dimelab dimelab: shrinking the gap between talk and action.

seem Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

Debtor's prison Thu 2009-12-17 10:24 EST

Did Greenspan predict the inevitable collapse of the USD?

Much of our recent discussion has focused on the seemingly inevitable collapse of the US-debt-backed global financial system. In continuation of that theme, today we will explore a specific aspect of this problem: the likelihood of a US default...

Debtor s Prison; Greenspan predictions; inevitable collapse; USD.

Jesse's Café Américain Wed 2009-12-02 18:58 EST

The 38 Year Cycle in US Monetary History

..the longer cycle of 38 years and some others, is that they involve what people call 'generational memory.' People as a group essentially forget the lessons of the past, and human nature being what it is, events based on bad judgement and reckless behaviour seem to recur at these intervals. If there was any 'tell' for the current crisis, it was the general overturning of the safeguards for the financial system that had been put in place in the aftermath of the financial panic of 1929 and the Great Depression that followed, culminating in the eventual overturn of Glass-Steagall and the ascendancy of extreme leverage using exotic, unregulated instruments. This is why we call this a generational change. This is no slump, no recession. And it is far from over. We are experiencing some major changes that are easily lost when one only looks at the day to day moves, listens to the description of events on the mainstream media, and of course, have a lack of memory, a knowledge of history, of things that have happened to their grandfathers and great grandfathers. The arrogant ignorance of so many still in place is a sure sign of greater chastisement to come, until the lessons of history are learned again, and the system is brought back into a sustainable balance.

38 Year Cycle; Jesse's Café Américain; monetary History.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2009-11-19 10:48 EST

Tavakoli on Goldman's Lies of Omission

Janet Tavakoli asks, Did Goldman Lie? One is tempted to ask, 'were their lips moving?' But why the bluff? Why did Goldman have to pretend it was not concerned at all about AIG, even as the phone records show they were involved in intense and continuing discussions at the highest levels in the bailouts, with a unique and privileged presence in discussions with the government and the Fed in which their own man was the Chairman of the NY Fed. And as someone asked, Why pick on Goldman? Well, they seem to be at the center of everything.

Goldman's Lies; Jesse's Café Américain; omission; Tavakoli.

zero hedge Thu 2009-11-19 10:23 EST

Guest Post: Dear Prudence, Won't You Come Out To Play?

...consumers appear to have for now taken a vow of frugality. Whether by necessity or choice, prudence seems the order of the day. Does that mean consumers are not going to come out to play in the land of increased personal consumption any time soon? We think that's the theme, along with continued household balance sheet reconciliation that must come. Is monetary policy now impotent in an environment where consumers choose not to borrow and spend? If so, that leaves increased fiscal policy as the lever ahead for the government, with all the consequences that come along with that...it is critical to at least be open to the thinking that economic and financial market relationships we have grown to know and love over the past three to four decades are in the midst of meaningful change, perhaps secular change.

comes; Guest Post; play; prudence; Zero Hedge.

Harper's Magazine Thu 2009-11-19 10:20 EST

An Object Lesson in Governmental Failure: Derivatives reform

If you want to understand why Congress seems completely incapable of checking the power of Wall Street, look back to a hearing on the Hill last October 7, and the subsequent events surrounding it...he House Financial Services Committee hosted a panel on reform of the market for derivatives,...the committee, headed by Congressman Barney Frank (D-Wall Street), invited a panel of eight guests who were distinguished by their uniformly pro-industry positions...In response to complaints from Americans for Financial Reform, which represents hundreds of consumer groups and labor unions, the committee issued an invitation--the night before the hearing was held -- to Rob Johnson of the Roosevelt Institute. For the committee, the last minute inclusion of Johnson -- a former managing director at Bankers Trust Company and former economist at the Senate Banking Committee and Senate Budget Committee -- apparently constituted sufficient balance...About five days later Johnson submitted his full testimony to the committee, to be included on its website along with the statements of the other eight panelists...the committee's general counsel would not allow posting of the testimony because Johnson had not submitted it during the hearing. (Of course, since Johnson had been invited at the last minute it was impossible for him to fulfill this pointless requirement.)

Derivatives reform; Governmental Failure; Harper's Magazine; object lessons.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:15 EST

The US Dollar Rally of 2008: The Consequence of a Bull Market in Fraud

The theory of a short squeeze in Eurodollars which we had first put forward last year "The Dollar Rally and Deflationary Imbalances in the US Dollar Holdings of Overseas Banks" seems to be confirmed by this paper from the NY Federal Reserve bank, and the latest figures on cross border currency transactions from the BIS...the latest data from BIS shows that the dollar rally tracked the acquisition of eurodollars with a significant correlation...But much of the European outrage, as least, was in feeling that they had been 'set up' by the very banks that had sold them the foully rated instruments in the first place. A classic face ripping, as they say at Wall and Broad. And this similar to the reason is why the Chinese government declared that its own institutions could walk away from derivatives arrangements that had been sold to them by the Wall Street wiseguys under false pretenses. US towns and states are not so fortunate it appears...The foreign banks have now unwound a significant amount of the dodgy US dollar financial assets that caused the short squeeze through their fraudulent valuations.

