naked capitalism Thu 2010-09-30 08:22 EDT

Why Backstopping Repo is a Bad Idea

The normally sound Gillian Tett of the Financial Times endorses an idea that is both dangerous and unnecessary, namely, government backstopping of the system of short-term collateralized lending called repo, for ``sale with agreement to repurchase.''...But the real problem is that the only securities that were once considered to be suitable were those of the very highest quality, namely Treasuries. The real problem is in widening the market beyond that. If you have absolutely impeccable collateral, you don't care if your counterparty goes belly up if you aren't at risk of losses on the assets you hold...the real problem is the use of low quality collateral...why would we possibly WANT a system that might down the road encourage the pledging of less than stellar instruments as repo?...we need to go back and look hard at why the need for repo has risen since 2001, and how much is related to legitimate activity. The fact that it grew much more rapidly than the economy overall suggests not...official efforts should proceed...to shrink the repo market (as we've recommended for a market that has contributed to the growth of repo, credit default swaps)...our efforts NOT to restrain banks leads to a tremendous tax on all of us...a banking industry that creates global crises is negative value added from a societal standpoint. It is purely extractive...

Backstopping Repo; Bad Ideas; naked capitalism.

naked capitalism Tue 2010-08-17 12:40 EDT

Guest Post: Why Clearninghouses Are a Maginot Line Against Systemic Risk

Warren Turbeville

As discussed in ECONNED and on this blog, clearinghouses are not a solution to the systemic risk posed by credit default swaps, since there is no way to have a CDS counterparty post adequate margin and have the product be viable (to put it more simply, adequate margin make CDS uneconomic). ..I am one of the few people around who knows something about the clearing business and theory and is not employed by an investment bank or clearinghouse. At the end of my career on Wall Street, I was hired to perform a financial autopsy of the special purpose derivatives clearinghouse set up by California as part of an innovative power market structure. It had failed in the state's power crisis of 2001-02. Observing the tremendous systemic risk generated by using conventional clearing techniques for all but straightforward derivatives, I embarked on a seven year quest. I formed a company that designed a mathematical, IT and legal structure to provide a transparent and orderly system to manage the risks of those derivatives which shouldn't be cleared conventionally. Imagine my surprise when the banks decided against using the system...

Clearninghouses; Guest Post; Maginot Line; naked capitalism; systemic risk.

Jesse's Café Américain Sat 2010-04-03 09:48 EDT

Whistleblower Speaks Out On J. P. Morgan's Market Manipulation - Reports Violations to the CFTC

Jesse

Do we have another Harry Markopolos here, describing in detail the manipulation of the gold market by J.P. Morgan to the CFTC? How does this square with the testimony today from the CFTC Commissioners, who seem to indicate that the markets are functioning extremely well, and that investor can have full confidence in them? I am led to understand that Mr. McGuire had offered to testify before the CFTC today, and that he was refused admittance. I do not know him, or the position he is in within the trading community. I cannot therefore assess his credibility or the validity of any evidence which he may present or possess. But I have the feeling that nothing will come of this...What seems particularly twisted about this is that JPM is the custodian of the largest silver ETF (SLV). Is anyone auditing that ETF, and watching any conflicts of interest and self-trading? Multiple counterparty claims on the same bullion? If you ever wanted to see a good reason for the Volcker rule, this is it. These jokers are one of the US' largest banks, with trillions of dollars in unaudited derivatives exposure, and they seem to be engaging in trading practices like Enron did before it collapsed...

CFTC; J. P. Morgan's Market Manipulation; Jesse's Café Américain; reported violations; Whistleblowers speak.

Wed 2010-02-03 19:45 EST

Bankruptcy Judge Invalidates Securitization Payment Structure >> HousingWire

A federal bankruptcy court judge in New York ruled earlier this week that long-held assumptions about payments owed to a counterparty in securitization deals cannot be enforced under US Bankruptcy Code, in a decision set to upend the securitization market. The decision was handed down by Judge James Peck, the judge overseeing the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy proceedings, who said that certain contractual provisions in a Lehman collateralized default obligation (CDO) are unenforceable under Chapter 11.

Bankruptcy Judge Invalidates Securitization Payment Structure; HousingWire.

New Deal 2.0 Mon 2009-11-30 13:44 EST

Geithner's Disgrace

Eliot Spitzer

he issue has been festering for months: Why were AIG's counterparties -- including Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and UBS -- paid 100 cents on the dollar when the feds rescued the insurance giant, helping raising the cost of the bailout to nearly $200 billion? A new report issued by Special Inspector General Neil Barofsky now reveals that government officials, notably then -- New York Fed President and current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, grievously damaged the nation and capitulated to the very banks they should have been supervising.

0; Geithner's Disgrace; new dealing 2.

The Full Feed from HuffingtonPost.com Wed 2009-11-25 12:11 EST

Geithner Singled Out In TARP Watchdog Neil Barofsky's Scathing Report On AIG Bailout

The Huffington Post News Editors

In its bailout last fall of the insurance giant AIG, a team led by current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner failed nearly every step of the way, according to a scathing report released Monday by a government watchdog. Instead of bargaining with AIG's numerous counterparties to resolve its billions of dollars in souring derivatives contracts, Geithner's team ended up funneling payments for those toxic derivatives to AIG's counterparties at "an amount far above their market value at the time," the report notes.

