zero hedge Thu 2009-12-17 10:37 EST

Is Selling US CDS A Risk-Free Way To Short The Dollar?

There has been much conjecture on whether using CDS is an effective way to hedge against US default risk. Many theoreticians, especially those of the post-March lows variety, have sprung up and are speculating that buying Credit Default Swaps on the US is ultimately a futile and pointless endeavor. The main argument: a US default would likely mean that interconnected dealers won't recognize contracts on a US default event, as they themselves will be out of business. Even if they continued to exist, like cockroaches in a postapocalyptic world, the collateral which backs derivatives is mostly US Treasurys: the same obligations that would end up being massively impaired...the US CDS seller syndicate could easily be one of the key sources of dollar short funding: with sellers pocketing euros and immediately going to market and selling dollars...a dollar-short unwind would probably have repercussions in the US CDS market. Not only would the dollar spike, but paradoxically US credit risk would probably widen dramatically...any unwind at the heart of the prevalent risk trade now: the massive dollar carry, would impact virtually every investment product, quite possibly in self-referential feedback loops. If correct, it merely shows how much more the Fed has at stake in keeping the dollar depressed than merely getting mom and pop to buy Amazon at $130/share. Losing control of the carry trade will be the systemic equivalent of allowing Lehman's book to be marked-to-market: a potentially complete collapse in systemic confidence, which would have such far ranging implications as the $300 trillion interest rate derivative market. And when sudden volatility reaches this product universe which is 6 times bigger than world GDP, the events from last year will seem like a dress rehearsal.

CDS; Dollar; Risk-Free Way; sell; short; Zero Hedge.

Jesse's Café Américain Thu 2009-12-17 10:11 EST

Is the Price of World Silver the Result of Legitimate Market Discovery?

Jesse

Ted Butler: ...the concentrated short position in COMEX silver futures is so extreme, that it is hard to imagine how it can be resolved in an orderly manner. The most recent data from the CFTC indicate that one US bank, JPMorgan, now holds 200 million ounces net short in COMEX silver futures, fully 40% of the entire net short position on the COMEX (minus spreads). As I have previously written, JPMorgan accounted for 100% of all new short selling in COMEX silver futures for September and October, some 50 million additional ounces...So extreme is JPMorgan's silver short position that it cannot be closed out in an orderly fashion...As extreme as JPMorgan's position is, there is a total true net short position of 500 million ounces (100,000 contracts) in COMEX silver futures. Try to put that 500 million ounce short position in perspective. It equals 75% of world annual mine production, much higher than seen in any other commodity.

Jesse's Café Américain; Legitimate Market Discovery; Price; resulting; World Silver.

The Guardian World News Wed 2009-11-25 10:31 EST

What was really behind the crash?

John Cassidy

In an exclusive extract from his new book, John Cassidy explains why the huge salaries of Wall Street bosses created a culture that helped trigger the financial crisis...In the wake of last year's crash, even some top bankers have conceded that Wall Street remuneration schemes lead to excessive risk-taking...But without direct government involvement, the effort to reform Wall Street compensation won't survive the next market upturn. For although the financial sector as a whole has an interest in controlling rampant short-termism and irresponsible risk-taking, individual firms have an incentive to hire away star traders from any rivals that have introduced pay limits. Compensation reforms, therefore, are bound to break down. In this case, as in many others, the only way to reach a socially desirable outcome is to enforce compliance. And the only body that can do that is the government.

Crash; Guardian World News; really.