2008; Bull Markets; consequences; Dollar Rally; fraud; Jesse's Café Américain.

Jesse's Café Américain Mon 2009-10-26 09:52 EDT

The US Power Elite: An Alliance of Convenience or a Ménage à Trois?

"I submit that our spendthrift government, the Federal Reserve System and the TBTF banks together now comprise the paramount political tendency in America today. This tripartite "Alliance of Convenience," let's not call it a conspiracy, fits beautifully into the corporatist mold that seems to be America in the 21st Century - but only viewed by the elites in cities like New York and Washington. Many Americans of all political descriptions oppose this corrupt and unaccountable political formulation." Chris Whalen, Institutional Risk Analytics

alliance; convenience; Jesse's Café Américain; Ménage à Trois; power elites.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-26 09:28 EDT

How The Federal Reserve Bailed Out The World

The Bank of International Settlements [BIS] just released a major paper titled "The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response" which goes on to demonstrate just how it happened that Fed chief Ben Bernanke in essence bailed out the entire developed world, which was facing an unprecedented dollar shortage crisis due to the sudden implosion of FX swap lines and other mechanisms which until that point were critical in maintaining the dollar funding shortfall for virtually every foreign Central Bank...When the financial system almost imploded in the fall of 2008, one of the primary responses by the Federal Reserve was the issuance of an unprecedented amount of FX liquidity lines in the form of swaps to foreign Central Banks. The number went from practically zero to a peak of $582 billion on December 10, 2008. The number of swaps outstanding was almost directly inversely correlated with the value of the dollar...what happened is that short-term sources to sustain the massive dollar funding mismatch disappeared virtually overnight, and CBs were suddenly facing a toxic spiral of selling increasingly more worthless assets merely to satisfy currency funding needs in an environment where all of a sudden nobody was willing to provide FX swap lines...had the Fed not stepped in, the rest of the world...would have simply collapsed as the $6.5 trillion dollar funding gap closed in on itself, causing a indiscriminate selling off of all dollar denominated assets. The implosion of the basis trade would have seemed like a picnic compared to what was about to ensue had the Fed not stepped in to perpetuate the Fiat banking way of life.

Federal Reserve bail; world; Zero Hedge.

The Big Picture Wed 2009-10-14 11:36 EDT

Andy Xie: Here We Go Again

Former Morgan Stanley Analyst Andy Xie explains why China is a potential bubble: [Consider] the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The US Federal Reserve kept monetary policy loose to help the banking system. The dollar went into a prolonged bear market. During the descent, Asian economies that pegged their currencies to the dollar could increase money supply and lending without worrying about devaluation, but the money couldn't leave home due to the dollar's poor outlook, so it went into asset markets. When the dollar began to rebound in 1996, Asian economies came under tightening pressure that burst their asset bubbles. The collapsing asset prices triggered capital outflows that reinforced asset deflation. Asset deflation destroyed their banking systems. In short, the US banking crisis created the environment for a credit boom in Asia. When US banks recovered, Asian banks collapsed. Is China heading down the same path? There are many anecdotes to support the comparison. Property prices in Southeast Asia became higher than those in the US, but ``experts'' and government officials had stories to explain it, even though their per capita income was one-tenth that of the US. Their banks also commanded huge market capitalizations, as financial markets extended their growth ad infinitum. The same thing is happening in China today. When something seems too good to be true, it is. World trade -- the engine of global growth -- has collapsed. Employment is still contracting throughout the world. There are no realistic scenarios for the global economy to regain high and sustainable growth. China is an export-driven economy. Bank lending can support the economy for a short time, however, stocks are as expensive as during the heydays of the last bubble. Like all previous bubbles, this one, too, will burst.

Andy Xie; Big Picture; Go.

The Big Picture Sun 2009-10-11 17:12 EDT

Andy Xie: Why One Bubble Burst Deserves Another

...Lehman died in vain. Today, governments and central banks are celebrating their victorious stabilizing of the global financial system. To achieve the same, they could have saved Lehman with US$ 50 billion. Instead, they have spent trillions of dollars -- probably more than US$ 10 trillion when we get the final tally -- to reach the same objective. Meanwhile, a broader goal to reform the financial system has seen absolutely no progress...The lesson from the Lehman collapse seems to be, ``Take whatever you can and, when it crashes, you get to keep it.'' How governments and central banks have dealt with this bubble will encourage more people to join bubble making in the future.

Andy Xie; Big Picture; bubble burst deserves.

