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2009 Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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Sun 2010-01-31 23:06 EST

The Formula for This Market Rally In Simple Terms

The first, most obvious trend is the Manic Mondays trend...for the 43 weeks ended Friday January 8, 2010, stocks have rallied on 30 out of the 43 Mondays...these Monday ramp jobs have contributed the bulk of the market rally's gains since March 2009...The second trend that has dominated this market since the March 2009 bottom is the Bernanke Options Expiration juicing. In simple terms Ben Bernanke has shown a REAL preference for pumping money into the financial system on the exact week when options are expiring...The final trend that has dominated this market is cousin to the Manic Monday Ramp Job. It is the Night Session Ramp Job...from September 13, 2009 until year-end, ALL of the stock market's gains occurred in the over-night futures session from 4:00 ET to 9:30 AM ET...So there you have it, the three most dominant trends of this market rally. None of them are pretty. None of them involve fundamentals. And ALL of them are directly related to the Fed's liquidity pump.

Formula; markets Rally; simple terms.

Sun 2010-01-31 11:43 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: The Stock Market Has Never Been This (Intermediate-Term) Overbought - October 19, 2009

In reviewing the status of the market late last week, the condition of the data was something of an anomaly in that regard. On the valuation front, stocks are presently overvalued, but to levels that we've observed at least several times in history. The anomaly relates to market action, where we can no longer find a single historical instance where stocks were more overbought on the combination of short- and intermediate-term measures we respond to most strongly. Indeed, only one instance comes close, which is November 28, 1980...the peak of the furious advance in S&P 500 driven by enthusiasm over "less bad" economic news, though with little proven economic strength. It was the last day of the 1980 bull market. The economy later proved to have been in a short lull within a double-dip recession, taking stocks to their final lows in 1982...One of the notable features of extreme overbought conditions is that investors rarely have much opportunity to get out...

2009; Hussman Funds; intermediate term; October 19; Overbought; stock market; weekly market comments.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard - Finance and business comments Thu 2010-01-07 19:00 EST

Global bear rally of 2009 will end as Japan's hyperinflation rips economy to pieces

The contraction of M3 money in the US and Europe over the last six months will slowly puncture economic recovery as 2010 unfolds, with the time-honoured lag of a year or so. Ben Bernanke will be caught off guard, just as he was in mid-2008 when the Fed drove straight through a red warning light with talk of imminent rate rises -- the final error that triggered the implosion of Lehman, AIG, and the Western banking system. As the great bear rally of 2009 runs into the greater Chinese Wall of excess global capacity, it will become clear that we are in the grip of a 21st Century Depression -- more akin to Japan's Lost Decade than the 1840s or 1930s, but nothing like the normal cycles of the post-War era. The surplus regions (China, Japan, Germania, Gulf ) have not increased demand enough to compensate for belt-tightening in the deficit bloc (Anglo-sphere, Club Med, East Europe), and fiscal adrenalin is already fading in Europe. The vast East-West imbalances that caused the credit crisis are no better a year later, and perhaps worse. Household debt as a share of GDP sits near record levels in two-fifths of the world economy. Our long purge has barely begun.

2009; Ambrose Evans Pritchard; Business Comment; ending; finance; Global Bear Rally; Japan's hyperinflation rips economy; pieces.

Wed 2009-12-16 15:41 EST

Steve Keen's DebtWatch No 31 February 2009: ``The Roving Cavaliers of Credit'' | Steve Keen's Debtwatch

``Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money-lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and gives this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner-- and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it.'' [Karl Marx] Marx's analysis of money and credit, and how the credit system can bring an otherwise well-functioning market economy to its knees, was spot on. His observations on the financial crisis of 1857 still ring true today...

31 February 2009; credit; Roving Cavaliers; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

naked capitalism Wed 2009-12-16 12:13 EST

``Values and Rules''

Wall Street Revalued: Imperfect Markets and Inept Central Bankers by Andrew Smithers (2009) The Road to Financial Reformation: Warnings, Consequences, Reforms by Henry Kaufman (2009) In a sense, this crisis is about values (the prices paid for many assets) and the rules (regulations governing financial markets). It is also about rules (rigid model based formulations of price) and values (ethics or the lack thereof). These two books provide different perspectives on the issues...

naked capitalism; rules; valued.

Calculated Risk Wed 2009-11-25 11:38 EST

Fannie Mae: $18.9 Billion Loss, Requests Another $15 Billion

Press Release: Fannie Mae Reports Third-Quarter 2009 Results Fannie Mae (FNM/NYSE) reported a net loss of $18.9 billion in the third quarter of 2009, compared with a loss of $14.8 billion in the second quarter of 2009. ... Third-quarter results were largely due to $22.0 billion of credit related expenses, reflecting the continued build of the company's combined loss reserves and fair value losses associated with the increasing number of loans that were acquired from mortgage backed securities trusts in order to pursue loan modifications. ... As a result, on November 4, 2009, the Acting Director of the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) submitted a request for $15.0 billion from Treasury on the company's behalf.

15; 18; 9; Calculated Risk; Fannie Mae; losses; requesting.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Bruce Krasting Thu 2009-11-19 10:52 EST

FHFA's DeMarco Speaks - Ouch!

FHFA's Acting Director Edward DeMarco provided written testimony to the Senate today. I would give his presentation a B+. There is little room for optimism in this story. Mr. DeMarco did not gloss that fact over. A few snips from that speech: -From July 2007 through the first half of 2009--combined losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac totaled $165 billion. In the first half of 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together reported net losses of $47 billion. -Since the establishment of the conservatorships, the combined losses at the two Enterprises depleted all their capital and required them to draw $96 billion. The combined support from the federal government exceeds $1 trillion. -The short-term outlook for the Enterprises remains troubled and likely will require additional draws...