Wed 2009-11-25 09:59 EST

Hussman Funds - Weekly Market Comment: "Should Come as No Shock to Anyone" - November 16, 2009

John P. Hussman

The big picture is this. There is most probably a second wave of mortgage defaults in the immediate future as a result of Alt-A and Option-ARM resets. Yet our capacity to deal with these losses has already been strained by the first round that largely ended in March. The Federal Reserve has taken a massive amount of mortgage-backed securities onto a balance sheet that used to be restricted to Treasury securities. The purchase of these securities is reflected by a surge in cash reserves held by banks. Not only are the banks not lending these funds, they are contracting their loan portfolios rapidly. Ultimately, in order to unwind the Fed's position in these securities, it will have to sell them back to the public and absorb those excess reserves, so to some extent, the banking system can count on losing the deposits created by the Fed's actions, and can't make long-term loans with these funds anyway. Increasingly, the Fed has decided to forgo the idea of repurchase agreements (which require the seller to repurchase the security at a later date), and is instead making outright purchases of the debt of government sponsored enterprises (GSEs such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). Again, the Fed used to purchase only Treasuries outright, but it is purchasing agency securities with the excuse that these securities are implicitly backed by the U.S. government. This strikes me as a huge mistake, because it effectively impairs the Fed's ability to get rid of the securities at the price it paid for them, should Congress change its approach toward the GSEs. It simultaneously complicates Congress' ability to address the problem because Bernanke has tied the integrity of our monetary base to these assets. The policy of the Fed and Treasury amounts to little more than obligating the public to defend the bondholders of mismanaged financial companies, and to absorb losses that should have been borne by irresponsible lenders. From my perspective, this is nothing short of an unconstitutional abuse of power, as the actions of the Fed (not to mention some of Geithner's actions at the Treasury) ultimately have the effect of diverting public funds to reimburse private losses, even though spending is the specifically enumerated power of the Congress alone.

2009; comes; Hussman Funds; November 16; shocks; weekly market comments.

Bruce Krasting Thu 2009-11-19 10:52 EST

FHFA's DeMarco Speaks - Ouch!

Bruce Krasting

FHFA's Acting Director Edward DeMarco provided written testimony to the Senate today. I would give his presentation a B+. There is little room for optimism in this story. Mr. DeMarco did not gloss that fact over. A few snips from that speech: -From July 2007 through the first half of 2009--combined losses at Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac totaled $165 billion. In the first half of 2009, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac together reported net losses of $47 billion. -Since the establishment of the conservatorships, the combined losses at the two Enterprises depleted all their capital and required them to draw $96 billion. The combined support from the federal government exceeds $1 trillion. -The short-term outlook for the Enterprises remains troubled and likely will require additional draws...

Bruce Krasting; FHFA's DeMarco Speaks; Ouch.

zero hedge Thu 2009-11-19 10:36 EST

Bob (Janjuah) Is Back... And He Is Pissed

Near term I think the battle will be between Central Bankers, who deep down, and I think privately at least, FEAR bubbles, FEAR failure and FEAR FORCED abandonment if current policies are persisted with too long and/or added to, vs Fiscal Authorities, who by definition want short-term fixes (there is after all an election cycle in the UK & in the US next yr). This is like a rumble in the jungle between the VOLCKER-ites and the GREENSPAN-ites, with GREENSPAN representing the Fiscal Authorities (he was after all surely the most politicised central banker ever). Are the Volcker-ites up to a fight? I think so. I hope so. Kevin feels and I FEAR however that they aren't/they won't. In which case MORE policy and then, very soon thereafter DISASTER, will follow. In this rumble the inevitable outcome is deflation and multi-yr austerity.

Bob; Janjuah; piss; Zero Hedge.

Thu 2009-11-19 10:14 EST

Business & Technology | Part two | WaMu: Hometown bank turned predatory | Seattle Times Newspaper

David Heath

What few people knew was that bank executives crafted a radical new business strategy in 2003 that was intended to boost profits. The new WaMu used huge sales commissions and misleading marketing to hawk risky and overpriced loans to borrowers. In short, WaMu became one of the nation's biggest predatory lenders. The strategy eventually failed, not only bringing down Washington Mutual but deceiving borrowers, costing thousands their homes. In particular, the bank promoted as its "signature loan" a complex product known as the option ARM. This adjustable-rate mortgage, much like a credit card, gave borrowers the choice of making low minimum payments. But that option didn't cover the interest and only dug them deeper into debt.

business; Hometown bank turned predatory; part; Seattle Times Newspaper; Technology; WaMu.