Bogarty Files Sun 2009-09-20 14:22 EDT

Bogarty Files: The Postmodern Explanation

...Every time there is a gap between what appears to be reality, and what mainstream seems to believe, I get this uneasy feeling. Is it me, I wonder, am I missing something?...I ordered a few books on postmodernism...So now everything is starting to make sense. This is the Obama strategy -- the ``Geithner plan''. While I'm busy studying the balance sheets of the banks, unemployment data etc. they acted, creating a new reality, one without another great depression. Are the banks insolvent? What is insolvency? My definition or Ken Lewis's? There is no universal meaning for insolvent, there is no transcendental signified, just some archaic meaning handed down to us. We don't have to accept it, we can define it anyway we want, especially if another great depression hinges on its meaning...

Bogarty Files; Postmodern Explanation.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Sun 2009-09-20 11:23 EDT

Yellen Calls For "U" Shaped Recession and Another Jobless Recovery

...excerpts from Janet Yellen's Outlook for Recovery in the U.S. Economy: ...the complex topic of inflation. In my career, I have never witnessed a situation like the one that exists now, when views about inflation risks have coalesced into two diametrically opposed camps. On the one hand, one group worries about the long-term inflationary implications of a seemingly endless procession of massive federal budget deficits. At the same time, others fear that economic slack and downward wage pressure are pushing inflation below rates that are considered consistent with price stability and even raising the specter of outright deflation... My personal belief is that the more significant threat to price stability over the next several years stems from the disinflationary forces unleashed by the enormous slack in the economy.

Jobless Recovery; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Shaped Recession; U; Yellen called.

The IRA Analyst Thu 2009-09-17 10:22 EDT

Back to Basis for Securitization and Structured Credit: Interview With Ann Rutledge

To get some further insight into the world of securitization and cash flows, we spoke last week to Ann Rutledge of RR Consulting...The difference between a futures contract for T-bonds and a credit default swap is that the former is a real contract for a real deliverable, whereas the CDS trades against what people think is the cash basis, but there is no cash market price to discipline and validate that derivative market. Rutledge: a contract or structure without a cash basis should not be allowed at all. You cannot have a derivative that is honest and fair to all market participants without a true cash basis. ...derivatives markets such as CDS and CDOs that have no cash basis tend to magnify speculative excesses, while derivative markets where there is a visible cash basis market to discipline investor behavior seem less unstable in terms of systemic risk. Rutledge: If the cash market were visible and could be examined by all participants, then it would give away the ability of the dealer banks to tax participants in the market and extract these abnormal returns. So how do we fix the problem... Rutledge: These originators play this game over and over again and they don't get caught, in part because we do not have a common, standardized set of definitions for governing the most basic aspects of the securitization process. The buyers don't do the work and the accounting framework is a counterparty-oriented framework, not one that is focused on the underlying assets. So banks like Countrywide and WaMu originated and sold some truly hideous structures during the bubble, but the buyers only diligence was reliance upon recourse to these banks. It costs maybe 50bp for a buyer to get the data and grind the numbers to really diligence a securitization based on cash flows, even a complex CDO. But the cost to the buyer and the system of not doing the diligence is an order or magnitude bigger. If the Congress, the SEC and the FASB, and the financial regulators only do one thing this year when it comes to reforming the world of structured credit, then it should be to impose by law and regulation common standards for the definitions used in the marketplace.

Ann Rutledge; basis; interview; IRA Analyst; securitizations; structured credit.

Minyanville Sat 2009-09-05 11:47 EDT

Why Hanging On to UNG Is Risky Business

People have been up in arms for months now about the troubles at the United States Natural Gas Fund LP (UNG) the ETF designed to track the price of natural gas. And as far as I can tell rightly so. ETFs were meant to be a nearly frictionless relatively simple alternative to the clunky closed-end funds (CEFs) and managed products that our parents and grandparents had to contend with. But UNG recently traded at a 19% premium to its net asset value (NAV) -- behavior far more fitting a CEF...But since hand-wringing over UNG seems to be the consensus approach, here's a contrarian thought: UNG has, to date, tracked natural gas futures (NG) fairly well.

hang; Minyanville; Risky Business; UNG.

zero hedge Fri 2009-08-28 17:03 EDT

One Man's Critique Of A Loose Monetary Policy

It seems these days everyone is happy to blame Greenspan for creating the biggest housing/credit bubble in American history, yet few have the same problem when it comes to voicing their support of Ben Bernanke, who is repeating exactly the same monetary steps (mistakes) as performed by his predecessor. Proponents will say that this time the justification was to prevent a full financial systemic collapse, and the trillions of excess liquidity (an approach that even Greenspan did not embark on full bore) that drowned the capital markets were just what the doctor ordered. Whether that is true or not will be debated by historians who analyze the 2009 as the year when China, the US and the Eurozone let loose the most unprecedented monetary loosening in the history of...

loose monetary policy; Man's Critique; Zero Hedge.

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