zero hedge - on a long enough timeline, the survival rate for everyone drops to zero Wed 2010-08-25 10:47 EDT

Illinois Teachers' Retirement System Enters The Death Spiral: AIG Wannabe's Go-For-Broke Strategy Fails As Pension Fund Begins Liquidations

Two few months ago we disclosed how the Illinois Teachers' Retirement System (TRS) was doing all it can to become the next AIG. In addition to, or maybe precisely due to, its deplorable fundamental condition, which can be summarized as being 61% underfunded on its $33.7 billion in assets, with a performance record of down $4.4 billion in 2009 and 5% in 2008, the fund, courtesy of a detailed analysis by Alexandra Harris of the Medill Journalism school at Northwestern, was found to be on its way to trying to become a veritable self-made TBTF: as was described then, "TRS is largely on the risky side of the contracts, selling and writing OTC derivatives, including credit default swaps,..."

AIG Wannabe's Go; Broke Strategy Fails; Death Spiral; dropped; Illinois teacher; long; Pension Fund Begins Liquidations; Retirement System Enters; survival rate; Timeline; zero; Zero Hedge.

The Wall Street Examiner Sun 2010-05-09 09:58 EDT

The Minsky Cruise (part 2, Households)

...Now for the Minsky part. The theory above, in layman's terms, argues that over time, when an economy expands without serious contractions, finances will become increasingly risky. Minsky wrote of a shift from hedge finance (when debt, both principal and interest, can be serviced from cash flows) through speculative finance (when debt must be rolled over as only interest payments can be serviced from cash flows) and into Ponzi finance (when cash flows cannot cover interest payments and thus new debt must be added or assets sold). The idea in the Ponzi finance stage is that asset appreciation will compensate for the extra risk...I don't mean to suggest we (collectively) are broke, just that, as Minsky argued (and the data bears out) our balance sheets are increasingly betting on real estate and equity price appreciation with borrowed money...

Household; Minsky Cruise; Part 2; Wall Street Examiner.

naked capitalism Thu 2010-04-22 18:21 EDT

Guest Post: Are Interest Rate Derivatives a Ticking Time Bomb?

Washington's Blog

...Most economists and financial institutions assume that interest rate derivatives help to stabilize the economy. But cumulatively, they can actually increase risky behavior, just as portfolio insurance previously did. As Nassim Taleb has shown, behavior which appears to decrease risk can actually mask long-term risks and lead to huge blow ups. Moreover, there is a real danger of too many people using the same strategy at once... Given that the market for interest rate derivatives is orders of magnitude larger than credit default swap market -- let alone portfolio insurance -- the risks of a ``black swan'' event based on interest rate derivatives should be taken seriously...

Guest Post; Interest Rate Derivatives; naked capitalism; ticking time bomb.

Mon 2010-02-01 17:19 EST

Did Larry Langford bet Birmingham's future on Wall Street scheme? / The Christian Science Monitor - CSMonitor.com

The Christian Science Monitor

Now on trial in US District Court in Tuscaloosa, Ala., on 60 counts of money laundering and bribery charges, Mr. Langford is at the center of a spectacular scandal where, prosecutors say, a popular mayor whose motto is ``Do something!'' gambled a city's future on a risky Wall Street scheme, all while taking bribes in the form of cash, Rolex watches, and designer clothes.

Christian science Monitor; com; CSMonitor; Larry Langford bet Birmingham's future; Wall Street schemes.

naked capitalism Wed 2009-12-16 15:18 EST

Hosptial Cleaners Are Worth More Than Bankers (and Quelle Surprise, Bankers Destroy Value!)

A provocative report by the New Economics Foundation has made an effort to put a price tag on the broader costs and benefits of various types of work. As quoted in the Financial Times...The authors assume the financial crisis and recession would not have happened without City bankers engaging in risky, opaque and complex transactions. Applying a guess about the cost of the recession on the rest of society, they estimate top City bankers des-troy £7 of value for every £1 they are paid privately.

bankers; Bankers Destroy Value; Hosptial Cleaners; naked capitalism; Quelle Surprise.

Tue 2009-12-01 22:52 EST

Harvard ignored warnings about investments - The Boston Globe

It happened at least once a year, every year. In a roomful of a dozen Harvard University financial officials, Jack Meyer, the hugely successful head of Harvard's endowment, and Lawrence Summers, then the school's president, would face off in a heated debate. The topic: cash and how the university was managing - or mismanaging - its basic operating funds. Through the first half of this decade, Meyer repeatedly warned Summers and other Harvard officials that the school was being too aggressive with billions of dollars in cash, according to people present for the discussions, investing almost all of it with the endowment's risky mix of stocks, bonds, hedge funds, and private equity. Meyer's successor, Mohamed El-Erian, would later sound the same warnings to Summers, and to Harvard financial staff and board members. ... But the warnings fell on deaf ears, under Summers's regime and beyond. And when the market crashed in the fall of 2008, Harvard would pay dearly, as $1.8 billion in cash simply vanished. Indeed, it is still paying, in the form of tighter budgets, deferred expansion plans, and big interest payments on bonds issued to cover the losses.

Boston Globe; Harvard ignored warnings; investment.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

How Goldman secretly bet on the U.S. housing crash | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

In 2006 and 2007, Goldman Sachs Group peddled more than $40 billion in securities backed by at least 200,000 risky home mortgages, but never told the buyers it was secretly betting that a sharp drop in U.S. housing prices would send the value of those securities plummeting. Goldman's sales and its clandestine wagers, completed at the brink of the housing market meltdown, enabled the nation's premier investment bank to pass most of its potential losses to others before a flood of mortgage defaults staggered the U.S. and global economies. Only later did investors discover that what Goldman had promoted as triple-A rated investments were closer to junk...

