dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

2007 Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

  1. Newest
  2. Newer
  3. Older
  4. Oldest

Fri 2010-02-26 16:37 EST

Wall Street's Bailout Hustle : Rolling Stone

...The nation's six largest banks -- all committed to this balls-out, I drink your milkshake! strategy of flagrantly gorging themselves as America goes hungry -- set aside a whopping $140 billion for executive compensation last year, a sum only slightly less than the $164 billion they paid themselves in the pre-crash year of 2007..."What is the state of our moral being when Lloyd Blankfein taking a $9 million bonus is viewed as this great act of contrition, when every penny of it was a direct transfer from the taxpayer?" asks Eliot Spitzer...A year and a half after they were minutes away from bankruptcy, how are these assholes not only back on their feet again, but hauling in bonuses at the same rate they were during the bubble? The answer to that question is basically twofold: They raped the taxpayer, and they raped their clients...a brief history of the best 18 months of grifting this country has ever seen...

Rolling Stone; Wall Street's Bailout Hustle.

zero hedge Tue 2010-02-16 16:33 EST

The LBO Refi Wave Approaches: $800 Billion In Junk Debt Maturing By 2014, Adds To Multi Trillion Fixed Income Refi Cliff

After a mere $100 billion in projected debt maturities in the 2010-2011 period, the LBO wave of 2005-2007, largely financed with 5-7 year tenor bonds and loans, will set the refi scene on fire in the 2012-2014 period, when $700 billion of debt is set to mature. Should Fed Fund rates, and the yield curve begin to shift higher, the incremental cost of debt capital will destroy tens if not hundreds of billions of equity value over the next 5 years...

2014; 800; adds; Junk Debt Maturing; LBO Refi Wave Approaches; Multi Trillion Fixed Income Refi Cliff; Zero Hedge.

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Wed 2010-02-10 11:22 EST

AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE REAL ESTATE TRAIN WRECK

The first time I spoke with real estate entrepreneur Andy Miller was in late 2007, when I asked him to serve on the faculty of a Casey Research Summit...what most intrigued me about Andy was that he had been almost alone among his peer group in foreseeing the coming end of the real estate bubble, and in liquidating essentially all of his considerable portfolio of projects near the top...he remains deeply concerned about the outlook for real estate...the United States home mortgage market has been nationalized without anybody noticing...If government support goes away, and it will go away, where will that leave the home market? It leaves you with a catastrophe...eventually the bond market is going to gag on the government-sponsored paper...commercial properties are not performing and that values have gone down, although I've got to tell you, the denial is still widespread, particularly in the United States and on the part of lenders sitting on and servicing all these real estate portfolios...The current volume of defaults is already alarming. And the volume of commercial real estate defaults is growing every month...When you hit that breaking point, unless there's some alternative in place, it's going to be a very hideous picture for the bond market and the banking system...second quarter 2010 is a guess...the FDIC and the Treasury Department have decided that rather than see 1,000 or 2,000 banks go under and then create another RTC to sift through all the bad assets, they'll let the banking system warehouse the bad assets. Their plan is to leave the assets in place, and then, when the market changes, let the banks deal with them. Now, that's horribly destructive...it's exactly a Japanese-style solution...The entire U.S. residential mortgage market has in effect been nationalized, but there wasn't any act of Congress, no screaming and shouting, no headlines in the Wall Street Journal or the New York Times...That's a template for what they could do with the commercial loan market.

insider's view; pragmatic capitalists; Real Estate Train Wreck.

Culture of Life News Sun 2010-01-31 11:46 EST

US Dollar No Longer Main FOREX Currency

A meteorite came crashing through the stratosphere on Tuesday. A reminder about what real danger is all about. The US dollar is breaking apart in the stratosphere, too. The FOREX holdings of all our major trade rivals is rapidly changing from sucking in US dollars to sucking in yen and euros. Both Japan and the EU hate this but can't stop it. As I predicted in July, 2007, the final result of the US, EU and Japan demanding China strengthen the yuan while not demanding Japan strengthen the yen, has led to this global shift in dollar holdings.

Culture; Dollar; Life News; Longer Main FOREX Currency.

Calculated Risk Wed 2010-01-13 12:01 EST

HAMP Loan Modifications and the Fifth Amendment

...The homedebtor enjoyed some initial success arguing a non-judicial foreclosure was a violation of due process...The homedebtors are named Huxtable and Agnew. Interestingly, Agnew is also listed as the "lead attorney" for the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs defaulted in late 2007, and the bank began a non-judicial foreclosure process in late 2008. The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court to stop the foreclosure, naming as defendants Timothy Geithner, the FHFA the lender and the servicer. The plaintiffs were allegedly denied a HAMP modification, and they claim the government and the bank violated the plaintiffs' right to "due process under the Fifth Amendment for failing to create rules implementing HAMP that comport with due process."...The judge refused to dismiss the case because the plaintiffs might be able to prove the government has "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence" with the bank.

amendment; Calculated Risk; HAMP Loan Modifications.