Jesse's Café Américain Tue 2009-11-03 20:15 EST

The US Dollar Rally of 2008: The Consequence of a Bull Market in Fraud

Jesse

The theory of a short squeeze in Eurodollars which we had first put forward last year "The Dollar Rally and Deflationary Imbalances in the US Dollar Holdings of Overseas Banks" seems to be confirmed by this paper from the NY Federal Reserve bank, and the latest figures on cross border currency transactions from the BIS...the latest data from BIS shows that the dollar rally tracked the acquisition of eurodollars with a significant correlation...But much of the European outrage, as least, was in feeling that they had been 'set up' by the very banks that had sold them the foully rated instruments in the first place. A classic face ripping, as they say at Wall and Broad. And this similar to the reason is why the Chinese government declared that its own institutions could walk away from derivatives arrangements that had been sold to them by the Wall Street wiseguys under false pretenses. US towns and states are not so fortunate it appears...The foreign banks have now unwound a significant amount of the dodgy US dollar financial assets that caused the short squeeze through their fraudulent valuations.

2008; Bull Markets; consequences; Dollar Rally; fraud; Jesse's Café Américain.

zero hedge Tue 2009-11-03 19:57 EST

Guest Post: Systemic Risk is All About Innovation and Incentives: Ed Kane

Edward J. Kane vi Chris Whalen

...we present the views of our friend and mentor Ed Kane of Boston College, who argues that the problem with the financial regulatory framework is not the law, regulation nor even the regulators, but rather the confluence of poorly aligned incentives and financial innovation... The financial crisis of 2007-2009 is the product of a regulation-induced short-cutting and near elimination of private counterparty incentives to perform adequate due diligence along the chain of transactions traversed in securitizing and re-securitizing risky loans (Kane, 2009a). The GLBA [Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999] did make it easier for institutions to make themselves more difficult to fail and unwind. But it did not cause due-diligence incentives to break down in lending and securitization, nor did it cause borrowers and lenders to overleverage themselves. Still, the three phenomena share a common cause. Excessive risk-taking, regulation-induced innovation, and the lobbying pressure that led to the GLBA trace to subsidies to risk-taking that are protected by the political and economic challenges of monitoring and policing the safety-net consequences of regulation-induced innovation. These challenges and the limited liability that their stockholders and counterparties enjoy make it easy for clever managers of large institutions to extract implicit subsidies to leveraged risk-taking from national safety nets (Kane, 2009b)...To reduce the threat of future crises, the pressing task is not to rework bureaucratic patterns of financial regulation, but to repair defects in the incentive structure under which private and government supervisors manage a nation's financial safety net.

Ed Kane; Guest Post; incentives; innovation; systemic risk; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-27 11:13 EDT

Guest Post: Global Rebalancing: The G20 and Bernanke Versions

Richard Alford, a former economist at the New York Fed

What was achieved at the G20 meeting in Pittsburgh to help restore global economic balance? The short answer: nothing of any substance as reflected in the conspicuous absent of any mention of two subjects, i.e. currency adjustments and protectionism.

Bernanke Versions; G20; Global Rebalancing; Guest Post; naked capitalism.

zero hedge Mon 2009-10-26 09:28 EDT

How The Federal Reserve Bailed Out The World

The Bank of International Settlements [BIS] just released a major paper titled "The US dollar shortage in global banking and the international policy response" which goes on to demonstrate just how it happened that Fed chief Ben Bernanke in essence bailed out the entire developed world, which was facing an unprecedented dollar shortage crisis due to the sudden implosion of FX swap lines and other mechanisms which until that point were critical in maintaining the dollar funding shortfall for virtually every foreign Central Bank...When the financial system almost imploded in the fall of 2008, one of the primary responses by the Federal Reserve was the issuance of an unprecedented amount of FX liquidity lines in the form of swaps to foreign Central Banks. The number went from practically zero to a peak of $582 billion on December 10, 2008. The number of swaps outstanding was almost directly inversely correlated with the value of the dollar...what happened is that short-term sources to sustain the massive dollar funding mismatch disappeared virtually overnight, and CBs were suddenly facing a toxic spiral of selling increasingly more worthless assets merely to satisfy currency funding needs in an environment where all of a sudden nobody was willing to provide FX swap lines...had the Fed not stepped in, the rest of the world...would have simply collapsed as the $6.5 trillion dollar funding gap closed in on itself, causing a indiscriminate selling off of all dollar denominated assets. The implosion of the basis trade would have seemed like a picnic compared to what was about to ensue had the Fed not stepped in to perpetuate the Fiat banking way of life.