Goldman Secretly Bet; McClatchy; U.S. housing crash.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:26 EST

Goldman left foreign investors holding the subprime bag | McClatchy

Greg Gordon

Goldman sold more than $57 billion in risky mortgage-backed securities during a 14-month period in 2006 and 2007, including nearly $39 billion issued from mortgages it purchased. Meanwhile, the firm peddled billions of dollars in complex deals, many of them tied to subprime mortgages, in the Caymans and other offshore locations...Goldman's traders also made huge bets that those securities would lose value by buying insurance-like contracts, called credit-default swaps, with private parties. Beginning early in 2007, they bought swaps on a London-based exchange.

Goldman left foreign investors holding; McClatchy; subprime bag.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:14 EST

Business & Technology | Part two | WaMu: Hometown bank turned predatory | Seattle Times Newspaper

David Heath

What few people knew was that bank executives crafted a radical new business strategy in 2003 that was intended to boost profits. The new WaMu used huge sales commissions and misleading marketing to hawk risky and overpriced loans to borrowers. In short, WaMu became one of the nation's biggest predatory lenders. The strategy eventually failed, not only bringing down Washington Mutual but deceiving borrowers, costing thousands their homes. In particular, the bank promoted as its "signature loan" a complex product known as the option ARM. This adjustable-rate mortgage, much like a credit card, gave borrowers the choice of making low minimum payments. But that option didn't cover the interest and only dug them deeper into debt.

business; Hometown bank turned predatory; part; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology; WaMu.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Fri 2009-10-23 09:05 EDT

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity To Rise Markedly Next Year

As anyone who has spent even a day looking at securitization tranching or CDS trading will tell you, there are two critical components to any investment that involves risky fixed income: cumulative loss probability and loss severity...artificial delays in bringing the CRE market to fair value in terms of delinquencies and REOs going to foreclosures will simply result in much lower eventual recoveries...the temporary reprieves granted to many leveraged securities will come back to bite investors when defaults eventually pick up again, however with the result being loss rates which will be much higher than default expectations.

Fitch Expects CMBS Loss Severity; Rise Markedly; years; Zero Hedge.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Tue 2009-10-13 20:03 EDT

No Country for Old Jobs: 10 Charts Showing the Fragile Recovery. Home Sales, Buying versus Renting, Unemployment, and Real Economy Data.

...Until jobs start showing up, any talk of a rebounding housing market is moot especially with this entire artificial stimulus still bouncing around the economy. And collapsing tax revenues are not a good sign. I don't buy the jobless recovery argument and the government tends to agree. If all is well, why is the U.S. government and Fed buying $1.25 trillion in agency debt to lower mortgage rates, putting in place an $8,000 tax credit, boosting car sales with gimmicks, encouraging risky low money down loans with FHA insured products, and extending unemployment insurance to a record 92 weeks in states like California? Do these things sounds like policies of a booming economy?

10 Charts Showing; Buying versus Renting; country; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Fragile recovery; home Sale; old job; Real Economy Data; unemployment.

Minyanville Sat 2009-09-05 11:47 EDT

Why Hanging On to UNG Is Risky Business

People have been up in arms for months now about the troubles at the United States Natural Gas Fund LP (UNG) the ETF designed to track the price of natural gas. And as far as I can tell rightly so. ETFs were meant to be a nearly frictionless relatively simple alternative to the clunky closed-end funds (CEFs) and managed products that our parents and grandparents had to contend with. But UNG recently traded at a 19% premium to its net asset value (NAV) -- behavior far more fitting a CEF...But since hand-wringing over UNG seems to be the consensus approach, here's a contrarian thought: UNG has, to date, tracked natural gas futures (NG) fairly well.

hang; Minyanville; Risky Business; UNG.

Fri 2008-11-07 00:00 EST

naked capitalism: It Isn't Over Until the Fat Lady Sings

Benoit Mandelbrot warned ``Markets are very, very risky more risky than the standard theories assume.''

Fat Lady Sings; naked capitalism.

Tue 2008-08-26 00:00 EDT

The End of the Beginning -- Developments in the Credit Crisis

The End of the Beginning - Developments in the Credit Crisis, by Satyajit Das (Prudent Bear); 2008-05-27; ``limited recognition of the massive de-leveraging of the global financial system that is under way.'' ``The banking systems ability to supply credit is significantly impaired and will remain so for the foreseeable future.'' ``Changes in financial markets will have a significant impact on many companies that now rely on financial engineering rather than real engineering'' Das proposes: ``holdings and values of risky assets held by banks and investment banks must be accurately determined...Risky assets must be valued on a hold-to-maturity basis...Mark-to-market accounting should be suspended...Capital levels should be set on a bank-by-bank basis by regulators...Capital requirements should be eased...government [should] guarantee of all major bank liabilities''

Begins; credit crisis; develop; ending.

Thu 2007-12-20 00:00 EST

Bear In Mind > Fannie Mae: Systemic time bomb

Bear In Mind > Fannie Mae: Systemic time bomb; half of issued debt bought by non-US investors; risky mortgage exposure 10x capital base; falling home prices drive foreclosures, huge Fannie Mae losses

Bear; Fannie Mae; mind; Systemic time bomb.

Tue 2007-11-13 00:00 EST

Wall Street firms increasingly relying on risky assets - Nov. 12, 2007

Wall Street firms increasingly relying on risky assets, by Peter Eavis, Fortune; Level 3 bank assets increase ominously - Nov. 12, 2007

12; 2007; Nov; risky assets; Wall Street firms increasingly relying.

Mon 2007-11-05 00:00 EST

Economist.com

Credit derivatives | At the risky end of finance | (CDS debacle looming)

com; Economist.