Thu 2010-01-07 19:54 EST

Conversation with John Rubino <<; Phil's Favorites -- By Ilene

John Rubino is the co-author, with GoldMoney's James Turk, of The Collapse of the Dollar and How to Profit From It (Doubleday, 2007), and author of Clean Money: Picking Winners in the Green-Tech Boom (Wiley, 2008), How to Profit from the Coming Real Estate Bust (Rodale, 2003) and Main Street, Not Wall Street (Morrow, 1998)...``This is the end of a long era and the beginning of another that is not going to be nearly as nice.''...go to a coin dealer and buy some gold and silver coins and then store them in a safe place. And gold and silver mining stocks will go up if the dollar goes down...Clean tech is interesting...which of the twenty different possible clean tech sectors do you want to focus on first? ...The best of them is called smart grid....

conversations; Ilene; John Rubino; Phil's Favorites.

zero hedge Mon 2009-12-28 22:26 EST

Moody's CMBS Delinquency Tracker Hits Decade High

Yes, yes, everyone knows commercial real estate is a neutron bomb waiting to go off, and while many are yapping, nobody is doing jack. The Fed will deal with that implosion, the expectation goes, just as tidily as it dealt with the last bubble implosion...Delinquency increased 37 basis points in October, as measured by the Moody's Delinquency Tracker (DQT). The delinquency rate now stands at 4.01%, more than six times the rate seen at the same time last year. The rate has increased over 375 basis points from the low reached in July 2007, with further increases anticipated.

Moody's CMBS Delinquency Tracker Hits Decade High; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-12-22 11:53 EST

``Basel III -- the OK, the Unfinished and the Ugly''

The BIS analysis of the 2007-09 banking crisis floats my boat. Here is their headline list of causes: excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage, diminutive and low quality capital bases, insufficient liquidity buffers at banks.

Basel III; naked capitalism; Ok; ugly; unfinished.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 12:13 EST

Two Opposing Amendments Emerge That Seek To Either Perpetuate The Fed's Secrecy, Or Overturn It

As the time to make or break the Fiat Money Overlords (no, not Chrysler), aka the Successor to the Second Bank of The United States which President Andrew Jackson managed to disassemble in 1832, yet which came back with a vengeance in 1913 under the guise of the Federal Reserve, approaches, two independent amendments emerged today: one drafted by Fed transparency proponents Ron Paul and Alan Grayson (found here) and one by Bank of America and Citigroup's favorite Congressman, North Carolina democrat Mel Watt (found here). As a reminder, here is a list of the Congressman's top contributors and sources of money in 2007-2008, which may explain some of his motivations: #1 Bank of America;#2 Wachovia Corp;#3 American Express;#4 American Bankers Assn.

Fed's Secrecy; Opposing Amendments Emerge; overturn; perpetual; seek; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 10:10 EST

Shadow Banking Topology

A new paper by the IMF provides much needed insights into the nature of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits, which amounted to $1.2 trillion in June 2007, a subset of the broader Commercial Paper shadow asset class (which as Bill Dudley discussed a week ago, hit a peak of $2.3 trillion), and the product's role in funding imbalances (and maturity mismatch) at global banks courtesy of the shadow banking system. However, the most useful observation of the paper's addenda include insights into the global shadow banking system's holdings, as well as its changing composition over time, the collapse of the ABS securitization market whose reincarnation via TALF is critical for preventing the CRE market's implosion in 2012, and lastly a comprehensive overview of the entire shadow banking system...

Shadow Banking Topology; Zero Hedge.

Bruce Krasting Thu 2009-11-19 10:52 EST

FHFA's DeMarco Speaks - Ouch!

FHFA's Acting Director Edward DeMarco provided written testimony to the Senate today. I would give his presentation a B+. There is little room for optimism in this story. Mr. DeMarco did not gloss that fact over. A few snips from that speech: -From July 2007 through the first half of 2009--combined losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac totaled $165 billion. In the first half of 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together reported net losses of $47 billion. -Since the establishment of the conservatorships, the combined losses at the two Enterprises depleted all their capital and required them to draw $96 billion. The combined support from the federal government exceeds $1 trillion. -The short-term outlook for the Enterprises remains troubled and likely will require additional draws...

Bruce Krasting; FHFA's DeMarco Speaks; Ouch.

naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 10:43 EST

Roubini Predicts ``Mother of All Carry Trade Unwinds''

Nouriel Roubini has officially left the ``hedging your bets on the economy'' camp. He has declared the markets to be frothy because super low dollar borrowing rates have turned the greenback into the funding currency for the carry trade. Far more important than the peppy rally in the stock market is the resumption of early 2007 style risk taking in the credit markets.

carry trade unwind; mother; naked capitalism; Roubini predicted.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash | McClatchy

In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting. Goldman's sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation's premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies. Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk...

Goldman Secretly Bet; McClatchy; U.S. housing crash.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:12 EST

Business & Technology | Part one | Reckless strategies doomed WaMu | Seattle Times Newspaper

In its headlong pursuit of growth, WaMu systematically dismantled or weakened the internal controls meant to prevent the bank from taking on too much risk -- the very standards and practices that had helped it grow in the first place. WaMu's riskiest loans raked in money from high fees, but because the bank skimped on making sure borrowers could repay them, they eventually failed at disastrously high rates. As loans went bad, they sucked massive amounts of cash that WaMu needed to stay in business. WaMu's subprime home loans failed at the highest rates in nation. Foreclosure rates for subprime loans made from 2005 to 2007 -- the peak of the boom -- were calamitous. In the 10 hardest-hit cities, more than a third of WaMu subprime loans went into foreclosure.

business; part; Reckless Strategies Doomed WaMu; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

  1. Newest
  2. Newer
  3. Older
  4. Oldest