Bruce Krasting; FHFA's DeMarco Speaks; Ouch.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Tue 2009-10-27 11:25 EDT

The Manhattan Project: Did Bernanke Use The Monetary Nuclear Option?

...was the Fed's policy response on March 18, 2009 the financial equivalent of Fat Man and Little Boy? (The direct purchase of equities?)...did the Fed exceed its policy statement by directly buying assets not contemplated therein?...Did Bernanke, encouraged by Goldman's Hatzius, heed his own advice and monetize the equity markets?

Bernanke used; Manhattan Project; Monetary Nuclear Option; Zero Hedge.

Fri 2009-10-23 08:55 EDT

Is Goldman Sachs Evil? Or Just Too Good? -- New York Magazine (2009-07-26)

(Goldman Sachs, Financial Times, The Wall Street Journal, Rolling Stone, John Rogers, John Whitehead, AIG, Neil Barofsky, Troubled Asset Relief Program, Morgan Stanley, Hank Paulson, Lloyd Blankfein, John Thain, Lehman Brothers, Standard & Poor's, Tim Geithner, JPMorgan Chase, Jon Winkelried, David Solomon, Richard Friedman, Jamie Dimon, Robert Rubin, Dan Jester, Eric Dinallo, Hank Greenberg, Edward C. Forst, Neel Kashkari, Edward Liddy, Stephen Friedman, Sidney Weinberg, TARP, Joseph --Stiglitz, Lucas van Praag, Frank Suozzo, Mike Morgan, Matt Taibbi, Edith Cooper, Byron Trott, Warren Buffett, Barney Frank, John Thornton, Michael Lewis, Larry Summers, Barack Obama, Rahm Emanuel, Robert Hormats, Eliot Spitzer) Inside Goldman Sachs, America's most successful, cynical, envied, despised, and (in its view, anyway) misunderstood engine of capitalism. [2009-07-26]

2009-07-26; Goldman Sachs evil; good; just; New York magazine.

Bruce Krasting Sat 2009-10-10 12:57 EDT

FHFA's DeMarco Speaks

FHFA's Acting Director Edward DeMarco provided written testimony to the Senate today...From July 2007 through the first half of 2009--combined losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac totaled $165 billion. In the first half of 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together reported net losses of $47 billion. Since the establishment of the conservatorships, the combined losses at the two Enterprises depleted all their capital and required them to draw $96 billion. The combined support from the federal government exceeds $1 trillion. The short-term outlook for the Enterprises remains troubled and likely will require additional draws...

Bruce Krasting; FHFA's DeMarco Speaks.

Credit Writedowns Mon 2009-09-14 14:43 EDT

Murder-Suicide in Chimerica

threading the events of 2008 and 2009 together makes a compelling case that the Chinese -- U.S. marriage is coming apart...GSE collapse, Geithner's charges of Chinese currency manipulation, Chairman Wen slamming the U.S. as a profligate nation, stimulus bill buy-American provision, a steady drumbeat of ditch-the-dollar talk coming out of China, Chinese central bank head Zhou's call for a new international reserve currency, Obama's chinese tire tariff was ``proverbial serving of divorce papers''. Expect prices to rise, look for Chinese retaliation on U.S. poultry and auto products...This marriage is over. The question is whether it will end gradually and peacefully in divorce or violently in murder-suicide.

Chimerica; credit writedowns; murder suicide.

Bruce Krasting Fri 2009-09-04 18:31 EDT

Fannie Has .9 Trillion in Troubled Loans - 8K

Fannie Mae's 8k has an interesting slide. It is a look at their questionable assets. The slide is not easy to read. It can be found in the 2009 Second Quarter Supplement, on page 5. The report describes FNM's exposure to problematic classes of mortgages on their book. That total comes to a whopping .9 Trillion. The total book of business is $2.7 Trillion, fully 32% of their book is troubled.

8k; 9 trillion; Bruce Krasting; Fannie; troubled loans.

Bruce Krasting Thu 2009-09-03 18:21 EDT

US Treasury on Agency MBS -- Don't Buy It!

The office of Inspector General, Department of Treasury released a report on 8/6/09 on the failure of the National Bank of Commerce. NBC went toast on 1/16/2009. The principal source of its collapse was its investments in Fannie Mae Preferred Stock. They owned $98mm of that swill. When they wrote it off they had no tier-one equity left and had to be shuttered... This report is a kick in the head for everyone involved. Fannie and Freddie look bad. Who would want to own the GSE paper with this warning from Treasury? It makes Treasury look silly. They hold the Government Pref. issued by the Agencies. If they guy down the hall is saying don't buy the debt he is certainly saying don't buy the equity. The Fed looks the worst of the lot in light of this. They are in the process of buying $1.25 Trillion of Agency MBS. I wonder what the Treasury IG would have to say about that level of concentration.

Agency MBS; Bruce Krasting; buy; Treasury.

zero hedge Wed 2009-09-02 20:01 EDT

Money On The Sidelines... 1930 Versus 2009

There is a saying, that everything new is just well-forgotten old. The same apparently is especially applicable to propaganda that seeks to part fools with their money. Today's brownie point question is: was the statement below just uttered by Larry Kudlow, or did it appear first more than 79 years ago? There's a large amount of money on sidelines waiting for investment opportunities; this should be felt in market when ``cheerful sentiment is more firmly intrenched.'' Economists point out that banks and insurance companies ``never before had so much money lying idle.'' If you answered "the latter" you were correct. It first appeared on August 28, 1930 to be precise (and who knows how many times prior...

1930 Versus 2009; money; sidelined; Zero Hedge.

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