The Economic Populist - Speak Your Mind 2 Cents at a Time Mon 2009-12-28 18:57 EST

Pricing a CDO - Not only Bad Math, Bad Computation too

A working paper, Computational complexity and informational asymmetry in financial products, Sanjeev Arora, Boaz Barak, Markus Brunnermeier, Rong Ge. sheds some light on the complex mathematical models upon which credit default obligations and other derivatives are based. What Arora et al. prove is not only are many derivative mathematical models impossible to compute, never mind in real time, because they require more computing power than the world possesses, the missing information to run a mathematical model is a very good place to cheat with.

Bad Computation; bad math; CDO; economic populist; Mind 2 Cents; Price; speaking; Time.

zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2009-12-17 10:11 EST

Is the Price of World Silver the Result of Legitimate Market Discovery?

Jesse

Ted Butler: ...the concentrated short position in COMEX silver futures is so extreme, that it is hard to imagine how it can be resolved in an orderly manner. The most recent data from the CFTC indicate that one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces...So extreme is JPMorgan's silver short position that it cannot be closed out in an orderly fashion...As extreme as JPMorgan's position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

Jesse's Café Américain; Legitimate Market Discovery; Price; resulting; World Silver.

Wed 2009-12-16 15:41 EST

Steve Keen's DebtWatch No 31 February 2009: ``The Roving Cavaliers of Credit'' | Steve Keen's Debtwatch

``Talk about centralisation! The credit system, which has its focus in the so-called national banks and the big money-lenders and usurers surrounding them, constitutes enormous centralisation, and gives this class of parasites the fabulous power, not only to periodically despoil industrial capitalists, but also to interfere in actual production in a most dangerous manner-- and this gang knows nothing about production and has nothing to do with it.'' [Karl Marx] Marx's analysis of money and credit, and how the credit system can bring an otherwise well-functioning market economy to its knees, was spot on. His observations on the financial crisis of 1857 still ring true today...

31 February 2009; credit; Roving Cavaliers; Steve Keen's Debtwatch.

zero hedge Wed 2009-11-25 10:10 EST

Shadow Banking Topology

A new paper by the IMF provides much needed insights into the nature of Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) conduits, which amounted to $1.2 trillion in June 2007, a subset of the broader Commercial Paper shadow asset class (which as Bill Dudley discussed a week ago, hit a peak of $2.3 trillion), and the product's role in funding imbalances (and maturity mismatch) at global banks courtesy of the shadow banking system. However, the most useful observation of the paper's addenda include insights into the global shadow banking system's holdings, as well as its changing composition over time, the collapse of the ABS securitization market whose reincarnation via TALF is critical for preventing the CRE market's implosion in 2012, and lastly a comprehensive overview of the entire shadow banking system...

Shadow Banking Topology; Zero Hedge.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:14 EST

Business & Technology | Part two | WaMu: Hometown bank turned predatory | Seattle Times Newspaper

David Heath

What few people knew was that bank executives crafted a radical new business strategy in 2003 that was intended to boost profits. The new WaMu used huge sales commissions and misleading marketing to hawk risky and overpriced loans to borrowers. In short, WaMu became one of the nation's biggest predatory lenders. The strategy eventually failed, not only bringing down Washington Mutual but deceiving borrowers, costing thousands their homes. In particular, the bank promoted as its "signature loan" a complex product known as the option ARM. This adjustable-rate mortgage, much like a credit card, gave borrowers the choice of making low minimum payments. But that option didn't cover the interest and only dug them deeper into debt.

business; Hometown bank turned predatory; part; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology; WaMu.

Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis Tue 2009-11-03 20:30 EST

Is Debt-Deflation Just Beginning?

Michael Shedlock

You should not be afraid of deflation. You should be afraid of policies attempting to fight it. Deflation (rather price deflation) is actually the natural state of affairs. As productivity increases, more goods and services are produced relative to the population and prices would therefore be expected to drop. It is the Fed, along with misguided Keynesian and Monetarist economists who think falling prices are a bad thing. Who amongst us does not like falling prices (except of course on things we own like houses, but even then who is not sick of higher property taxes that result)? The reality is inflation benefits those with first access to money. Guess who that is? The answer is easy: banks, government, and the already wealthy. Inflation is actually a tax on the middle class and the poor who get access to money last. During the housing bubble, by the time the poor could get access to to money easily, it was far too late to buy. Given that inflation benefits those with first access to money, any targeted inflation at all is morally wrong.

Debt-Deflation Just Beginning; Mish's Global Economic Trend Analysis.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:12 EST

Nine More Banks Fail with CIT on Deck for a Packaged Bankruptcy While Gold Shines

Jesse

...The current state of economics is most remarkable for its arrogant complacency in the face of two failed bubbles, a near systemic failure, a pseudo-scientific perversion of mathematics exposed, and an incredible capacity for spin and self-delusion. The people wish to believe, and Wall Street and the government economists are all too willing to tell them whatever they wish to hear, for a variety of motives. And there is an army of salesmen and lobbyists and econo-whores touting this fraud around the clock...There are good reasons for this failure of American "monetary capitalism," and it has to do with an oversized financial sector and a surplus of white collar crime that both distort and drain the productive economy. The current approach is to pump money into a failed system without attempting to reform it, to fix its fundamental flaws, to make an honest accounting of the results. The result are serial bubbles and the foundation for long duration zombie economy with a grinding stagflation that may morph into a currency crisis and the fall and reissuance of the dollar, as we saw with the Russian rouble. It will stretch the political fabric of the US to the breaking point. This is how oligarchies and their empires fall.

banks failed; CIT; deck; gold shines; Jesse's Café Américain; packaged bankruptcies.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

Tue 2009-10-27 13:03 EDT

`We still have the same disease' - The Globe and Mail

On anniversary of Lehman collapse, author of The Black Swan can say 'I told you so'...Nassim Nicholas Taleb: Central bankers have no clue. In the first place, the financial crisis was not a black swan. It was perfectly predictable. They ignored the phenomenal buildup in leverage since 1980. They acted like airline pilots who'd never heard of hurricanes. After finishing The Black Swan, I realized there was a cancer. The cancer was a huge buildup of risk-taking based on the lack of understanding of reality. The second problem is the hidden risk with new financial products. And the third is the interdependence among financial institutions.

disease; globe; mail.

