winterspeak.com Sat 2010-05-22 14:02 EDT

Richard Koo, who is so close, is still wrong

winterspeak

...Richard Koo, who understands the situation in Japan (which is very very similar) quite well still makes suboptimal recommendations because he too does not understand how the financial system works...He's correct in saying that massive fiscal stimulus saved Japan. They really were on the brink of their Great Depression in the 80s, and have avoided it without going to War. This is good, but none of it was necessary, so really represents a massive failure. Koo thinks that the Govt is spending the money the private sector has saved. In fact, Govt spending is what is giving the private sector its savings! Government is not borrowing anything. Japan should really just massively slash taxes and fund its private sector. Let the balance sheets heal already! Koo does not talk about all the terrible malinvestment that the Governments fiscal spending did. The US should simply implement a payroll tax holiday until inflation starts to tick up. Right now, the US's savings desire is not as high as the Japanese's, but a double dip might get it closer. That just means the US will need even higher deficits. It took Japan 20 years to start getting comfortable with sufficiently large deficits. Now might be a good time to go long the Nikkei, actually.

closed; com; Richard Koo; Winterspeak; wrong.

Sat 2010-05-22 13:46 EDT

KOO's "Good News": Nomura Economist Says GDP Needn't Fall In "Balance Sheet Recession"

...Koo's theory and his prescriptions for what currently ails the world are as fascinating as they are unconventional. Considering the woeful track record of orthodox economists (across the entire spectrum from liberal to conservative) in diagnosing, much less treating, the body economic as it has been wracked with credit ills, Koo's fresh perspectives, grounded in the searing experience of Japan's Great Recession, demand careful consideration...

Balance Sheet Recessions; GOOD NEWS; Koo's; Nomura Economist Says GDP Needn't Fall.

Tue 2010-05-18 14:16 EDT

billy blog >> Blog Archive >> The enemies from within

...Unemployment is the major source of poverty whether it be in a advanced or developing country. It is alienating, soul destroying, extends its costs well beyond the individual and the income losses alone dwarf the costs arising from so-called microeconomic inefficiencies. The daily loss of GDP involved in not having all available workers doing something productive is mammoth. It is a no-brainer that it is the large economic problem that should be solved in any country...If the private sector cannot produce enough then there is only one sector left ladies and gentleman who can do the trick!...Given the private sector doesn't want to spend at present -- and you cannot blame them for that given the appalling state of their balance sheets and the very unsteady housing market -- there is a danger that demand will drop further unless the government adds to its stimulus packages...the US is an economy that desperately needs more aggregate demand. The only constraint on employment is the lack of spending and there is no financial constraint that exists in a fiat monetary system that prevents the government from eliminating that demand deficiency...

Billy Blog; blogs Archive; enemies.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:58 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 2, Households)

...Now for the Minsky part. The theory above, in layman's terms, argues that over time, when an economy expands without serious contractions, finances will become increasingly risky. Minsky wrote of a shift from hedge finance (when debt, both principal and interest, can be serviced from cash flows) through speculative finance (when debt must be rolled over as only interest payments can be serviced from cash flows) and into Ponzi finance (when cash flows cannot cover interest payments and thus new debt must be added or assets sold). The idea in the Ponzi finance stage is that asset appreciation will compensate for the extra risk...I don't mean to suggest we (collectively) are broke, just that, as Minsky argued (and the data bears out) our balance sheets are increasingly betting on real estate and equity price appreciation with borrowed money...

Household; Minsky Cruise; Part 2; Wall Street Examiner.

zero hedge Fri 2010-04-23 20:02 EDT

How Lehman, With The Fed's Complicity, Created Another Illegal Precedent In Abusing The Primary Dealer Credit Facility