AIG Bailout; com; full Feeds; Geithner singled; HuffingtonPost; TARP watchdog Neil Barofsky's scathing report.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 11:40 EST

Neil Barofski's AIG Counterparty Payment Report Released; Demands Federal Reserve Transparency

The full SIGTARP report on AIG and its counterparty payments has been released. It contains all you need to know about the NYFED's bailout of Goldman Sachs. We are currently going through the report, and will post our findings as we have them...the most critical conclusion presented by Neil Barofsky: The SIGTARP blasts the Fed's ongoing desire to keep everything hidden and under a layer of opacity, as it keeps on lying to taxpayers that all is fine with the US economy, and urges investors to part with their hard-earned dollars and "invest" in toxic husks of zombie companies, when it knows full well that the entire financial system is constantly on the cusp of yet another collapse, and the market ponzi scheme could collapse at any minute.

Demands Federal Reserve Transparency; Neil Barofski's AIG Counterparty Payment Report Released; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 19:32 EST

Very Abbreviated Takedown on SIGTARP Report on AIG CDS Payouts

Dear sports fans, your humble blogger, along with a ton of others, got the not-very-embargoed copy of the SIGTARP report on the New York Fed's conduct with respect to its full payout on AIG's credit default swaps to its counterparties. The press is treating the report as if it was tough. I was sputtering with anger when reading it on how soft it was on the Fed. The positioning and framing of the issues was almost without exception far too forgiving. It read as if the findings had been negotiated with the Fed (and SIGTARP lost the negotiations as the ``shape of the table'' stage), but I am assured not, not by SIGTARP, but by those, as they like to say, in a position to know. That says SIGTARP is almost as badly cognitively captured as the Fed is...

Abbreviated Takedown; AIG CDS Payouts; naked capitalism; SIGTARP report.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

naked capitalism Sun 2009-09-13 15:59 EDT

Another Lehman Mess: No One Can Run the Software

Lehman's global derivatives book included contracts with a notional face value of $39,000bn and deals with 8,000 different counterparties when it went bust. The derivatives business was actually split into multiple strands, backed up by between 20 and 30 different systems. Once it went bankrupt, the staff who supported these systems "evaporated"...The more time goes by, the less insight remains in terms of the people who staffed those systems...Many previously hidden costs of running a derivatives business, including technology support of multiple disjointed systems, can no longer be discounted.

Lehman Mess; naked capitalism; running; software.

Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Guest Post: Moral Hazard Now Biting GM

``GM bondholders are probably wondering why they need to take a haircut on their bonds when the counterparties of Bear Sterns, Lehman, and AIG are being made whole at par after investing in far riskier securities''

Biting GM; Guest Post; moral hazard; naked capitalism.

Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

The real scandal at AIG is the not the bonuses. It's the payments to counterparties. - By Eliot Spitzer - Slate Magazine

The real scandal at AIG is the not the bonuses. It's the payments to counterparties. - By Eliot Spitzer - Slate Magazine

AIG; bonus; counterparty; Eliot Spitzer; payment; Real Scandal; Slate Magazine.

Tue 2009-04-21 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: AIG Posts List of <strike>Beneficiaries of Government Largesse</strike> Counterparties

naked capitalism: AIG Posts List of Beneficiaries of Government Largesse Counterparties; Goldman Sachs received 13 billion

AIG Posts List; beneficiaries; counterparty; government largesse; naked capitalism; striking.

Thu 2009-01-15 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Has Beggar Thy Neighbor Started?

``we have often been faced with counterparties with mercantilist objectives, and our responses appear not to have served us well in the long term''

Beggar Thy Neighbor Started; naked capitalism.

Tue 2008-05-13 00:00 EDT

Interfluidity :: Counterparty of last resort?

Fed purchasing mortgage-backed securities; Will Fed have contingent liabilities, counterparty exposures?

counterparty; Interfluidity; resort.

Tue 2008-03-25 00:00 EDT

Interfluidity :: Counterparty of last resort?

Fed "loan" "to support J.P. Morgan's purchase of Bear Stearns...not a loan at all. The Fed and J.P. Morgan are creating an investment fund, to be managed by BlackRock."

counterparty; Interfluidity; resort.

Thu 2008-02-14 00:00 EST

Minyanville -

Default Swaps Intensify Credit Crunch, by Rob Roy (Minyanville); "Counterparty risk may be greatest risk of all."; impending CDS blowup;

Minyanville.

Mon 2007-12-17 00:00 EST

Bear In Mind > Wipe out on Wall Street: Derivatives credit risk

Bear In Mind > Wipe out on Wall Street: Derivatives credit risk; ACA Capital hedge counterparty CIBC takes 3B markdown; major investment banks "dead men walking"

Bear; Derivatives credit risk; mind; Wall Street; WIPED.

Fri 2007-11-30 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: Counterparty Risk Problems With Credit Default Swaps?

(45 trillion notional CDS outstanding; counterparties "concerned about collecting from hedge funds that were long"?

Counterparty Risk Problems; Credit Default Swap; naked capitalism.