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Lends Topic in The Credit Debacle Catalog

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naked capitalism Mon 2009-12-21 15:58 EST

Obama's demand that fat cats lend is no ode to Samuelson

...to-do about President Obama's fat cat remarks and his meeting with bankers exhorting them to lend...we are getting a bunch of populist rhetoric which is pure politics to induce banks to lend recklessly and save the economy when basic economics would tell you that there is a deficit of lending capacity and demand for credit. It is the absurd kabuki theater of depression economics...David Rosenberg...sees something altogether more cynical -- an orchestrated campaign to shame and bully banks into going against their fiduciary responsibility and lending irresponsibly again!...Easy money is not the solution, it is the problem. Jobs are the solution...fiscal policy is more effective than monetary policy in a depressionary environment. Quantitative easing is overrated.

fat cats lend; naked capitalism; Obama s demands; Ode; Samuelson.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Wed 2009-11-25 12:05 EST

What Is Inflation and How Does One Measure It?

...Inflation is a net expansion of money supply and credit, where credit is marked to market. Deflation is the opposite: a net contraction of money supply and credit, where credit is marked to market...Credit (and credit problems) dwarf monetary concerns at the present...I still expect the US to slip in and out of deflation and recession for years to come just as happened in Japan...banks aren't lending, consumer credit is contracting, credit writeoffs are likely to exceed monetary printing, and symptoms like treasury yields are in generally in agreement...To bail out the banks' poor bets on Dot-Com companies and Latin America in 2001-2002, Greenspan purposely ignited a credit bubble that led to the mother of all housing crashes. In response to the housing bust, the Fed refused to let failed banks go out of business and is attempting to force another credit bubble...However, this is the end of the line. Housing was the bubble of last resort, nothing can come close to the number of jobs created by the global housing bubble. Further attempts to reflate will do nothing but create a currency crisis, crash the economy, and add to future liabilities that cannot be paid back.

Inflation; measured; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Fri 2009-11-20 09:59 EST

Interfluidity :: Sympathy for the Treasury

On Monday, I was among a group of eight bloggers who attended a discussion with "senior Treasury officials" in Washington...Although the format of our meeting did not lend itself to forging deep relationships, I was flattered and grateful for the meeting and left with more sympathy for the people I spoke to than I came in with. In other words, I have been corrupted, a little...The most interesting aspect of the meeting was anthropological, getting a look at how senior Treasury officials behaved, how they interacted with us and what kind of a thing this was to them. It was a two hour meeting, but different groups of officials came at us in shifts, and stayed with us for 20 to 40 minutes. The tone of the meeting was open, earnest, and informal. But somehow, it never felt like we connected, like there was a lot of actual communication occurring.

Interfluidity; sympathy; Treasury.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

zero hedge Tue 2009-10-27 11:50 EDT

Freddie Mac Annualized Defaults Hit Record High At 7.3%, Even As Lending Increases Once Again

With the US government now having taken over the functions of such pristine subprime lenders as New Century, with the provision that it not only is not checking borrowers' credit scores, income potential, or other "facts" that the mortgage lenders at least pretended to care about, but also giving away massive incentives to promote housing bubble V2, it was only a matter of time before the taxpayer's balance sheet would start looking like an Angelo Mozilo wet dream. Today, Freddie Mac released its September Monthly Volume Summary and, as expected, it is beginning to look just like the subprime debacle is among us, only this time all of America is on the hook thanks to a brilliant Fed and the even more brilliant geniuses in D.C.

3; 7; Freddie Mac Annualized Defaults Hit Record High; lending increasingly; Zero Hedge.

The Big Picture Wed 2009-10-14 11:36 EDT

Andy Xie: Here We Go Again

Former Morgan Stanley Analyst Andy Xie explains why China is a potential bubble: [Consider] the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The US Federal Reserve kept monetary policy loose to help the banking system. The dollar went into a prolonged bear market. During the descent, Asian economies that pegged their currencies to the dollar could increase money supply and lending without worrying about devaluation, but the money couldn't leave home due to the dollar's poor outlook, so it went into asset markets. When the dollar began to rebound in 1996, Asian economies came under tightening pressure that burst their asset bubbles. The collapsing asset prices triggered capital outflows that reinforced asset deflation. Asset deflation destroyed their banking systems. In short, the US banking crisis created the environment for a credit boom in Asia. When US banks recovered, Asian banks collapsed. Is China heading down the same path? There are many anecdotes to support the comparison. Property prices in Southeast Asia became higher than those in the US, but ``experts'' and government officials had stories to explain it, even though their per capita income was one-tenth that of the US. Their banks also commanded huge market capitalizations, as financial markets extended their growth ad infinitum. The same thing is happening in China today. When something seems too good to be true, it is. World trade -- the engine of global growth -- has collapsed. Employment is still contracting throughout the world. There are no realistic scenarios for the global economy to regain high and sustainable growth. China is an export-driven economy. Bank lending can support the economy for a short time, however, stocks are as expensive as during the heydays of the last bubble. Like all previous bubbles, this one, too, will burst.

