Mon 2010-04-05 15:16 EDT

Eleven lessons from Iceland

Thorvaldur Gylfason

Iceland's economic crisis has destroyed wealth equivalent to about seven times its GDP. The damage inflicted on foreign creditors, investors, and depositors amounts to about five times its GDP, while the asset losses thrust upon Icelandic residents account for the rest. These figures do not include the cost of Iceland's increased indebtedness. Iceland's gross public debt, domestic and foreign, is estimated to increase by more than 100% of GDP as a result of the collapse of the banks, or from 29% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 136% by the end of 2010. In 2009, the government spent almost as much on interest payments as on healthcare and social insurance, the single largest public expenditure item. The damage due to Iceland's tarnished reputation is harder to assess...the absence of checks and balances that had led to an unbalanced division of power between the strong executive branch and the much weaker legislative and judicial branches came to haunt the country when unscrupulous politicians put the new banks in the hands of reckless owners who then found themselves in a position to expand their balance sheets as if there were no tomorrow -- and no supervision. Politicians who privatise banks by delivering them on a silver plate to their friends are not very likely to subject the banks to stringent supervision or other such inconveniences...What can be done to reduce the likelihood of a repeat performance -- in Iceland and elsewhere?

Iceland; Lessons.

China Financial Markets Thu 2010-03-04 08:47 EST

Stuck in neutral -- what Japan's rebalancing can teach us

Michael Pettis

...A few days ago I read a good article (``Stuck on Neutral'') about Japan [from] the Economist...about Japan's post-1989 rebalancing, ...discusses why, in spite of every attempt, Japan has not been able supposedly to rebalance the economy and achieve any real growth during the two lost decades after 1990. Private consumption never took off to drive economic growth...After many years of excess investment driving growth, Japan's rebalancing process, which occurred after corporate, bank and government debt levels prevented the investment party from continuing, locked the country into many years of slow growth because it had to grind through years of debt-fueled overinvestment...it doesn't matter what individual policies we take to boost consumption if these polices don't in the aggregate represent a real transfer of income to the household sector, as they did not in Japan...Japan's experience suggests one of the risks China faces...Chinese household consumption will undoubtedly rise as a share of Chinese GDP over the next decade or two, but the process nonetheless can be disappointing for growth. It depends on lots of other moving parts, most importantly perhaps the change in investment and the speed with which income is transferred to households. And the change in investment might depend on debt capacity constraints and the extent of earlier overinvestment.

China Financial Markets; Japan's rebalancing; neutral; stuck; teach.

Sun 2010-02-28 13:43 EST

"Sultans of Swap" by Gordon T Long, FSU Editorial 02/24/2010

...When asked why there are $605 Trillion derivatives outstanding (1) how do you articulate an answer to this horrendous and almost unimaginable number? The US is the largest economy in the world but tallies only 2.3% in comparison. Global bank reserves amount to only 1.2% of this accumulation. The gargantuan size appears to defy all logic...we discover the Sultans of Swap. The Bond Vigilantes are of a previous era. They are dead -- RIP. Through the magic mix of Credit Default Swaps, Dynamic Hedging and Interest Rate Swaps the Sultans of Swaps effectively control interest rate spreads. Through Regulatory Arbitrage they extort tremendous political sway globally. They live in the world of risk free spreads. Low interest rates simply attract more volume for their concoctions. We have had an explosion in Money Supply globally as the charts (right) indicate. The parabolic rise matches the increase in these derivative products along with their ability to turn Interest Rate Swaps into high powered bank lending...Everything is based on tax payers paying, GDP expanding and interest rates staying low...

FSU Editorial 02/24/2010; Gordon T Long; sultans; Swap.

Fri 2010-02-26 16:26 EST

Risk taking, regulatory capture and bailouts: The doomsday cycle | vox - Research-based policy analysis and commentary from leading economists

Peter Boone and Simon Johnson

Over the last three decades, the US financial system has tripled in size, as measured by total credit relative to GDP (see Figure 1). Each time the system runs into problems, the Federal Reserve quickly lowers interest rates to revive it. These crises appear to be getting worse and worse -- and their impact is increasingly global. Not only are interest rates near zero around the world, but many countries are on fiscal trajectories that require major changes to avoid eventual financial collapse. What will happen when the next shock hits? We believe we may be nearing the stage where the answer will be -- just as it was in the Great Depression -- a calamitous global collapse. The root problem is that we have let a `doomsday cycle' infiltrate our economic system...

Bailout; commentary; doomsday cycle; leading economists; regulatory capture; research-based policy analysis; risk take; Vox.

