naked capitalism Thu 2009-11-19 10:33 EST

Guest Post: Herding the Sheep

George Washington of Washington's Blog

Financial insider and commentator Yves Smith wrote an essay last week entitled ``MSM Reporting as Propaganda'' arguing that the government has been using propaganda to make people think that things are getting better, no one is angry, and -- therefore -- no one should get upset...Is Smith right? And even if she is, isn't ``propaganda'' too strong a word?...Even if true, propaganda is too strong a word for attempts to convince people that important issues are boring, that no one else is angry about them, and that everything is normal. Perhaps ``herding the wayward sheep'' would be better . . .

Guest Post; Herd; naked capitalism; sheep.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting. Goldman's sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation's premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies. Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk...

Goldman Secretly Bet; McClatchy; U.S. housing crash.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

zero hedge Thu 2009-11-19 10:22 EST

The Dollar And The Deficits

Great read from C. Fred Bergstein, Director of the Peter G. Peterson Institute for International Economics, on the role of the dollar in the current environment: the paper reviews both positive and negative implications for the dollar as the world's reserve currency, what that has meant, the impact adverse actions have had upon the United States and how to progress forward.

Deficit; Dollar; Zero Hedge.

Harper's Magazine Thu 2009-11-19 10:20 EST

An Object Lesson in Governmental Failure: Derivatives reform

KEN SILVERSTEIN

If you want to understand why Congress seems completely incapable of checking the power of Wall Street, look back to a hearing on the Hill last October 7, and the subsequent events surrounding it...he House Financial Services Committee hosted a panel on reform of the market for derivatives,...the committee, headed by Congressman Barney Frank (D-Wall Street), invited a panel of eight guests who were distinguished by their uniformly pro-industry positions...In response to complaints from Americans for Financial Reform, which represents hundreds of consumer groups and labor unions, the committee issued an invitation--the night before the hearing was held -- to Rob Johnson of the Roosevelt Institute. For the committee, the last minute inclusion of Johnson -- a former managing director at Bankers Trust Company and former economist at the Senate Banking Committee and Senate Budget Committee -- apparently constituted sufficient balance...About five days later Johnson submitted his full testimony to the committee, to be included on its website along with the statements of the other eight panelists...the committee's general counsel would not allow posting of the testimony because Johnson had not submitted it during the hearing. (Of course, since Johnson had been invited at the last minute it was impossible for him to fulfill this pointless requirement.)

Derivatives reform; Governmental Failure; Harper's Magazine; object lessons.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:14 EST

Business & Technology | Part two | WaMu: Hometown bank turned predatory | Seattle Times Newspaper

David Heath

What few people knew was that bank executives crafted a radical new business strategy in 2003 that was intended to boost profits. The new WaMu used huge sales commissions and misleading marketing to hawk risky and overpriced loans to borrowers. In short, WaMu became one of the nation's biggest predatory lenders. The strategy eventually failed, not only bringing down Washington Mutual but deceiving borrowers, costing thousands their homes. In particular, the bank promoted as its "signature loan" a complex product known as the option ARM. This adjustable-rate mortgage, much like a credit card, gave borrowers the choice of making low minimum payments. But that option didn't cover the interest and only dug them deeper into debt.

business; Hometown bank turned predatory; part; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology; WaMu.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:12 EST

Business & Technology | Part one | Reckless strategies doomed WaMu | Seattle Times Newspaper

Drew DeSilver

In its headlong pursuit of growth, WaMu systematically dismantled or weakened the internal controls meant to prevent the bank from taking on too much risk -- the very standards and practices that had helped it grow in the first place. WaMu's riskiest loans raked in money from high fees, but because the bank skimped on making sure borrowers could repay them, they eventually failed at disastrously high rates. As loans went bad, they sucked massive amounts of cash that WaMu needed to stay in business. WaMu's subprime home loans failed at the highest rates in nation. Foreclosure rates for subprime loans made from 2005 to 2007 -- the peak of the boom -- were calamitous. In the 10 hardest-hit cities, more than a third of WaMu subprime loans went into foreclosure.

business; part; Reckless Strategies Doomed WaMu; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:09 EST

The downfall of Washington Mutual - Puget Sound Business Journal (Seattle)

Kirsten Grind

WaMu suffered through not one but two bank runs in its final months. The first run was many times larger than the run that felled California lender IndyMac in July 2008, though neither shareholders nor the public knew about it. WaMu survived that run, and the second run was tapering off when regulators moved in and shut the bank, citing the run as the reason. In addition, WaMu's top executives, led by CEO Alan Fishman, were trying to sell the bank after federal regulators imposed a deadline, only to discover that they were being undermined by those same regulators, executives say. The government's plan to seize the bank, if it became known beforehand, would cause potential buyers to immediately cool their heels, because buying after a government takeover would be a lot cheaper than even the desperate private purchase deal that Fishman was seeking.

downfall; Puget Sound Business Journal; Seattle; Washington Mutual.

naked capitalism Wed 2009-11-11 13:50 EST

Guest Post: Big Banks Are NOT More Efficient

George Washington of Washington's Blog

I have repeatedly pointed out that big banks are not more efficient than smaller banks. For example, I previously noted that an article in Fortune concluded: The largest banks often don't show the greatest efficiency...``They actually experience diseconomies of scale,''...James Kwak has done some sleuthing and discovered that even Fed economists don't buy the bigger-is-more-efficient argument...

big banks; efficiency; Guest Post; naked capitalism.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Tue 2009-11-03 20:30 EST

Is Debt-Deflation Just Beginning?

