full payout on AIG's credit default swaps to its counterparties. The press is treating the report as if it was tough. I was sputtering with anger when reading it on how soft it was on the Fed. The positioning and framing of the issues was almost without exception far too forgiving. It read as if the findings had been negotiated with the Fed (and SIGTARP lost the negotiations as the ``shape of the table'' stage), but I am assured not, not by SIGTARP, but by those, as they like to say, in a position to know. That says SIGTARP is almost as badly cognitively captured as the Fed is...

Abbreviated Takedown; AIG CDS Payouts; naked capitalism; SIGTARP report.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 10:41 EST

Fed Authorized 100% Payout by AIG on CDS

It had generally been assumed that the AIG payouts of 100% on credit swaps (when the insurer was under water and bankrupt companies do not satisfy their obligations in full) was the result of some gap in oversight plus traders at AIG exercising discretion (they were unhappy about bonus rows and had reason to curry favor with dealers, who were potential employers). The article makes clear that AIG had been negotiating to settle on the swaps prior to getting aid from the government, and was seeking a 40% discount. The Fed might not have gotten that much of a discount, but there was clearly no need to pay out at par. This massive backdoor subsidy to the likes of Goldman, DeutscheBank was authorized by Geithner while he was at the New York Fed.

AIG; CDS; Fed Authorized 100; naked capitalism; payout.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-26 09:28 EDT

How The Federal Reserve Bailed Out The World

The Bank of International Settlements [BIS] just released a major paper titled "The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response" which goes on to demonstrate just how it happened that Fed chief Ben Bernanke in essence bailed out the entire developed world, which was facing an unprecedented dollar shortage crisis due to the sudden implosion of FX swap lines and other mechanisms which until that point were critical in maintaining the dollar funding shortfall for virtually every foreign Central Bank...When the financial system almost imploded in the fall of 2008, one of the primary responses by the Federal Reserve was the issuance of an unprecedented amount of FX liquidity lines in the form of swaps to foreign Central Banks. The number went from practically zero to a peak of $582 billion on December 10, 2008. The number of swaps outstanding was almost directly inversely correlated with the value of the dollar...what happened is that short-term sources to sustain the massive dollar funding mismatch disappeared virtually overnight, and CBs were suddenly facing a toxic spiral of selling increasingly more worthless assets merely to satisfy currency funding needs in an environment where all of a sudden nobody was willing to provide FX swap lines...had the Fed not stepped in, the rest of the world...would have simply collapsed as the $6.5 trillion dollar funding gap closed in on itself, causing a indiscriminate selling off of all dollar denominated assets. The implosion of the basis trade would have seemed like a picnic compared to what was about to ensue had the Fed not stepped in to perpetuate the Fiat banking way of life.

Federal Reserve bail; world; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2009-09-22 08:29 EDT

Guest Post: Satyajit Das on Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde Finance

Satyajit Das

One year ago, AIG was brought to the brink of bankruptcy as a result its exposure under credit default swaps (''CDS'') (a form of credit insurance). Asset backed securities and Collateralised Debt Obligations (''CDOs''), which lived up to its cheery nickname Chernobyl Death Obligation, brought the financial system to the edge of collapse...If you assumed that these events meant that wild beast of derivatives would be tamed, then you would be wrong. History tells us that there will be cosmetic changes to the functioning of the market but business as usual will resume in the not too distant futureIf you assumed that these events meant that wild beast of derivatives would be tamed, then you would be wrong. History tells us that there will be cosmetic changes to the functioning of the market but business as usual will resume in the not too distant future.

Dr. Jekyll; Guest Post; Mr. Hyde Finance; Satyajit Das.