Wed 2010-02-24 08:49 EST

What the PBoC cannot do with its reserves

Michael Pettis

...Revaluing the RMB, in other words, is important and significant because it represents a shift of wealth largely from the PBoC, exporters, and Chinese residents who have stashed away a lot of wealth in a foreign bank, in favor of the rest of the country. Since much of this shift of wealth benefits households at the expense of the state and manufacturers, one of the automatic consequence of a revaluation will be an increase in household wealth and, with it, household consumption. This is why revaluation is part of the rebalancing strategy -- it shifts income to households and so increases household consumption. So a revaluation has important balance sheet impacts on entities within China, and to a much lesser extent, on some entities outside China. But since it merely represents a distribution of wealth within China should we care about the PBoC losses or can we ignore them? Unfortunately we cannot ignore them and might have to worry about the PBoC losses because, once again, of balance sheet impacts. The PBoC runs a mismatched balance sheet, and as a consequence every 10% revaluation in the RMB will cause the PBoC's net indebtedness to rise by about 7-8% of GDP. This ultimately becomes an increase in total government debt, and of course the more dollars the PBoC accumulates, the greater this loss. (Some readers will note that if government debt levels are already too high, an increase in government debt will sharply increase future government claims on household income, thus reducing the future rebalancing impact of a revaluation, and they are right, which indicates how complex and difficult rebalancing might be). In that sense it is not whether or not China as a whole loses or gains from a revaluation that can be measured by looking at the reserves, and I would argue that it gains, but how the losses are distributed and what further balance sheet impacts that might have.

PBoC cannot; reserves.

Ambrose Evans-Pritchard - Finance and business comments Thu 2010-01-07 19:00 EST

Global bear rally of 2009 will end as Japan's hyperinflation rips economy to pieces

The contraction of M3 money in the US and Europe over the last six months will slowly puncture economic recovery as 2010 unfolds, with the time-honoured lag of a year or so. Ben Bernanke will be caught off guard, just as he was in mid-2008 when the Fed drove straight through a red warning light with talk of imminent rate rises -- the final error that triggered the implosion of Lehman, AIG, and the Western banking system. As the great bear rally of 2009 runs into the greater Chinese Wall of excess global capacity, it will become clear that we are in the grip of a 21st Century Depression -- more akin to Japan's Lost Decade than the 1840s or 1930s, but nothing like the normal cycles of the post-War era. The surplus regions (China, Japan, Germania, Gulf ) have not increased demand enough to compensate for belt-tightening in the deficit bloc (Anglo-sphere, Club Med, East Europe), and fiscal adrenalin is already fading in Europe. The vast East-West imbalances that caused the credit crisis are no better a year later, and perhaps worse. Household debt as a share of GDP sits near record levels in two-fifths of the world economy. Our long purge has barely begun.

2009; Ambrose Evans Pritchard; Business Comment; ending; finance; Global Bear Rally; Japan's hyperinflation rips economy; pieces.

naked capitalism Sun 2010-01-03 15:28 EST

Guest Post: Military Spending is INCREASING Unemployment and REDUCING GDP

George Washington

PhD economist Dean Baker pointed out yesterday that America's massive military spending on unnecessary and unpopular wars actually lowers economic growth and increases unemployment...

Guest Post; increasing unemployment; military spending; naked capitalism; reduce GDP.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Fri 2009-12-18 09:52 EST

China Faces Crash Scenario

Michael Shedlock

Problems in China continue to mount. Money supply is growing rampantly out of control, property prices are in a bubble, exports are weak, commodity speculation is pervasive, and GDP growth is more of a mirage than real...I side with Andy Xie who states ``China's asset markets are a Ponzi scheme''...Various Chinese asset bubbles are guaranteed to pop, but as I have said many times, the timing of such events is unknown. In this case however, I am more apt to believe sooner, rather than later.

China Faces Crash Scenario; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Fri 2009-10-23 19:30 EDT

A Stern Opponent Of Funding The FDIC's Depleted Deposit Insurance Fund, And Monetization Is... Alan Greenspan?

What a difference twenty years makes. The man whose actions basically lead to the eradication of the American middle class in its aspirational pursuit of buying massive SUVs, Prada bags, and 3rd investment properties, compliments of cheap credit, in order to appear ever so much like the upper class yet ultimately drowning itself in debt, Alan Greenspan, is probably the most critical reason why America's debt service will be nearly 90% of GDP within several decades. The adoption of his actions by the current deranged operator of the reserve currency printing press, is merely a continuation of a multiple decade long process of keeping inflation contained at the expense of devaluing the US currency, as the global liquidity pyramid recently hit one quadrillion, and continues to grow exponentially, yet...

Alan Greenspan; FDIC's Depleted Deposit Insurance Fund; funds; monetize; Stern Opponent; Zero Hedge.