Federal Reserve bail; world; Zero Hedge.

Mon 2009-10-26 09:13 EDT

Wall Street's Naked Swindle : Rolling Stone

Matt Taibbi

A scheme to flood the market with counterfeit stocks helped kill Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers -- and the feds have yet to bust the culprits. [naked short selling]

Rolling Stone; Wall Street's Naked Swindle.

Credit Writedowns Fri 2009-10-23 08:57 EDT

US angling to get Chinese to revalue renminbi

In what looks to be a central line of attack in the quest to re-balance the global economy, the Treasury Department has ratcheted up the rhetoric against China's currency peg. The Treasury's semiannual report to Congress slammed the Chinese for their lack of exchange rate `flexibility,' but stopped well short of accusing the Chinese of currency 'manipulation' as Tim Geithner had claimed...[dollar losing reserve currency status]

angle; Chinese; credit writedowns; revalue renminbi.

The Big Picture Wed 2009-10-14 11:36 EDT

Andy Xie: Here We Go Again

Former Morgan Stanley Analyst Andy Xie explains why China is a potential bubble: [Consider] the US Savings and Loans crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The US Federal Reserve kept monetary policy loose to help the banking system. The dollar went into a prolonged bear market. During the descent, Asian economies that pegged their currencies to the dollar could increase money supply and lending without worrying about devaluation, but the money couldn't leave home due to the dollar's poor outlook, so it went into asset markets. When the dollar began to rebound in 1996, Asian economies came under tightening pressure that burst their asset bubbles. The collapsing asset prices triggered capital outflows that reinforced asset deflation. Asset deflation destroyed their banking systems. In short, the US banking crisis created the environment for a credit boom in Asia. When US banks recovered, Asian banks collapsed. Is China heading down the same path? There are many anecdotes to support the comparison. Property prices in Southeast Asia became higher than those in the US, but ``experts'' and government officials had stories to explain it, even though their per capita income was one-tenth that of the US. Their banks also commanded huge market capitalizations, as financial markets extended their growth ad infinitum. The same thing is happening in China today. When something seems too good to be true, it is. World trade -- the engine of global growth -- has collapsed. Employment is still contracting throughout the world. There are no realistic scenarios for the global economy to regain high and sustainable growth. China is an export-driven economy. Bank lending can support the economy for a short time, however, stocks are as expensive as during the heydays of the last bubble. Like all previous bubbles, this one, too, will burst.

Andy Xie; Big Picture; Go.

zero hedge Tue 2009-10-13 20:07 EDT

Global Central Banks Join The "Short Dollar" Bandwagon

A recent piece by Barclay's Steven Englander demonstrates how everybody and the kitchen sink is soundly amused by Geithner's call for a strong dollar. "The IMF Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves data suggest that central banks are doing more than talking about reducing the concentration of USD in their reserve portfolios. They are actually acting on their statements." [dollar losing reserve currency status]

bandwagon; Global Central Banks Join; short dollar; Zero Hedge.

naked capitalism Tue 2009-10-13 19:53 EDT

Central Banks Diversifying Away from Greenback

Sentiment on the dollar is very bearish, and its long-term outlook is not promising at all. But this could point to either another leg down (the beginning of a disorderly slide that many observers worry about) or could also produce a snapback rally if an unexpected rise led to short covering (particularly if equities markets rallies were to fade and lead investors to seek cover until the dust settled in Treasuries). [dollar losing reserve currency status]

Central Banks Diversifying; greenback; naked capitalism.