Five months ago, Zero Hedge observed the nuances of the Federal Reserve's Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) and concluded that this artificial liquidity boosting construct was nothing more than yet another scam to allow banks to extract ever more money from taxpayers, with the complicit blessing of the Federal Reserve Board Of New York (as the original piece also provided an in-depth discussion of the triparty repo market which is now a parallel to the buzzword of the day in the form of Lehman's "Repo 105" off balance sheet contraption, it should serve as a useful refresher course to anyone who wishes to understand why while Repo 105 with its $50 billion in liability contingency may have been an issue, the true Repo market, with over $3 trillion of likely just as toxic assets, is where the real pain in the future will come from). The PDCF would allow assets of declining and even inexistent value to be pledged as collateral, thus making sure that taxpayer cash was funneled into sham institutions holding predominantly toxic assets, and whose viability was and is limited, yet still is backed by the Fed, which to this day continues to pour our money into them. Today, with a tip from the NYT's Eric Dash, we demonstrate just how grossly negligent the Federal Reserve was when it came to Lehman's abuse of the PDCF, and how the trail of slime of Lehman's increasingly obvious manipulation of its books goes to the very top of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and its then governor - a very much complicit Tim Geithner...

abuse; created; Fed's Complicity; Illegal Precedent; Lehman; Primary Dealers Credit Facility; Zero Hedge.

Mon 2010-04-19 15:42 EDT

Why The World Is Headed For A Balance Sheet Recession - Credit Writedowns

...[Richard Koo] believes the US, Europe and China are headed for a period of incredibly weak consumer spending not unlike what Japan has been through...what US policymakers are trying to do is to both increase asset prices and consumption in order to short circuit the D-Process i.e. prevent the debt deflation that results from deleveraging and asset and price deflation. Almost all measures taken to date are attempts to prop up asset prices (artificially I believe)...we are in for a debt restructuring across Europe, and in America and China because of the accumulation of debt and malinvestment. Policy makers are reverting to the same old game of asset price inflation to stave this off...It leaves us with chronically weak consumption trends acutely exacerbated by the demographic trends of an aging populace...these dynamics are particularly problematic for Europe because of the strictures imposed by the Euro, the large public sector debt-to-GDP ratios and the advance age of the populace. The Greek problem is the tip of the iceberg and the Europeans are seriously deluded if they think their troubles are over...

Balance Sheet Recessions; credit writedowns; Head; world.

zero hedge Wed 2010-04-07 18:31 EDT

Quantitative Easing And Its Effect On Inflation And The Economy

Sancho Ponzi

The Fed's response to the financial meltdown was twofold: Interest rates were effectively set at zero, and the monetary base was increased 140%. While it is not known exactly what formula the Fed used to arrive at the 140% increase of the monetary base, the expansion from roughly 800 billion to 2.2 trillion roughly correlates with the asset backed securities since purchased by the Fed...Rather than an attempt to spur bank lending, Bernanke, like Paulson before him, employed QE strictly to offload toxic assets from bank balance sheets in an attempt to make banks and other financial institutions whole, with the effect of preserving historically inflated asset valuations for residential real estate. As a result, massive increases in federal spending have been required to offset the erosion of private sector GDP...

economy; effect; Inflation; Quantitative Easing; Zero Hedge.

THE PRAGMATIC CAPITALIST Wed 2010-04-07 18:22 EDT

THE ENRON BANKING SYSTEM

TPC

``Panics do not destroy capital -- they merely reveal the extent to which it has previously been destroyed by its betrayal in hopelessly unproductive works'' -- John Mills ...We should draw a distinct line in the sand between banks and diverse risk taking firms. There are always going to be Enron's in the economy, but why should we allow our entire banking sector to mirror Enron? Taking a 30,000 foot risk management view I say something must be done to ensure these banks can never do this again. Turn banks into true banks. Hedging and exotic business models are fine. Just don't commingle them under the same umbrella as a deposit taking ``bank''. With that, a few ideas come to mind: * Our banking system should be aligned with the goals of the nation to help ``grease'' the wheels of the economic growth engine of the United States. Banks should be more like utilities and less like hedge funds. Otherwise, banking becomes counter-productive and potentially destructive. * Banks should not be allowed to exact onerous fees on the public or enact a business model which is inherently dependent on driving their customers deeper and deeper into debt. This undermines the entire goal of productive economic growth. * ``Banks'' should be true lending institutions. Non-traditional banking operations and products such as CDS, ``off balance sheet'' finance, derivatives as collateral and such would be deemed illegal unless performed only by non banking/lending institutions (such as hedge funds) so as to insulate the public and true lending institutions from the risk taking, ``hedging'', and ``financial innovation'' of firms such as Lehman Brothers.