Satyajit Das's Blog - Fear & Loathing in Financial Products Fri 2009-10-23 09:44 EDT

OTC Derivative Regulation Proposals ? Neat, Plausible and Wrong!

Satyajit Das

Proposals for over-the-counter (OTC) derivative regulations are consistent with H. L. Mencken?s proposition that: "there is always a well-known solution to every human problem--neat, plausible, and wrong." A central omission is the speculative use of derivatives. Industry lobbyists focus on the use of derivatives to hedge and manage risk promoting investment and capital formation. While derivatives can play this role, the primary use of derivatives now is manufacturing risk and creating leverage.

fears; financial products; loath; neat; OTC Derivative Regulation Proposals; plausible; Satyajit Das's Blog; wrong.

Fri 2009-10-23 08:30 EDT

How Moody's sold its ratings - and sold out investors | McClatchy

Kevin G. Hall

As the housing market collapsed in late 2007, Moody's Investors Service, whose investment ratings were widely trusted, responded by purging analysts and executives who warned of trouble and promoting those who helped Wall Street plunge the country into its worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. A McClatchy investigation has found that Moody's punished executives who questioned why the company was risking its reputation by putting its profits ahead of providing trustworthy ratings for investment offerings. Instead, Moody's promoted executives who headed its "structured finance" division, which assisted Wall Street in packaging loans into securities for sale to investors. It also stacked its compliance department with the people who awarded the highest ratings to pools of mortgages that soon were downgraded to junk. Such products have another name now: "toxic assets."

Investors; McClatchy; Moody's Sold; rate; SOLD.

Dr. Housing Bubble Blog Tue 2009-10-13 20:03 EDT

No Country for Old Jobs: 10 Charts Showing the Fragile Recovery. Home Sales, Buying versus Renting, Unemployment, and Real Economy Data.

...Until jobs start showing up, any talk of a rebounding housing market is moot especially with this entire artificial stimulus still bouncing around the economy. And collapsing tax revenues are not a good sign. I don't buy the jobless recovery argument and the government tends to agree. If all is well, why is the U.S. government and Fed buying $1.25 trillion in agency debt to lower mortgage rates, putting in place an $8,000 tax credit, boosting car sales with gimmicks, encouraging risky low money down loans with FHA insured products, and extending unemployment insurance to a record 92 weeks in states like California? Do these things sounds like policies of a booming economy?

10 Charts Showing; Buying versus Renting; country; Dr. Housing Bubble Blog; Fragile recovery; home Sale; old job; Real Economy Data; unemployment.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-12 10:13 EDT

Overview Of Goldman Sachs Electronic Trading: Part 1

Zero Hedge is starting a multi-part overview of Goldman Sachs' Electronic Trading client-focused product suite, to demonstrate just how extensively embedded in modern market architecture are Goldman's various DMA and "liquidity" facilitation schemes, and the depths of dark pool domination via Goldman's global order router, and other specific topical offerings.

Goldman Sachs Electronic Trading; overview; Part 1; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Sun 2009-10-11 15:55 EDT

The Speculative Bubble in Equities and the Case for Deflation, Stagflation and Implosion

Jesse

As part of their program of 'quantitative easing' which is another name for currency devaluation through extraordinary expansion of the monetary base, the Fed has very obviously created an inflationary bubble in the US equity market...The monetary stimulus of the Fed and the Treasury to help the economy is similar to relief aid sent to a suffering Third World country. It is intercepted and seized by a despotic regime and allocated to its local warlords, with very little going to help the people...quantitative easing that is not part of an overall program to reform, regulate, and renew the system to change and correct the elements that caused the crisis in the first place, is nothing more than a Ponzi scheme...The most probable path is a lingering death for the dollar over the next ten years, with a productive economy that continues to stagger forward under the rule of the financial oligarchs.

Case; deflation; Equities; implosion; Jesse's Café Américain; Speculative bubbles; Stagflation.

Wed 2009-09-16 19:21 EDT

Corrosive, stinking Chinese drywall may be radioactive - Los Angeles Times

The final years of the U.S. housing boom and a disastrous series of Gulf Coast hurricanes created a golden opportunity for Chinese drywall manufacturers. With domestic suppliers unable to keep up with demand, imports of Chinese drywall to the U.S. jumped 17-fold in 2006 from the year before. That imported drywall is now at the center of complaints of foul odors seeping from walls. Hundreds of homeowners, most in Florida, have also reported corrosion to their air conditioners, mirrors, electrical outlets and even jewelry. State and federal authorities have traced the problems to Chinese-made drywall but haven't yet fully determined the causes. Some Chinese experts, however, suspect that the culprit is a radioactive phosphorus substance -- phosphogypsum -- that is banned for construction use in the U.S. but has been used by Chinese manufacturers for almost a decade.(china, building materials, defective products, health hazards)

corrosive; Los Angeles Times; Radioactive; stinking Chinese drywall.