Andy Xie; Big Picture; Go.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 10:10 EDT

Albert Edwards Warns Of Western Authorities' Positioning For Dismal Failure, As US Becomes Japan Redux

Albert Edwards continues doling out common sense; everyone, and the market in particular, continues ignoring it...The post-bubble whiplash in the economic and profits cycle is exactly a replay of Japan?'s experience. They too had seen an extended period of strong and steady growth going into the peak of the bubble. It took many years, repeated painful lapses back into recession, and sharp declines in equity markets before investors fully de-rated valuations low enough to reflect a new new paradigm...To gauge whether the world economy can surprise and escape this balance sheet recession, keep a very close eye on the bank lending numbers.

Albert Edwards Warns; Becomes Japan Redux; dismal failure; positive; Western authorities; Zero Hedge.

Calculated Risk Mon 2009-10-12 09:56 EDT

More on Problems at the FHA and Quote of the Day

``I don't think it's a bad thing that the bad loans occurred. It was an effort to keep prices from falling too fast. That's a policy.'' Barney Frank, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee on recent FHA lending.The quote is from David Streitfeld and Louise Story's article in the NY Times: U.S. Mortgage Backer May Need Bailout, Experts Say

Calculated Risk; day; FHA; problem; quote.

The Baseline Scenario Thu 2009-10-08 16:52 EDT

The Problem with Securitization

The New York Times has a story on ``Paralysis in the Debt Markets'' which says, basically, that credit has dried up because of lack of demand for asset-backed securities. In English, that means that since no one wants to invest in securities that are made out of home mortgages, the people who originate mortgages have no place to sell the mortgages to, so they don't have any money to lend. And this is also true of commercial real estate, student loans, and so on. For example, ``A once-thriving private market in securities backed by home mortgages has collapsed, from $744 billion in 2005, at the peak of the housing boom, to $8 billion during the first half of this year.''...the private market may never recover. The boom in securitization was based on investors' willingness to believe what investment banks and credit rating agencies said about these securities.

Baseline Scenario; problem; securitizations.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Thu 2009-10-08 15:29 EDT

Competitive Currency Debasement - A Look at Rampant Monetary Expansion In China

The Chinese central banks' printing and respective Chinese bank lending make us look like amateurs. Chinese central bank assets and the money supply are up 25-26% annualized YTD...nearly everyone is absolutely sure the Renminbi would soar if China allowed it to float. Conceivably it could crash...Neither the G-20 nor G-7 did anything to address the massive global imbalances. Something critical is going to blow sky high, when and what remains to be seen.

China; Competitive Currency Debasement; looking; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; Rampant Monetary Expansion.

Calculated Risk Tue 2009-09-22 09:30 EDT

Inspector General: FDIC saw risks at IndyMac in 2002

From the Inspector General Report: Between 2001 and 2003, [Division of Insurance and Research] DIR risk assessments and quarterly banking profiles identified concerns about a number of issues, including:*** consumers' ever-increasing debt load, the expansion of adjustable rate mortgages, and a potential housing bubble; *** subprime and high loan-to-value (HLTV) lending as a risk in the event that the United States economy suffered a significant recession; and *** pricing and modeling charge-off risk with respect to the originate-to-sell model of the mortgage business.

2002; Calculated Risk; FDIC saw risks; IndyMac; Inspector generally.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Mon 2009-09-21 14:09 EDT

Is Pent-Up Inflation From Fed Printing Waiting On Deck?

Inquiring minds are wondering about the possibility of "pent-up" inflation from the massive expansion money supply by the Fed...Hardly. A funny thing happened to the inflation theory: Banks aren't lending and proof can be found in excess reserves at member banks. Because of rising credit card defaults, commercial real estate defaults, foreclosures, walk-aways, and other bad debts, banks need those reserves to cover future losses...banks are insolvent, unable or unwilling to lend. Moreover, tapped out consumers are unable or unwilling to borrow.

deck; Fed Printing Waiting; Inflation; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis; pent.

Mon 2009-09-21 13:47 EDT

The Hole in the FDIC

This week we continue to look at what powers the forces of deflation...This week we look at one more factor: bank lending. I give you a sneak preview of what will be an explosive report from Institutional Risk Analytics about the problems in the banking sector. Are you ready for the FDIC to be down as much as $400 billion?

FDIC; holes.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Thu 2009-09-17 09:47 EDT

Consumer Credit Contracts Record $21.6 Billion

U.S. Consumer Credit Falls by a Record $21.6 Billion. U.S. consumer credit plunged more than five times as much as forecast in July as banks restricted lending terms and job losses made Americans reluctant to borrow. Consumer credit fell by a record $21.6 billion, or 10 percent at an annual rate, to $2.5 trillion, according to a Federal Reserve report released today in Washington. Credit dropped by $15.5 billion in June, more than previously estimated. Credit fell for a sixth month, the longest series of declines since 1991.

21; 6; Consumer Credit Contracts Record; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Language Log Wed 2009-09-16 18:57 EDT

Language Log >> Google Books: A Metadata Train Wreck

.This is almost certainly the Last Library, after all. There's no Moore's Law for capture, and nobody is ever going to scan most of these books again. So whoever is in charge of the collection a hundred years from now -- Google? UNESCO? Wal-Mart? -- these are the files that scholars are going to be using then. All of which lends a particular urgency to the concerns about whether Google is doing this right...you need good metadata. And Google's are a train wreck: a mish-mash wrapped in a muddle wrapped in a mess.

Google Books; Language Log; Metadata Train Wreck.

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