Willem Buiter's Maverecon Sat 2009-10-10 14:00 EDT

Expect little and you may yet be disappointed

Willem Buiter

...the most disappointing development this year was the performance of president Barack Obama and his administration - and my expectations were modest to begin with...On the fiscal side, Barack Obama is presiding over the biggest peace-time government deficits and public debt build-up ever. According to my back-of-the-envelope calculations there is about a 10 percent of GDP gap between the medium and longer-term spending plans of the Obama administration and the taxes the Congress is willing and able to impose. The reality that you cannot run a West-European welfare state (with decent quality health care, decent pre-school, primary and secondary school education for all), rebuild America's crumbling infrastructure, invest in the environment and fulfill your post-imperial global strategic ambitions while raising 33 percent of GDP in taxes, has not yet dawned on the Obama administration or on the American people at large...Clearly, the qualities one needs to get elected to high office in western democracies are not qualities that are likely to be helpful once you have achieved high office and are expected to govern and lead. To survive the selection process to become president you have to be able to stitch together a coalition of special interests that can provide sufficient financial and sweat equity resources to win this grueling race to the top. Once you get there, you should shed the unfortunate baggage you accumulated on your way up and govern in the interest of all the people. Few can do that. Apparently Obama is not one of them.

disappointment; expectations; Willem Buiter's Maverecon.

Willem Buiter's Maverecon Sat 2009-10-10 13:13 EDT

I know I know nothing; but at least I know that

Willem Buiter

...Except for the important qualifier that the US dollar is a global reserve currency, and that the US government (and private sector) has most of its domestic and external liabilities denominated in US dollars, the pathologies of financial boom, bubble and bust in the US, the UK, Iceland, Ireland and Spain (and many of the Central and East European emerging market economies) track those of classical emerging market crises in South America, Asia and CEE in the 1990s, rather well. The emerging market analogy makes one less optimistic about a robust recovery, as typically, emerging markets whose financial sector was destroyed by a serious financial crisis took many years to recover their pre-crisis growth rates and often never recovered their pre-crisis GDP paths.

know; least; Willem Buiter's Maverecon.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-09-22 09:15 EDT

Confessions of a 'Flationary Agnostic

Jesse

I have no particular allegiance to either the hyperinflation or the deflationary camps. Both outcomes are possible, but not yet probable. Rather than being a benefit, occupying the middle ground too often just puts one in the middle, being able to see the merits in both arguments and possibilities, and being unwilling to ignore the flaws in each argument...The growth rate of dollars is slowing at the same time that the 'demand' for dollars, the velocity of money and the creation of new commercial credit, is slowing. GDP is negative, and the growth rate of money supply is still positive, and rather healthy. This is not a monetary deflation, but rather the signs of an emerging stagflation fueled by slow real economic activity and monetization, or hot money, from the Fed. The monetary authority is trying to lead the economic recovery through unusual monetary growth. All they are doing is creating more malinvestment, risk addiction, and asset bubbles...Using money as a 'tool' to stimulate or retard economic activity is a dangerous game indeed, fraught with unintended consequences and unexpected bubbles and imbalances, with a spiral of increasingly destabilizing crises and busts. The Obama Administration bears a heavy responsibility for this because of their failure to reform the system and restore balance to the economy in any meaningful way.

confessed; Flationary Agnostic; Jesse's Café Américain.

The Guardian World News Sun 2009-09-20 10:57 EDT

Sarkozy refuses to fret over GDP

Nicolas Sarkozy called for a "great revolution" in the way national wealth is measured today, throwing his weight behind a report which criticises "GDP fetishism" and prioritises quality of life over financial growth. Speaking days before the G20 summit in Pittsburgh, France's president urged the rest of the world to follow his example as he ordered a shake-up in research methods aimed at providing a more balanced reading of countries' performance. Endorsing the recommendations of a report given to him by Nobel prize winners Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, he said governments should do away with the "religion of statistics" in which financial prowess was the sole indicator of a country's state of health.

fret; GDP; Guardian World News; Sarkozy refuses.

Fri 2009-07-24 00:00 EDT

naked capitalism: Guest post: Economic recovery and the perverse math of GDP reporting

Economic recovery; GDP report; Guest Post; naked capitalism; perverse math.

Fri 2009-06-26 00:00 EDT

Jesse's Café Américain: A Final Word on Inflation and Deflation

Jesse's Café Américain: A Final Word on Inflation and Deflation; ``serious monetary inflation is triggered by excessive government debt obligations, and not private debt, that can no longer be adequately serviced by a productive real economy and domestic taxation...the output gap is no sure barrier to this type of inflation is that it ironically serves to feed it in the presence of profligate government spending, since it dampens tax revenues and domestic GDP.

deflation; final words; Inflation; Jesse's Café Américain.