Bank-Implode! Sun 2009-09-20 12:22 EDT

Bank-Implode! >> Blog Archive >> Exclusive -- Wells Fargo's Commercial Portfolio is a ticking time bomb

In order to sort through the disaster that is Wells Fargo's (quote: WFC) commercial loan portfolio, the bank has hired help from outside experts to pour over the books... and they are shocked with what they are seeing. Not only do the bank's outstanding commercial loans collectively exceed the property values to which they are attached, but derivative trades leftover from its acquisition of Wachovia are creating another set of problems for the already beleaguered San Francisco-based megabank...According to sources currently working out these loans at Wells Fargo, when selling tranches of commercial mortgage-backed securities below the super senior tranche, Wachovia promised to pay the buyer's risk premium by writing credit default swap contracts against these subordinate bonds...should the junior tranches eventually default, then the bank is on the hook.

bank implode; blogs Archive; exclusive; ticking time bomb; Wells Fargo's commercial portfolio.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Thu 2009-07-30 00:00 EDT

Michael Hudson: The Toll Booth Economy

Michael Hudson: The Toll Booth Economy -- by Michael Hudson ``The Latest in Junk Economics'' What is missing is a critique of the big picture how Wall Street has financialized the public domain to inaugurate a neo-feudal tollbooth economy while privatizing the government itself, headed by the Treasury and Federal Reserve. Left untouched is the story how industrial capitalism has succumbed to an insatiable and unsustainable finance capitalism, whose newest final stage seems to be a zero-sum game of casino capitalism based on derivative swaps and kindred hedge fund gambling innovations...What have been lost are the Progressive Eras two great reforms. First, minimizing the economys free lunch of unearned income (e.g., monopolistic privilege and privatization of the public domain in contrast to ones own labor and enterprise) by taxing absentee property rent and asset-price (capital) gains, by keeping natural monopolies in the public domain, and by anti-trust regulation...A second Progressive Era aim was to steer the financial sector so as to fund capital formation. Industrial credit was best achieved in Germany and Central Europe in the decades prior to World War I. But the Allied victory led to the dominance of Anglo-American banking practice, based on loans against property or income streams already in place. Todays bank credit has become decoupled from capital formation, taking the form mainly of mortgage credit (80 per cent), and loans secured by corporate stock (for mergers, acquisitions and corporate raids) as well as for speculation. The effect is to spur asset-price inflation on credit, in ways that benefit the few at the expense of the economy at large.''

Michael Hudson; Toll Booth Economy.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-07-30 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Kabuki on the Potomac: Reforming Credit Default Swaps and OTC Derivatives

-- he Masters of the Universe who run the largest Wall Street firms of have learned not a thing when it comes to credit default swaps ("CDS") and other types of high-risk financial engineering. Indeed, not only are the largest derivative dealers fighting efforts to reform the CDS and other derivative instruments that caused the AIG fiasco, but regulators like the Federal Reserve Board and US Treasury are working with the banks to ensure that a small group of dealers increase their monopoly over the business of over-the-counter ("OTC") derivatives.''

Institutional Risk Analyst; IRA Analyst; Kabuki; OTC derivative; Potomac; Reforming Credit Default Swaps.

Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Musings on Credit Default Swaps

Credit Default Swap; mused; naked capitalism.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Tue 2009-06-16 00:00 EDT

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps -- Through The Looking Glass

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products: Credit Default Swaps - Through The Looking Glass; ``The specter of banks, some of whom have needed capital injections and liquidity support from governments to ensure their own survival, offering to insure other market participants against the risk of default of sovereign government (sometimes their own) is surreal.'' ``much of what passed for financial innovation was specifically designed to conceal risk, obfuscate investors and reduce transparency''

Credit Default Swap; fears; financial products; loath; Looking Glass; Satyajit Das's Blog.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-06-11 00:00 EDT

The Institutional Risk Analyst: Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane

Credit Default Swaps and Too Big to Fail or Unwind: Interview With Ed Kane; ``The whole basis of policy making in Washington today is that the taxpayer is a sucker who does not know how to defend him or her self against this kind of regulatory gambling.''

big; Credit Default Swap; Ed Kane; fail; Institutional Risk Analyst; interview; IRA Analyst; unwinds.

Wed 2009-05-20 00:00 EDT

Credit Default Swaps, Herald of Doom (for Beginners) << The Baseline Scenario

Baseline Scenario; beginners; Credit Default Swap; doomed; Herald.