ENRON BANKING SYSTEM; pragmatic capitalists.

Mon 2010-04-05 15:16 EDT

Eleven lessons from Iceland

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Iceland's economic crisis has destroyed wealth equivalent to about seven times its GDP. The damage inflicted on foreign creditors, investors, and depositors amounts to about five times its GDP, while the asset losses thrust upon Icelandic residents account for the rest. These figures do not include the cost of Iceland's increased indebtedness. Iceland's gross public debt, domestic and foreign, is estimated to increase by more than 100% of GDP as a result of the collapse of the banks, or from 29% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 136% by the end of 2010. In 2009, the government spent almost as much on interest payments as on healthcare and social insurance, the single largest public expenditure item. The damage due to Iceland's tarnished reputation is harder to assess...the absence of checks and balances that had led to an unbalanced division of power between the strong executive branch and the much weaker legislative and judicial branches came to haunt the country when unscrupulous politicians put the new banks in the hands of reckless owners who then found themselves in a position to expand their balance sheets as if there were no tomorrow -- and no supervision. Politicians who privatise banks by delivering them on a silver plate to their friends are not very likely to subject the banks to stringent supervision or other such inconveniences...What can be done to reduce the likelihood of a repeat performance -- in Iceland and elsewhere?

Iceland; Lessons.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 19:57 EDT

NY Fed Under Geithner Implicated in Lehman Accounting Fraud Allegation

Quite a few observers, including this blogger, have been stunned and frustrated at the refusal to investigate what was almost certain accounting fraud at Lehman. Despite the bankruptcy administrator's effort to blame the gaping hole in Lehman's balance sheet on its disorderly collapse, the idea that the firm, which was by its own accounts solvent, would suddenly spring a roughly $130+ billion hole in its $660 balance sheet, is simply implausible on its face. Indeed, it was such common knowledge in the Lehman flailing about period that Lehman's accounts were sus that Hank Paulson's recent book mentions repeatedly that Lehman's valuations were phony as if it were no big deal. Well, it is folks, as a newly-released examiner's report by Anton Valukas in connection with the Lehman bankruptcy makes clear. The unraveling isn't merely implicating Fuld and his recent succession of CFOs, or its accounting firm, Ernst & Young, as might be expected. It also emerges that the NY Fed, and thus Timothy Geithner, were at a minimum massively derelict in the performance of their duties, and may well be culpable in aiding and abetting Lehman in accounting fraud and Sarbox violations...

Geithner Implicated; Lehman Accounting Fraud Allegation; naked capitalism; NY Fed.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 16:10 EDT

Lehman: Regulators Chose to Deny, Extend and Pretend

The Lehman Examiner's report gives an unintentionally damning portrayal, both of the the structure of financial regulation in the US and how regulators failed to use the powers they had effectively...the authorities recognized Lehman had a large negative net worth. Yet rather than move decisively towards an unwind, they proceeded inertially. They urged Lehman CEO Dick Fuld to find a rescuer (who would invest in that garbage barge, particularly when Andrew Ross Sorkin's account makes clear that Fuld's moves were so obviously desperate and clumsy as to be certain to fail) and also promoted the notion of an LTCM-style ``share the pain'' resolution. Yet with the rest of the industry weak, and the magnitude of hole in Lehman's balance sheet a mystery, these courses of action had low odds of success from the outset (indeed, the ``Lehman weekend'' in which the authorities almost bulldozed through a deal, seemed designed to avoid sober analysis of how bad things were at the failing investment bank)...As much as the SEC did not cover itself with glory in this exercise, its lapses are somewhat comprehensible. By contrast, the Fed's are much harder to explain or excuse. And guess who is about to be given more oversight authority?

denied; extends; Lehman; naked capitalism; Pretends; Regulators Chose.