Michael Shedlock

You should not be afraid of deflation. You should be afraid of policies attempting to fight it. Deflation (rather price deflation) is actually the natural state of affairs. As productivity increases, more goods and services are produced relative to the population and prices would therefore be expected to drop. It is the Fed, along with misguided Keynesian and Monetarist economists who think falling prices are a bad thing. Who amongst us does not like falling prices (except of course on things we own like houses, but even then who is not sick of higher property taxes that result)? The reality is inflation benefits those with first access to money. Guess who that is? The answer is easy: banks, government, and the already wealthy. Inflation is actually a tax on the middle class and the poor who get access to money last. During the housing bubble, by the time the poor could get access to to money easily, it was far too late to buy. Given that inflation benefits those with first access to money, any targeted inflation at all is morally wrong.

Debt-Deflation Just Beginning; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:15 EST

The US Dollar Rally of 2008: The Consequence of a Bull Market in Fraud

Jesse

The theory of a short squeeze in Eurodollars which we had first put forward last year "The Dollar Rally and Deflationary Imbalances in the US Dollar Holdings of Overseas Banks" seems to be confirmed by this paper from the NY Federal Reserve bank, and the latest figures on cross border currency transactions from the BIS...the latest data from BIS shows that the dollar rally tracked the acquisition of eurodollars with a significant correlation...But much of the European outrage, as least, was in feeling that they had been 'set up' by the very banks that had sold them the foully rated instruments in the first place. A classic face ripping, as they say at Wall and Broad. And this similar to the reason is why the Chinese government declared that its own institutions could walk away from derivatives arrangements that had been sold to them by the Wall Street wiseguys under false pretenses. US towns and states are not so fortunate it appears...The foreign banks have now unwound a significant amount of the dodgy US dollar financial assets that caused the short squeeze through their fraudulent valuations.

2008; Bull Markets; consequences; Dollar Rally; fraud; Jesse's Café Américain.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:12 EST

Nine More Banks Fail with CIT on Deck for a Packaged Bankruptcy While Gold Shines

Jesse

...The current state of economics is most remarkable for its arrogant complacency in the face of two failed bubbles, a near systemic failure, a pseudo-scientific perversion of mathematics exposed, and an incredible capacity for spin and self-delusion. The people wish to believe, and Wall Street and the government economists are all too willing to tell them whatever they wish to hear, for a variety of motives. And there is an army of salesmen and lobbyists and econo-whores touting this fraud around the clock...There are good reasons for this failure of American "monetary capitalism," and it has to do with an oversized financial sector and a surplus of white collar crime that both distort and drain the productive economy. The current approach is to pump money into a failed system without attempting to reform it, to fix its fundamental flaws, to make an honest accounting of the results. The result are serial bubbles and the foundation for long duration zombie economy with a grinding stagflation that may morph into a currency crisis and the fall and reissuance of the dollar, as we saw with the Russian rouble. It will stretch the political fabric of the US to the breaking point. This is how oligarchies and their empires fall.

banks failed; CIT; deck; gold shines; Jesse's Café Américain; packaged bankruptcies.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:06 EST

A Brilliant Warning On Robert Rubin's Proposal to Deregulate Banks, circa 1995

Jesse

...The notion that Glass-Steagall prevents American financial intermediaries from fulfilling their utmost potential in a global marketplace reflects inadequate understanding of the events that precipitated the act and the similarities between today's financial marketplace and the market nearly a century ago...The unbridled activities of those gifted financiers crumbled under the dynamic forces of the capital marketplace. If you take away the checks, the market forces will eventually knock the system off balance. Mark D. Samber (1995)

Brilliant Warning; circa 1995; Deregulate Banks; Jesse's Café Américain; Robert Rubin's Proposal.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 19:36 EST

Obama's Economic Policy Has Doomed the US to Stagnation - Or Worse

Jesse

This was the very moment of Obama's failure, when he allowed Summers, Geithner and Bernanke to establish the principle of "Too Big To Fail" and set up a financial oligarchy at the expense of taxpayers. We would have expected this out of the Treasury under Hank Paulson, but to see this kind of policy error favoring Wall Street over the US taxpayers from a government elected on the promise of reform is inexcusable, a disgrace. ...(Bloomberg) Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said the world's biggest economy is suffering because of the U.S. government's failure to nationalize banks during the financial crisis.

doomed; Jesse's Café Américain; Obama s economic policy; stagnated; worse.

Tue 2009-10-27 12:58 EDT

Looting: The Economic Underworld of Bankruptcy for Profit by George Akerlof, Paul Romer

During the 1980s, a number of unusual financial crises occurred. In Chile, for example, the financial sector collapsed, leaving the government with responsibility for extensive foreign debts. In the United States, large numbers of government-insured savings and loans became insolvent - and the government picked up the tab. In Dallas, Texas, real estate prices and construction continued to boom even after vacancies had skyrocketed, and the suffered a dramatic collapse. Also in the United States, the junk bond market, which fueled the takeover wave, had a similar boom and bust. In this paper, we use simple theory and direct evidence to highlight a common thread that runs through these four episodes. The theory suggests that this common thread may be relevant to other cases in which countries took on excessive foreign debt, governments had to bail out insolvent financial institutions, real estate prices increased dramatically and then fell, or new financial markets experienced a boom and bust. We describe the evidence, however, only for the cases of financial crisis in Chile, the thrift crisis in the United States, Dallas real estate and thrifts, and junk bonds. Our theoretical analysis shows that an economic underground can come to life if firms have an incentive to go broke for profit at society's expense (to loot) instead of to go for broke (to gamble on success). Bankruptcy for profit will occur if poor accounting, lax regulation, or low penalties for abuse give owners an incentive to pay themselves more than their firms are worth and then default on their debt obligations.

bankruptcy; Economic Underworld; George Akerlof; Looting; Paul Romer; profits.