naked capitalism Fri 2010-03-19 15:02 EDT

SEC, Fed Alerted By Merrill of Lehman Balance Sheet Games in March 2008

...The Valukas report shows both regulators were monitoring Lehman on a day-to-day basis shortly after Bear's failure. They recognized that it has a massive hole in its balance sheet, yet took an inertial course of action. They pressured a clearly in denial Fuld to raise capital (and Andrew Ross Sorkin's accounts of those efforts make it clear they were likely to fail) and did not take steps towards any other remedy until the firm was on the brink of collapse (the effort to force a private sector bailout as part of a good bank/bad bank resolution)...Merrill warned both the SEC and the Fed in March 2008 that Lehman was engaging in balance sheet window dressing of a serious enough nature for it to put pressure on Merrill (as in it was making Merrill look worse relative to the obviously impaired Lehman)...

Fed Alerted; Lehman Balance Sheet Games; March 2008; Merrill; naked capitalism; SEC.

zero hedge Tue 2010-03-09 17:59 EST

Is The Federal Reserve Insolvent?

...For a refined analysis of what would happen in that moment of clarity when the world realizes the world's biggest bank is broke, we turn to a presentation by Chris Sims, given before Princeton University, titled "Fiscal/Monetary Coordination When The Anchor Cable Has Snapped."...discusses precisely the issues were are faced with today: namely a monetary policy that has run amok, seignorage, exploding excess reserves, the impact of these on "power money", and, in general, a Fed balance sheet that is increasingly reminiscent of a drunk, rapid and schizophrenic bull in a China store...the only way to deal with a mark-to-market of the Fed currently is to embrace monetization. It is no longer a question of semantics, of who promised what: it is the only mechanical way by which the Fed can dig itself out of a capital deficiency. With GSE delinquencies exploding, and with the Fed (and Congress) singlehandedly facilitating imprudent lender policy by allowing ever more borrowers to become deliquent without consequences, the MBS delinquency rate will likely hit 10% over the next 6-12 months. At that moment, someone will ask the Fed: "what is the true basis of your capital account?" And when the Fed is forced to justify a valid response, is when monetizaton will begin...

Federal Reserve Insolvent; Zero Hedge.

New Deal 2.0 Sat 2010-02-27 22:55 EST

GSE Losses As Shadow Bailout

Roosevelt Institute Fellow Mike Konczal

...As the private sector started to dump housing and housing bonds quickly in 2007 and 2008, government officials made sure that the GSEs would be capable of absorbing these bad loans...This constitutes one part of many ``shadow bailouts'' according to Roosevelt Institute senior fellows Rob Johnson and Tom Ferguson; this argument, and the graph above, is from their Too Big to Bail: The `Paulson Put,' Presidential Politics, and the Global Financial Meltdown Part II paper. (In Part I, they argue that the Federal Home Loan Bank System was also used in a similar manner.) Astute readers will notice that the action of government officials using public funding sources to provide makeshift backstops for losses of the banking sector to clear the balance sheets of toxic assets to ``unlock the frozen credit market'', without having to go to Congress for funding, was also a central feature of Geithner's PPIP plan, with FDIC stepping up to the plate once the GSEs went bust...

0; GSE losses; new dealing 2; Shadow Bailout.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

zero hedge Wed 2010-02-03 16:00 EST

Russia Urged China To Dump Its Fannie, Freddie Holdings Before GSE Bailout

This is how the cold war will look like in the post-Lehman era (when all the debt risk is held on the public balance sheet): one country urging another to sell a third's bonds. According to Hank Paulson's soon to be released memoir, Russia had urged China to sell its GSE holdings in August 2008 "in a bid to force a bailout of the largest U.S. mortgage-finance companies." China refused... That time. Of course, what has transpired since is that China, through the Fed custodial account, has rotated a vast majority of its GSE holdings into Treasuries, in essence doing just what Pimco's Bill Gross has been doing since the beginning of 2009: offloading hundreds of billions of Fannie and Freddie bonds straight to the Federal Reserve.

Dump; Fannie; Freddie Holdings; GSE bailout; Russia Urged China; Zero Hedge.